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| Project RISE | 1 |
| The Organized Crime Study . | 5 |
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| Background | 9 |
| Summary of Findings | 13 |
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| Recommendations . | 23 |
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In 1999 the IBT General Executive Board approved an ambitious plan to keep organized crime out of the Teamsters and, in the words of General President James E Hoffa, "run a clean union:" Since then the plan has evolved into a comprehensive anti-corruption program under the name "Project RISE," which stands for "Respect, Integrity, Strength, and Ethics."
Contrary to public perceptions, only a minority of Teamster locals have ever been linked to racketeering and even in places where organized crime influence was strongest most Teamsters were victims, not collaborators. Nevertheless, for more than a generation, the image of the Teamsters as a union dominated by organized crime has been embedded in American popular culture. Project RISE reflects the Teamsters' determination to clean up the union and never again permit a corrupt few to tarnish its reputation.
To build and maintain a strong anti-racketeering culture within the union, Project RISE has focused on four principal tasks: setting clear standards of conduct; educating all Teamsters about these standards; establishing fair and impartial processes for enforcing the standards; and identifying and removing any remaining organized crime influence.
To accomplish its goals, Project RISE utilized a task force comprised of Teamsters representing diverse positions, geographical locations, ethnic backgrounds, and viewpoints, as well as outside advisors with a wide variety of relevant expertise. The primary supervisor of the project, Edwin H. Stier, specialized in organized crime and corruption cases as a federal prosecutor and later headed New Jersey's Division of Criminal Justice. In 1987 Stier became the court-appointed trustee of Teamster Local 560 in New Jersey, a position he held until 1999, when the court found the local to have been purged of the organized crime influence that led to the trusteeship.
Local 560 was arguably the most mob-dominated Teamster local in the country and the successful effort to reform it helped inspire Project RISE. One of Project RISE's objectives is to apply the techniques and principles that worked in the case of Local 560 on a nationwide basis. The lessons and insights gained from the Local 560 experience have been used by the Project RISE team in the ongoing process of formulating new standards of conduct for the Teamsters Union and appropriate enforcement procedures.
Stier worked closely with the Project RISE Board of Advisors, composed of persons whose backgrounds included prominent positions in law enforcement, labor, government, and academia:
2 The Teamsters: Perception and Reality
Project RISE 3
Project RISE internal reforms are built upon the premise that the Teamsters have an obligation to confront the union's organized crime legacy and take appropriate remedial action. Understanding the nature and history of the Teamster relationship with organized crime is important to the reform effort. Accordingly, beginning in 1999, the union undertook an in-depth study of both the history and current status of the Teamster relationship with organized crime. The results of that study, which are summarized in this volume, are described in a 641-page report.
The organized crime study and report are designed to be an integral part of Project RISE. In essence, the reforms being implemented by Project RISE are derived from the experience of the past, both good and bad, and specifically include the lessons learned from the union's past relationship with organized crime. The current reforms are part of the IBT's attempt to build up the strongest possible internal defenses to racketeering influence.
The organized crime report, it is hoped, will help appropriate law enforcement agencies-as well as interested members of the public and their elected representatives determine whether and to what extent the current government monitoring of the union remains necessary. More important, an accounting is long overdue to the millions of Teamsters who have been stereotyped by the union's organized crime legacy and by a one-sided public image that has been shaped almost entirely by outsiders. This study and report mark the first time that the Teamsters Union, acting through its elected leadership, has undertaken a full self-assessment to confront the truth about the extent to which racketeers infiltrated the union in the past and whether they continue to do so today.
The organized crime study was conducted by a team with extensive experience in the investigation and prosecution of organized crime and labor racketeering in the locales they studied, as well as expertise in other relevant areas. In addition to Stier and other attorneys from Stier, Anderson & Malone, LLC, the study team included 19 field representatives, all former federal and state law enforcement agents, headed by former FBI agent James M. Kossler. These representatives conducted the field studies that were used to assess the current status of Teamster involvement with organized crime, as described in the report. Among these representatives were:
James M, Kossler-spent over 23 years as an FBI special agent. During that time he was the Organized Crime Program Manager for the District of
5
6 The Teamsters: Perception and Reality
New Jersey until he was promoted to the position of Coordinating Supervisor-Organized Crime for the FBI in New York City. Kossler supervised the investigation into the Cosa Nostra infiltration of Teamsters Local 560 and was responsible for initiating the investigation that led to the civil actions taken to rid the Teamsters of organized crime. He has lectured on organized crime matters throughout the United States and has testified as an expert witness for the government on numerous occasions.
Joseph A. Caiola-has over 32 years of law enforcement and security related experience. He retired from the New York City Police Department (NYPD) where his career included serving as the unit chief of a joint FBI/NYPD labor racketeering task force. He served as market manager for the Fulton Street Fish Market after federal authorities intervened to break up organized crime control of that industry. Caiola left government service as the director of the Criminal Investigations Bureau of the New York State Banking Commission.
James C. Dooley - has 25 years experience as an FBI special agent and supervisor. During his assignment to the Newark office of the FBI he handled some of the most complex and sensitive investigations involving organized crime, corruption, and labor racketeering. Dooley developed a great deal of the evidence that led to the prosecution of Anthony Provenzano and others and their corruption of Teamsters Local 560, and was the New Jersey case agent on the disappearance of James R Hoffa,
Robert E DeBellis - was an FBI special agent for more than 31 years, during which he was honored numerous times for his achievements, including the Attorney General's Award for Excellence in Law Enforcement. DeBellis was the foremost expert in the FBI in the area of theft from interstate shipments and has lectured on the subject on numerous occasions.
Patrick J Foran-retired from the FBI with 35 years of experience in law enforcement. He began his career conducting organized crime and labor racketeering investigations in Cleveland, Ohio. He spent several years as an organized crime unit chief at FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. until he was made the Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Las Vegas Office of the FBI. Foran transferred to the FBI Academy were he taught organized crime investigations to new agents and law enforcement personnel. He then became the head of a newly created unified intelligence section. He was the FBI personnel officer at the time of his retirement.
Richard W. Houston-was with the FBI for 25 years. Of that time he spent 18 years investigating organized crime in Chicago, Illinois. Houston was
The Organized Crime Study 7
the case agent assigned to the disappearance of James R Hoffa and was the lead investigator into the probe of Cosa Nostra control over various Teamster locals in Chicago. He was also the administrative case agent on the prosecution of labor racketeer Allen M. Dorfman.
Martin E McCann, Jr. - served in the FBI for 26 years. He was a supervisory special agent at the time of his retirement and was responsible for organized crime investigations in Cleveland, Ohio. McCann supervised several investigations involving the Teamsters and members of Cosa Nostra and was responsible for developing extensive information about those relationships.
J. Bruce Mouw-spent over 20 years as the supervisory special agent charged with investigation of the Gambino crime family. During that time the power of the family diminished as a result of numerous prosecutions of its hierarchy. Mouw was responsible for the successful investigation of John Gotti, then head of the Gambino family. In addition, Mouw supervised the investigation that uncovered the Gambino family infiltration and control of Teamsters Local 282. He received the Attorney General's Award for Excellence.
Donald V North-was an FBI special agent for over 32 years, during which he conducted and directed organized crime investigations in Las Vegas, Newark, and New York City. Prior to his assignment as Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Organized Crime Branch in New York City, North was the unit chief of the La Cosa Nostra/Labor Racketeering unit at FBI headquarters.
Francis J. Storey-had a 27-year career with the FBI and was the supervisor of the labor racketeering squad in the FBI's Philadelphia office; Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Organized Crime Branch of the New York FBI office; Chief of the Organized Crime Section at FBI headquarters; Special Agent in Charge of the Kansas City FBI office; and Deputy Assistant Director in Charge of the New York office at the time of his retirement.
In the aggregate, the study team and the Project RISE advisors provided as comprehensive a reservoir of knowledge and expertise concerning organized crime, the Teamsters, and related issues as has ever been assembled. Individual members of this group included, for example, the chief architect of the RICO statute; the key FBI agents who first applied that statute to organized crime and industrial-labor racketeering investigations, including those involving the Teamsters; the federal prosecutor who first used the RICO statute to gain control over the most mob-controlled Teamster local in the country; and the court appointed trustee of that local.
On June 28, 1988, the U.S. government filed a civil RICO suit alleging that organized crime figures, specifically the "Commission of La Cosa Nostra" and its members and associates, had corrupted the Teamsters. The lawsuit brought into focus the union's relationship with a powerful criminal organization that exploited many American institutions during the twentieth century. (See Organized Crime Court Decisions)
The events and circumstances that brought the Teamsters and the government together as adversaries in the 1988 lawsuit began in the late 1950s, during the same period when the existence of the Cosa Nostra syndicate was coming to light. In 1957 a U.S. Senate committee chaired by Senator John McClellan began a lengthy investigation into labor management issues that centered around allegations against the Teamsters. Led by its counsel, Robert E Kennedy, the committee first targeted IBT General President Dave Beck. Politically crippled by revelations of financial improprieties, Beck decided not to seek reelection and delegates to the IBT's 1957 convention chose James R (Jimmy) Hoffa to succeed him. By that time, Hoffa had also replaced Beck as the McClellan Committee's chief target.
The McClellan Committee's hearings and reports put a national spotlight on Teamster-gangster relationships and were extremely important in shaping the public perception of the union. The committee's hearings occurred during the early years of television and coincided with dramatic revelations about organized crime. Perhaps most important, the thinking and future priorities of Robert Kennedy were shaped by his work with the committee. In 1961 Kennedy became U.S. attorney general after his brother John was elected president and he immediately launched a vigorous campaign against organized crime. A high priority in that campaign was to continue investigating the allegations of Teamster corruption and ties to organized crime that Kennedy had pursued during his service with the McClellan Committee. The main focus of Kennedy's efforts continued to be Hoffa, with whom Kennedy had clashed repeatedly during the committee's investigation.
By the 1960s, Hoffa had become the best known and most powerful leader the Teamsters ever had. His organizing and bargaining achievements were substantial and he enjoyed great popularity within the union. Hoffa, however, made no secret about his dealings with underworld figures and Kennedy believed Hoffa's removal from office was essential to free the union from organized crime influence. Accordingly, Kennedy made it U.S. government policy to put Hoffa in jail and mobilized enormous resources to that end. For a time, Hoffa successfully resisted the federal government's campaign against him, but in 1964 he was convicted in two criminal trials and was imprisoned in 1967. He
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10 The Teamsters: Perception and Reality
left the powers of the general presidency in the hands of a trusted aide, Frank E. Fitzsimmons.
The intense struggle between Kennedy and Hoffa polarized relations between the Teamsters and the federal government and contributed heavily to the public perception of the union that persists to this day.
Later events, such as revelations about the U.S. government's own dealings with mobsters, undermined the moralistic tone and simplistic, one-dimensional view of Hoffa and the Teamsters that underlay Kennedy's campaign, but they also confirmed its essential premise-that the union was infiltrated by racketeers.
Even Hoffa, the primary target of Kennedy's campaign, eventually expressed this conclusion. Ironically, by 1975, when Hoffa was fighting to regain the IBT general presidency after his release from prison, he was making allegations against the then current Teamster leadership that are remarkably similar to what the government would later allege in its 1988 RICO complaint. An autobiography published shortly after Hoffa's 1975 disappearance documented views Hoffa had been openly espousing and which undoubtedly contributed to his demise. Hoffa presented a withering indictment of the Teamsters as administered under Fitzsimmons, the man Hoffa had left in charge when he went to prison but who later became a bitter enemy and rival for power. For example, he accused Fitzsimmons of "selling out to mobsters and letting known racketeers into the Teamsters" and "making vast loans from the billion-dollar Teamster pension fund to known mobsters:"
Hoffa made it clear that he was not intimidated by the mobsters who were allegedly keeping Fitzsimmons in power: "Well, mobsters be damned! There is evidence that no less than 83 percent of the membership is behind me and when I am back you can be damned sure that heads will roll:"
On July 30, 1975, Hoffa disappeared, almost certainly murdered by some of the very racketeers referred to in his above-quoted statements. Nevertheless Hoffa's prediction that mobster heads would roll came true-his disappearance became a major turning point in government efforts to combat organized crime and labor racketeering. Using the impetus provided by this event, the FBI and other agencies conducted aggressive anti-racketeering operations that eventually crippled many organized crime networks and virtually eliminated some of them.
In the short run, however, Hoffa's disappearance reinforced the climate of fear and intimidation that allowed mobsters to maintain their influence in certain parts of the union. It sent an especially clear message to members of lBT Local 560, headquartered in Union City, New Jersey. From the outset, Anthony (Tony Pro) Provenzano, a member of the Genovese organized crime family who had controlled Local 560 since the 1950s, was a prime suspect in Hoffa's
Background 11
murder. He was also suspected (and later convicted) of having eliminated a rival member of Local 560, Anthony Castellitto, in a manner chillingly similar to Hoffa's case: in June 1961 Castellitto disappeared and his body was never recovered. Two years later another outspoken member of Local 560 was murdered shortly after the man argued with Anthony Provenzano's brother, Salvatore (Sammy Pro) Provenzano, who was also a Local 560 official. Soon there were no rivals bold enough to challenge the Provenzanos and their associates. More than 25 years later, even after Local 560 was being run by a court appointed trustee and Anthony Provenzano was dead, the memory of the 1960s murders and other acts of brutality still inhibited union members from exercising their rights.
Provenzano and his associates continued to control Local 560 long after Hoffa's disappearance, but the changes resulting from that event ultimately brought powerful allies to the side of those Teamsters who were dissatisfied with the local's mob-controlled hierarchy. In 1982 the U.S. attorney for New Jersey, in a precedent-setting use of the RICO statute, sought an order placing Local 560 under court supervision until it could be cleansed of organized crime influence. Beginning in 1986, Local 560 was run by a court-appointed trustee. As noted, from 1987 to 1999 that trustee was Stier, who worked closely with federal prosecutors, FBI investigators, labor experts, and others who were part of the struggle to rid the union of mob influence.
Although it took more than a decade, the effort to restore control of Local 560 to its law abiding members was successful. In February 1999, acting on the joint recommendation of the trustee and the U.S. attorney, a federal court in New Jersey entered an order terminating the trusteeship, stating, "[I]n the final analysis ... the real heroes of this story are the members of this union. They wrested control of Local 560 from these evildoers who had exploited them for so many years .... Yes, they had substantial support from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Attorney's Office, and the Department of Labor, but in the final analysis, it is a job they had to do."
Using the evidence and experience gained through the Local 560 case and other anti-racketeering initiatives during the 1980s, Rudolph W Giuliani, at the time the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, filed the 1988 RICO lawsuit against the IBT. Giuliani stated that the lawsuit's objective was to impose court oversight on the union "only for so long as necessary to eliminate organized crime's influence over the Teamsters, to put permanent reforms into place, and to return control of the Teamsters to the many honest working men and women of the union:"
The government's portrayal of the Teamsters in this 1988 RICO complaint tended to confirm the already well-established public image of a union held captive by mobsters - one whose leaders, in the government's words, had made a
12 The Teamsters: Perception and Reality
"devil's pact" with the underworld. Nevertheless, the proposed remedy for this problem, government control of a major union, was so controversial that even dissident Teamster reformers opposed such a takeover. Playing upon this widely shared opposition, the IBT leadership mounted an extensive public relations and lobbying campaign which, among other things, secured the signatures of 269 members of Congress on a petition against the proposed government intervention. On the eve of trial, however, the Teamster leaders decided not to test the government's allegations in court. Instead, in 1989 the IBT agreed to allow -and to pay for- a stringent government oversight program that is still in effect.
The 1989 settlement of the government's lawsuit was embodied in a consent decree that imposed an indefinite period of government monitoring on the IBT and required specific changes in its constitution and procedures. One category of major changes concerned the election of the general president and other IBT officers. Previously, such officers were chosen by the delegates to IBT conventions, most of whom were local union officers. Beginning in 1991, they were to be chosen by direct secret vote of the membership. The 1991 election was to be conducted under the supervision of special officers selected by the government.
The changes in the electoral process, however, brought new problems and disappointments as well as benefits. Conducting a nationwide campaign for rank-and-file votes in a union with 1.4 million members requires extensive fundraising, thereby creating both a new potential vehicle for internal abuse and an opportunity for outsiders with corrupt motivations to gain a foothold in the union. That potential was soon realized. In 1997, Ron Carey, whose 1991 election as IBT general president had raised such high hopes for reform, was found to have been responsible for a scheme to use IBT funds for his own 1996 reelection campaign. This led to Carey's expulsion from the union, the criminal convictions of persons involved in his campaign, and a re-run election in 1998, which James P. Hoffa won.
A second major feature of the consent decree was the creation of an outside investigating body and reviewing agency, both designed to combat racketeer influence. After the 1991 election, the outside reviewing agency was reconstituted as the Independent Review Board (IRB). It consists of three members, one selected by the government, one by the union, and one to be agreed upon by the government and union representatives. The IRB was given the power to initiate charges for violations of the IBT Constitution (as revised by the consent decree) and to exercise the power of the general president in interpreting the constitution. The IRB can also hold hearings and impose sanctions for violations, although the usual procedure is for it to refer charges to the IBT for appropriate action and then to review the adequacy of such action. IRB decisions must be approved by the federal district court in New York with jurisdiction over the case.
Three factors principally determine whether and to what extent the Teamsters are vulnerable to racketeer influence: first, the strength of the union's internal commitment and ability to resist such influence; second, the strength of the organized crime forces motivated to corrupt and exploit the union; and third, the actions (or inaction) of government agencies in response to the threat posed by organized crime. Racketeers are most likely to gain or keep a foothold in the union when organized crime forces targeting the Teamsters are strong, the union's internal commitment to keeping them out is weak, and the government fails to support, or, worse, undermines anti-racketeering measures. Conversely, the likelihood of any serious racketeering influence on the union is greatly diminished when the union has strong internal defenses to racketeering, including a committed leadership, clear standards of conduct, and adequate mechanisms for enforcement; when the external threat posed by racketeers has been weakened; when the government consistently plays a positive role in combating organized crime and providing fair and impartial support to internal reform efforts; and when the union's relationship with government agencies is a healthy and cooperative one.
Conclusions Relating to Past Organized Crime Influence
The history of the Teamster relationship with organized crime is complex. Some Teamster participants in that history, like some outside the union, were either genuine heroes or genuine villains. For the most part, however the story of organized crime and the Teamsters is not a morality play. Instead, its central lesson is that under the right combination of economic, political, cultural, and historical circumstances, a relatively small group of racketeers can infiltrate and exploit a large institution overwhelmingly comprised of decent, ordinary people.
Other societal institutions contributed heavily to the success of racketeering schemes, which often began in the industries and geographic markets the Teamsters served, not in the union itself. Thus, the term "labor racketeering" can be misleading in its emphasis on the role unions played in advancing the interests of racketeers. Criminals not only controlled and influenced private businesses, markets, and entire industries, but also undermined key civic institutions and benefited from their inaction. Local law enforcement was often corrupt, gangsters had burrowed into political organizations and compromised public officials, and for many years the federal government virtually ignored organized crime. Under these favorable conditions, criminal organizations and the Cosa Nostra crime syndicate in particular-flourished, especially in
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14 The Teamsters: Perception and Reality
urban centers such as New York and Chicago where a great many Teamster locals were situated. It was predominantly in such corrupt environments that organized crime infiltration of the Teamsters Union occurred.
Because influence over the Teamsters offered a rich variety of advantages to racketeers, criminal organizations made sustained and determined efforts to infiltrate the union during much of the twentieth century. Although many Teamster leaders and members resisted these efforts with varying degrees of success, racketeers succeeded in gaining and maintaining influence when their assault on the union was aided by the right combination of internal and external conditions.
Internal Conditions Facilitating Racketeer Influence
Morally dubious choices by individual leaders and members did, at times and places, constitute an internal weakness that facilitated infiltration of the union. From the beginning, however, there was also a strong tradition of opposition to racketeer influence. This was demonstrated early by the ultimately successful reform movement in which George Innis, one of the union's original founders, and Daniel J. Tobin, the IBT's second general president, played prominent roles in taking back control of the International from other Teamsters who were influenced by Chicago-based racketeers. As a result of their actions the International was free of corruption, was not associated with organized crime, and maintained a cooperative relationship with the U.S. government well into the 1950s.
More important than the morality of Teamster leaders were structural, historical, and cultural factors that, under certain external conditions, made the union more vulnerable to racketeer exploitation.
One such factor was the union's strong tradition of local autonomy. From the beginning, there were problems with local unions that were controlled by corrupt leaders with close ties to racketeers. Where such localized pockets of corruption and racketeer influence existed, three external conditions were almost invariably present. First, the industries and businesses that employed Teamsters were themselves dominated by racketeers; second, the political and social structures within which the Teamster locals had to operate, including the law enforcement apparatus, were either ineffective or dominated by racketeers; and third, the Teamsters occupied a strategic position in relevant industries and markets that made them an attractive target for the racketeers and their business and political confederates. It is no accident that racketeer influences were concentrated in Teamster locals in large eastern and midwestern urban centers such as New York and Chicago, where all of these conditions prevailed throughout much of the twentieth century. Without outside help, such as that occasionally provided by crusading prosecutors and reform-
Summary of Findings 15
minded local governments, the relatively weak International was ill-equipped to deal effectively with locals under the domination of powerful racketeers. Thus, once racketeers gained a foothold in autonomous Teamster locals they were difficult to dislodge. Compounding the problem, racketeer-influenced locals eventually comprised a significant part of the political base that elected IBT officers.
On the other hand, because Teamster locals operated relatively independent of each other and the International, the Mob's domination of one local did not automatically spread to others. Consequently, most Teamster locals were not controlled or influenced by mobsters, even when mob influence over the union as a whole reached its peak during the 1970s.
Other factors played a part in making the Teamsters more vulnerable to racketeers seeking to use the union for their own purposes. First, many Teamsters worked in relative isolation from one another, making it easier for racketeers to influence individuals and, once in power, to keep members uninformed about their activities. Second, especially after the 1930s, many Teamsters held unskilled or semiskilled jobs and were vulnerable to economic and other pressures. Third, in addition to facilitating mob intimidation tactics, the number and diversity of less-skilled jobs made it easier for racketeers to find positions in the union for themselves and their friends. Finally, the selection of international officers by convention delegates, who were primarily local officers, eventually helped racketeers exert influence disproportionate to their numbers. The system allowed them to work through a small number of power brokers over whom they had influence.
External Factors: The Growing Strength of the Mob
In the 1920s and 1930s, during Prohibition and its aftermath, gangsters affiliated with the newly emerging Cosa Nostra crime syndicate gained control over certain Teamster locals, predominantly in the New York and Chicago metropolitan areas. In later years, as the union and the Mob expanded in many of the same markets, Cosa Nostra-affiliated gangsters infiltrated more locals, spread their influence to other parts of the union, and were able to exploit the benefit funds established after World War II. Like earlier gangsters, Cosa Nostra hoodlums used a mixture of intimidation and appeals to self-interest to persuade unions and businesses to cooperate with their racketeering schemes.
As both organized crime and the Teamsters underwent parallel expansions in a rapidly changing economy, racketeer influence in the union took on greater significance for society as a whole. By the 1950s, organized crime penetration of the Teamsters had become a nationwide public issue, prompting government responses that eventually led to court-supervised monitoring of the union and severe damage to its reputation.
16 The Teamsters: Perception and Reality
The Vulnerability of Teamster-Organized Industries
An important external factor making organized crime infiltration of the Teamsters easier was the vulnerability of key markets and industries to mob domination. The trucking industry in particular was characterized by numerous small companies operating on thin profit margins that were susceptible to intimidation and were tempted by collusive schemes that promised relief from cutthroat competition. It was through such schemes, usually carried out by mob-dominated business associations, that some Teamster locals came under the influence of racketeers.
The Problem of Government Corruption
Cosa Nostra gangsters dominated the corrupt business and political environments that were already present in many urban centers and extended their influence into higher levels of government. Organized crime's influence in government facilitated mob infiltration of Teamster locals and made the elimination of existing racketeer influence in Teamster locals even more difficult to achieve. In New York during the 1930s, for example, two Teamster local officers who tried to resist the Mob were murdered and in each case their murderers went free at least in part because of the Mob's influence on the local political and law enforcement establishment.
Although local governments and crusading prosecutors were occasionally successful in jailing individual mobsters, they were almost totally unsuccessful in keeping the developing Cosa Nostra criminal syndicate at bay. Moreover, the one entity with the potential authority and resources to mount an effective campaign against the Mob-the U.S. government-was slow to enter the war against organized crime. Indeed, until the late 1950s, the most famous and widely respected law enforcement official in the country, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, denied the existence of a national criminal cartel and insisted that local law enforcement should be primarily responsible for fighting organized crime.
Revelations from congressional hearings during the 1950s and such widely publicized events as a conclave of key mob bosses in Apalachin, New York, in 1957 finally shook the federal government out of its lethargy. For years after the government's great awakening in the 1950s, however, its campaigns against organized crime were hampered by inadequate statutory and investigative tools, infighting among law enforcement agencies, and flawed theories of how best to combat the Mob. Additionally, corruption and mob influences in local governments continued to impede efforts to eradicate business-labor racketeering and other mob activities. Some questionable dealings with mobsters were not limited to local governments, but extended into the highest levels of the federal government as well. In the mid 1970s, for example, a U.S. Senate
Summary of Findings 17
investigation revealed that the government under two administrations had contracted with Cosa Nostra gangsters in an effort to assassinate a foreign leader. The Teamsters' own relationship with the federal government, which had been good until 1957, was dominated for years by a feud between Jimmy Hoffa and Robert Kennedy when the latter was counsel to a U.S. Senate committee investigating labor racketeering and later attorney general of the United States. The bitter, personal nature of the feud polarized relations between the union and federal law enforcement agencies for years to come, even after Hoffa and Kennedy were no longer in power. A different but equally unhealthy relationship developed between the Teamsters and the highest level of the federal government during the administration of President Richard M. Nixon, when Hoffa's successor as IBT general president, Frank Fitzsimmons, struck a questionable deal with the White House intended to keep Fitzsimmons in power at a time when organized crime influence in the union was at its peak. Still another kind of relationship between the Teamsters and federal authorities came to light during the 1980s when it was revealed that Jackie Presser, who became IBT general president in 1983, had been an FBI informant against the Mob since the 1970s. Most recently, General President Ron Carey was expelled from the Teamsters in connection with an investigation into a campaign contribution swapping scheme that may have involved individuals in both the national Democratic Party and President Clinton's administration.
Conclusions Relating to
Current Organized Crime Influence
Effects of Court-Supervised Monitoring
The efforts of the court-appointed monitors to remove racketeers from the places where they had succeeded in infiltrating the union were highly successful. In the first five years after monitoring began in 1989, more than 90 persons were expelled from the union for associating with or being members of organized crime. During the 1990s, virtually all Teamsters who were members or associates of Cosa Nostra or who had comparably overt ties to the Mob were purged from the union, as were many others with lesser connections to organized crime. The result was to deprive racketeers of the internal networks and power bases that over a period of many years had enabled Cosa Nostra gangsters to infiltrate the union. The purge of mob members and associates allowed Teamsters with no ties to organized crime to run formerly infiltrated local unions free from racketeer influence.
A second major achievement of the monitoring was to reform the union's system for electing the general president and other IBT officers. Before the reforms, these officers were chosen by delegates to IBT conventions, who were
18 The Teamsters: Perception and Reality
primarily local officers and business agents. The reforms mandated election of such officers by union members. These reforms have made it difficult if not impossible for a relatively small group of racketeers and their union allies to exert the kind of influence they were able to achieve at certain earlier points in the union's history. No longer can candidates for such offices operate through a small network of power brokers, some of whose mob connections allowed Cosa Nostra racketeers to exercise disproportionate influence in the union. Electoral reforms, however, also brought with them new problems. Candidates for top IBT offices must now conduct campaigns that in many respects resemble those for major public offices in the United States, which require large sums of money. This has increased the potential for fundraising improprieties.
The Weakening of the Cosa Nostra Crime Syndicate
One of the conditions justifying optimism that the Teamsters Union can avoid a repetition of the mob infiltration that occurred during the twentieth century is the current weakened state of the Cosa Nostra crime syndicate that was responsible for most of the organized crime influence within the union. While far from extinguished, particularly in New York and Chicago, the crime families that posed external threats to the Teamsters in the past have been seriously weakened, if not eliminated in some areas, by the law enforcement campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s, by other societal changes, and by deterioration in the crime families' own discipline and value systems. Consequently, the remaining Cosa Nostra gangsters no longer command the fear and respect that allow relatively small numbers of racketeers to dominate a much larger organization such as the Teamsters.
Apart from the general weakening of organized crime families, specific industries in which Teamsters operate have been substantially cleansed of racketeer influences, making it far less likely that Teamster locals in those sectors will be drawn into racketeering schemes. Additionally, many of today's Teamsters work in industries that have no historical relationship with organized crime.
The Government: From Part of the Problem to Part of the Solution
in addition to the law enforcement campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s, which had a direct effect on weakening the Mob, the role of governments in general has changed. All too often in the past, governments stood by while rack racketeers corrupted unions and other legitimate institutions; indeed, they sometimes took part in the corruption. Now government agencies, especially at the federal level, are much more likely to supply the authority and resources needed to combat powerful criminal organizations. State and local governments, which once sheltered mobsters as often as they took steps to control them, have
Summary of Findings 19
in many places, such as New York and New Jersey, become significant actors in the war against organized crime. Strengthened federal and state sanctions for official corruption have helped bring about this change. As a result, in many more localities than in the past, Teamsters who are confronted with gangster attempts to infiltrate their locals can turn not only to the federal government, but also to local authorities for assistance. Because honest unionists today have potential government allies not available to earlier generations, they need not suffer the fate of the New York Teamsters who were killed during the 1930s trying to resist a criminal organization that also controlled much of the surrounding political establishment.
Government authority has helped the Teamsters fight pockets of mob domination in the union through court-ordered monitorships, such as the ones imposed on New Jersey Local 560 and on several New York locals. While the monitorship remedy is controversial among unionists and is capable of being abused, successful monitorships such as Local 560's prove that it is possible to cleanse even the most mob-dominated locals of racketeer influence, transform their cultures so that such influence is unlikely to recur, and return control of the locals to their members. For outside monitors to be successful, however, they must both investigate matters related to organized crime influence and take appropriate enforcement actions and, equally important, help the union make whatever internal changes are needed to resume full responsibility for its own affairs.
Thus, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, all of the conditions that made the Teamsters Union vulnerable to organized crime penetration in the previous century had changed for the better: the union's commitment and ability to resist racketeering influence was at an all-time high; the Cosa Nostra crime syndicate that had infiltrated the union was significantly weakened; and governments at all levels were themselves less likely to be compromised by mobsters and had developed effective techniques for combating organized crime.
While all of the conditions that made the Teamsters Union vulnerable to exploitation by organized crime have changed for the better, like any organization of comparable size, complexity, and strategic position in the world of commerce, the Teamsters can expect to find within their ranks a certain number of people who are susceptible to various kinds of corruption. Under the right combination of circumstances, such people can form alliances with gangsters. Indeed, the field study uncovered limited instances of corrupt behavior by union personnel and variations in the degree to which some locals had made anti-racketeering reforms an institutionalized part of their cultures. Thus, the need for vigilance has by no means disappeared.
What marks a radical change from the past is not the total absence of instances of corruption in the union-a standard that few organizations, private
20 The Teamsters: Perception and Reality
or public, could meet-but instead a genuine commitment to anti-racketeering reforms coupled with the realistic ability to carry them out and the expectation that such efforts will be supported, when necessary, by government agencies.
In the past these two ingredients were seldom present at one time. Many Teamsters opposed racketeers, but did not have the resources to resist them effectively, especially in political, economic, and social environments dominated by the Mob. By the time effective outside help became consistently available as a result of law enforcement initiatives, racketeers had become so entrenched in a politically significant number of locals that extraordinary measures were required to uproot them. Consequently, when the Teamsters finally received the kind of external help needed to eradicate racketeer influence, it was imposed on them by the government.
Nevertheless, by removing a critical mass of racketeers and their associates, the government-imposed monitoring destroyed the Mob's political base in the union at the same time law enforcement successes were shattering the myth of mob invincibility. As a result, the Teamsters now face a much weakened enemy with far stronger anti-racketeering defenses than the union had in the past.
As part of the Project RISE reform program, a national field study was conducted which focused on all Teamster locals-a total of 80-that had some demonstrated historical connection to organized crime or were publicly alleged to have such a connection. The study, which was conducted by a team of field representatives experienced in investigating organized crime, labor-management racketeering, and related fields, confirmed the vast improvement that had occurred even among the most mob-dominated locals highlighted in the government's 1988 civil RICO complaint. Most of the 80 locals evidenced no organized crime control or influence but rather environments in which democratic processes appear to flourish and in which cultures antithetical to racketeering influence have emerged. These locals typically have open and regularly scheduled general membership meetings, disclosure regarding their financial status, fair grievance procedures, accountability of officers and members for their actions, and fair elections where opposition slates emerged with no fear of reprisal or retaliation. These internal controls make it highly unlikely that efforts by organized crime to infiltrate these locals could succeed.
Few of the remaining 80 locals studied had current unresolved problems warranting further investigation, and fewer still had current problems related to organized crime. Even in these cases, the kinds of problems encountered did not compare to those found in the mob-dominated locals of the past, where
Summary of Findings 21
there was systemic corruption and acts of violence in the local. Consequently, addressing the union's remaining organized crime-related problems will not require the far-reaching measures that were employed in former mob-dominated enclaves such as Local 560. The union itself can resolve today's diminished problems if it maintains a firm commitment to rooting out organized crime influence and continues to develop cooperative relationships with law enforcement agencies.
Although the study was based on 80 locals, information about possible organized crime influence or corruption elsewhere in the union was not ignored. In all instances in which problems relating to organized crime were identified, they were referred to appropriate law enforcement agencies and there are active investigations being conducted by law enforcement or the lBT or both.
Of note, the problems identified in the field study were found in an intentionally skewed sample of locals with a history of contact with organized crime. Largely forgotten during the many decades of Teamster associations with organized crime have been the hundreds of Teamster locals and uncounted numbers of Teamster members that were never associated in any way with organized crime. Officers and members of these locals-indeed, the overwhelming majority of members throughout the union-have conducted their business year after year with no more exposure to mobsters than might be obtained by the average follower of media accounts.
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Preventing racketeers from regaining the ground they have lost requires addressing key conditions that allowed organized crime to infiltrate the union during the twentieth century. Some of the steps necessary to prevent a resurgence of mob influence are wholly within the power of the union, while others can only be achieved with the cooperation of other institutions, such as law enforcement agencies.
Acknowledging Responsibility for the Past
Acknowledging the role Teamsters themselves played in allowing mobsters into their union is an important step toward building and maintaining a culture that is inhospitable to organized crime. Understanding the failures of the past can enable today's Teamsters to recognize the threats that will present themselves in the future. Moreover, the new standards of conduct, investigative and enforcement mechanisms, and other anti-racketeering measures being implemented by the union will be accepted more readily by a membership that understands the conditions that made them necessary.
The union has already taken significant steps toward confronting the truth about its connections to organized crime during the twentieth century. Indeed, the organized crime study summarized in this volume evidences the union's willingness to confront its past. As the anti-racketeering reform program initiated by the union goes forward, continued efforts should be made to educate Teamsters not only about the current standards and enforcement mechanisms, but about the historical conditions that made them necessary.
Carrying Out the Commitment to Run a Clean Union
As the organized crime report emphasizes, one of the three key conditions that determine whether and to what extent racketeers will be able to infiltrate the Teamsters is the strength of the union's own commitment to keeping them out.
Project RISE is the best indicator of the union's current commitment to combating organized crime and corruption. The anti-racketeering measures being developed under Project RISE are designed to provide the Teamsters Union with the standards, investigative capabilities, and enforcement mechanisms needed to deal with any current instances of racketeer influence, as well as any foreseeable future threats. If carried out with integrity, these reforms will go far toward reversing the long-standing public image of the Teamsters as a union allied with organized crime. Already, the self-policing being undertaken
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24 The Teamsters: Perception and Reality
by the Teamsters places the union in a leadership role among labor organizations and compares favorably with the internal compliance systems of most business corporations and other private entities.
The exact form and content of the union's internal defenses to racketeering can be expected to change and evolve with the benefit of experience and to reflect agreements that may be negotiated with appropriate law enforcement agencies. The basic principles of the reform program are sound, however, and adherence to them is the surest path to building and maintaining a stable antiracketeering culture.
Developing Healthy and Cooperative Relationships with Government Agencies
Even a union that accepts its own responsibility and is fully committed to internal anti-racketeering reforms can become vulnerable to organized crime penetration if the surrounding political, business, and social environments come to resemble those in which many Teamster locals operated during the twentieth century Thus, while the union's acceptance of responsibility for its own actions is necessary, it is not sufficient. Successful reforms also require other institutions, especially relevant industries and government agencies, to remain free of corruption and committed to resisting organized crime.
The Project RISE reforms contemplate the maintenance of healthy and cooperative relationships between the union and relevant federal, state, and local government agencies. The process of developing such relationships is well underway. When fully developed, these relationships will enable the union and the government to present a united front against business-labor racketeers after monitoring under the consent decree ends. There should be open lines of communication between Teamsters and the FBI and other federal, state, and local agencies that deal with organized crime and corruption. Establishing working relations with such agencies will provide the Teamsters of the twenty-first century a resource earlier generations all too often lacked: powerful allies to confront the external threat by organized criminal groups.
Forming effective anti-racketeering alliances with public agencies, however, presupposes that the relevant political and governmental institutions do not themselves become as corrupted as many were during the twentieth century, that they remain vigilant and committed to the ongoing fight against organized crime, and that they support the union's efforts to police itself.
As part of the effort to put the Teamsters' relationship with the federal government on a healthy footing, a strategy should be developed to end the current monitorship of the IBT. Ideally, such a strategy will emerge from an agreement between the union and the government that provides:
Recommendations 25
A sense among Teamsters that they have regained control over their union after dealing successfully with the problems that led to a period of extraordinary government intervention.
Adequate measures to protect the union and the public against future racketeer incursions.
An acceptance of responsibility by the union to ensure that organized crime influence and corruption are not tolerated.
Safeguarding Pension and Benefit Funds
Historically, access to pension and benefit funds was a major goal for racketeers seeking to infiltrate the union. Since the 1970s, federal legislation and government-monitored reforms have made it more difficult for racketeers to control such funds, but the vast amount of money in Teamster-related funds nearly $85 billion-make them attractive targets. While the funds are by law independent of the union and there are severe limitations on its ability to police them, the union nevertheless has a substantial interest in doing whatever it can to ensure their integrity. Accordingly, the organized crime study team recommended that the IBT take appropriate steps to upgrade its ability to monitor the many affiliated pension and health and welfare funds that have been established on behalf of Teamsters at local and regional levels. A benefits coordinator or other appropriate international officer or department should develop a plan to conduct such monitoring which could, for example, include informational services to alert fund fiduciaries to information germane to carrying out their responsibilities.
By adhering faithfully to the commitments and spirit of the current reform program, the Teamsters Union will have done its part to fulfill the ultimate goal of the government's 1988 lawsuit as articulated by Rudolph Giuliani, the U.S. attorney who filed it: "to return control of the Teamsters to the many honest workingmen and women of the union:"