Office of the Independent Hearing Officer
Laborers' Union of North America
-- The Ruling
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF IHO DECISION
RE: LIUNA GENERAL PRESIDENT ARTHUR
A. COIA
Laborers General President Arthur A.Coia was cleared by the
Independent Hearing Officer (IHO) Peter F. Vaira of multiple charges of associating with
organized crime figures and knowingly permitting such individuals to influence the
activities of the union and its members.
After hearing testimony over the course of ten weeks and
considering over 500 exhibits, Hearing Officer Vaira, a former United States Attorney and
Chair of the Presidents Commission on Organized Crime, found that allegations of organized
crime influence over Mr. Coia "simply disintegrated."
A $100,000 fine was assessed against Mr. Coia for "a definite
conflict of interest and an appearance of impropriety"arising out of a joint venture
with a LIUNA car leasing vendor prior to the time that he became General
President. Related to this charge, Mr. Vaira added that he found that "no union funds
were involved" in the dealings and "there were no kickbacks or
payments, nor any direct effect on the union."
Coia was charged with 16 charges, arising out of five separate
subject areas:
1) Coia's knowing association with a Member of La Cosa Nostra ("LCN") New England Crime Family
2) Coia's role in the Trusteeship of Local 66
3) Coia's role in the International Union's Investigation of Ronald Fino's Allegations
4) Coia's appointment of John Serpico as chairman of the GEB Hearings Panel, and
Summary of the Decisions Relating to These Charges
1) New England Crime Family
The charges alleged that Mr. Coia associated with
Raymond Patriarca, Jr., once the head of the New England organized crime family. In
support of this charge, the GEB Attorney relied on the testimony of two federally
protected witnesses.
IHO Vaira found that the allegations of these witnesses
"disintegrated once both witnesses appeared on the witness stand." He also found
their testimony to be contradicted by testimony and evidence from FBI surveillance
records, the Rhode Island State Police, and former police officials in Rhode Island who
had conducted extensive surveillance of Mr. Patriarca. Mr. Vaira
concluded that no improper relationship existed between Mr. Coia a and Mr. Patriarca.
2) Local Union 66, Long Island
These charges relate to Mr. Coia's actions and failure to act in
allowing officers of Local 66, who were influenced and controlled by the LCN, to remain in
power and thereby allowed the LCN to continue its control and influence over Local 66.
Coia served as Hearing Officer in an emergency trusteeship, prior to becoming General
President.
The charges were dismissed as not being proven. The IHO ruled that
Mr. Coia's authority was limited, that constitutional authority was placed with the
General President, that Mr. Coia brought his concerns to the attention of the General
President and the Regional Manager, and that Mr. Coia fulfilled his fiduciary
and constitutional responsibilities.
3) Investigation of Ron Fino's allegations
These charges concern Arthur Coia's approval of expenditures of
funds to attack the credibility of Ron Fino regarding claims he had made of mob influence
in LIUNA.
The IHO found the charges not proved. Mr. Coia
was General Secretary-Treasurer at the time that two investigations were made regarding
Ron Fino, who was an International Representative of the Union and Business Manager of
Local 210, Buffalo, New York. Fino had charged that the International Union was under the
influence of the LCN at the highest levels.
One investigation was directed at reviewing the substance of
Fino's allegations, undertaken by the office of the LIUNA General Counsel through David
Elbaor, attorney with the firm of Connerton, Ray and Simon. The IHO found Elbaor well
qualified to conduct this investigation and found that the investigation was conducted
properly and in good faith.
The other investigation, aimed at uncovering
evidence to attack Fino's credibility, was conducted by outside counsel, Anthony Traini,
an experienced criminal defense attorney. The IHO found that Traini's investigation was
properly undertaken in the event that the Union eventually might need to defend a criminal
or civil RICO case. In addition, the IHO found that Mr. Coia "fully satisfied"
his fiduciary duties, acting in accordance with his powers and responsibilities under
federal law and the LIUNA Constitution.
4) Activity of Mr. Coia in appointing
John Serpico of the GEB Hearing Panel
The GEB Attorney charged that the Serpico appointment was improper
because Arthur Coia knew Serpico was "an instrument of organized crime influence over
LIUNA." These charges were dismissed as not proved.
The IHO found that Coia's appointment of Serpico to serve as
Hearing Officer was made for the legitimate purpose of bringing about John Serpico's
resignation from the Union, and that Mr. Coia's ability to achieve that
result in other ways was limited, if non-existent. He also noted that even after implementation of the LIUNA Ethics and Disciplinary Procedure, removing
Serpico was "a difficult endeavor."
5) Viking Oldsmobile
Three charges were reviewed by the IHO as a continuing, single
transaction.
One involves a claim that Mr. Coia obstructed an
investigation by the GEB Attorney and the Inspector General by giving false or misleading
deposition testimony. That charge was dismissed as not proved and the IHO specifically
found that it has not been established that Mr. Coia attempted to mislead the
investigation.
In the second charge, the GEB Attorney alleged that Coia, while
General Secretary-Treasurer, had violated the LIUNA Ethical Practices Code for purchasing
a 1991 Ferrari F40 automobile with Viking Oldsmobile, a union vendor. The IHO found that
the arrangements provided Coia with "favorable terms
and ...the opportunity to make a large profit," although he also found that there
were "no kickbacks or payments," and no use of union funds. The IHO imposed a
fine of $100,000, payable over two years, as a "penalty commensurate with the
benefits improperly obtained."
The third claim, relating to federal luxury tax on the Ferrari
transaction, was dismissed as beyond the scope of the IHO's jurisdiction.
OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT HEARING OFFICER
LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH
AMERICA
IN THE MATTER OF: ) DOCKET NO.
ARTHUR A. COIA ) 97-52D
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION ---1
II. KNOWING ASSOCIATION WITH A MEMBER
OF THE NEW ENGLAND LCN ---7
III. THE TRUSTEESHIP OF LOCAL 66 ---38
IV. THE INVESTIGATION OF RONALD
FINO'S ALLEGATIONS ---50
V. THE APPOINTMENT OF JOHN SERPICO
AS CHAIRMAN OF THE GEB HEARINGS PANEL ---64
VI. COIA'S DEALINGS WITH VIKING
OLDSMOBILE ---79
VII. DECISION
---106
VIII. PENALTY ---107
OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT HEARING OFFICER
LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH
AMERICA
IN THE MATTER OF: ) DOCKET NO.
)
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM
This Order and Memorandum addresses the disciplinary charges of
November 6, 1997, as amended on March 23 and April 8, 1998, filed by the Laborers'
International Union of North America ("LIUNA" or
"International Union") General Executive Board Attorney ("GEB
Attorney") against Arthur A. Coia ("Coia" or "Respondent Coia"),
the International General President of LIUNA.
The Independent Hearing Officer ("IHO") held a hearing
which began on April 14, 1998 and ended on June 23, 1998. There were 22 hearing days. The
transcripts from the hearing total over 5500 pages, and over 500 exhibits were submitted
into evidence. Both the GEB Attorney and counsel for Coia submitted
post-hearing briefs on September 25, 1998 and post-hearing responsive briefs on November
24, 1998.
Coia has been charged with sixteen charges arising out of five
separate subject categories which may be described as follows: Coia's Knowing Association
with a Member of La Cosa Nostra's ("LCN") New England Crime Family; Coia's Role in the Trusteeship of Local 66; Coia's Role in the International Union's
Investigation of Ronald Fino's Allegations; Coia's
Appointment of John Serpico as Chairman of the GEB Hearings Panel;
and Coia's Dealings with Viking Oldsmobile.
The incidents in question span the time period from 1981 to the
present and involve periods of Coia's career from his early involvement in LIUNA to his
ascent to the offices of International General Secretary-Treasurer and
International General President.
In this matter, the GEB Attorney has presented much evidence which
is far outside the scope of the charges. The IHO has dealt with these occasions as they
arose and has made no blanket prohibitions.
The following standards apply to the charges.
Barred Conduct
Pursuant to the LIUNA Ethics and Disciplinary Procedures
("EDP") and the LIUNA Ethical Practices Code ("EPC"), union officers
are prohibited from engaging in "barred conduct," which is defined to include --
a) committing any act of racketeering, as defined in 18 U.S.C. ?1961(1);
b) knowingly associating with any member or associate of the organized crime syndicate known as La Cosa Nostra (LCN);
c) knowingly permitting any member or associate of the LCN to exercise control or influence in the conduct of the affairs of the Union; or
d) obstructing or interfering with the LIUNA Inspector General, the GEB Attorney, or the Independent Hearing Officer . . . .
EDP, Section 1, Ethical Practices Code; EPC, Barred Conduct.
Knowing Association with the LCN and Permitting LCN
Influence on the Union
According to the EDP and the EPC, "knowing association" occurs when
--
a) an individual knows that the person with whom he or she is associating is a member or associate of the LCN;
b) the association relates directly or indirectly to the affairs of the Union; and
EDP, Section 1, Ethical Practices Code; EPC, Barred Conduct. See
also In the Matter of Rocco J. Napoli and Thomas Fallacara, IHO Order and Memorandum,
96-65D at 5-6 ?19 (September 25, 1997)(defining "knowing association").
Knowledge is established if an individual:
(a) had actual knowledge that the person with whom he was associating was an LCN member;
(b) reasonably should have known that the person with whom he was associating was an LCN member; or
(c) deliberately remained ignorant of facts that would demonstrate that the person with whom he was associating was an LCN member. Fallacara, IHO 96-65D at 7.
The relationship to the affairs of the union need not on its face
affect the operation of the union; it need only reflect that the "knowing
association" permits undesirable individuals to have easy access to the union
officers and members in the total atmosphere of the labor union operation. See In the
Matter of Trusteeship Proceeding Chicago Dist. Council, IHO Order and Memorandum,
97-30T at 9 (February 7, 1998). See also Fallacara, IHO 96-65D at 6 ?20.
The GEB Attorney must also demonstrate that the charged party's
association was "more than fleeting or casual." See generally United States
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am., 824
F. Supp. 410, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am., 745 F. Supp. 908, 917-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
aff'd, 941 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091 (1992)(contact that was
"knowing, purposeful and not fleeting" was enough to constitute "knowing
association").
The EDP and EPC incorporate certain exceptions
to the definition of "knowing association" which are contained in a Consent
Decree entered in the case of United States v. District Council of New York City and
Vicinity of The United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH),
1993 WL 364443 at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("the Carpenters' Consent Decree"). Those
exceptions would permit a LIUNA officer to --
1) Meet or communicate with a "barred person" who is an employer to discuss the negotiation, execution or management of a collective bargaining agreement, or a labor dispute, when the officer represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership the employees of that employer.
2) Meet or communicate with a "barred person" who is a representative of a labor organization to discuss union matters.
3) Meet or communicate with an officer, employee or member of LIUNA and its constituent locals.
The Carpenters' Consent Decree also permits a
"member" who holds no elected, appointed or salaried position in the union, or
any constituent local, to meet or communicate with "barred persons regarding matters
unrelated to the union or any constituent local."(1) Id. at 4.
"A 'barred person' is (1) any member or associate of any La
Cosa Nostra crime family or any other criminal group, or (2) any person prohibited from
participating in Union affairs." EDP, Appendix B.
Obstruction of the GEB Attorney and Inspector General
The LIUNA Appellate Officer has determined that in
"obstruction" cases involving false testimony during depositions, the GEB
Attorney must show that the testimony was material and would have impeded the Inspector
General's ("IG") investigation by being misleading and intentionally deceptive. See
In Re Martire, 1997 A.O. 81 (97-008D). In order for a statement to be considered
material, "the statement must have a 'natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable
of influencing, the decision making body to which it was
addressed'." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995), citing, Kungys
v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988).
The GEB Attorney also cites the following statutory provision in
support of his claims:
The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of
a labor organization occupy positions of trust in relation to such
organization and its members as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of each such person,
taking into account the special problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold
its money and property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members and to
manage, invest, and expend the same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any
resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder, to refrain from dealing with such organization as an adverse party or in behalf of an adverse party
in any matter connected with his duties and from holding or acquiring any pecuniary or
personal interest which conflicts with the interests of such organization, and to account
to the organization for any profit received by him in whatever capacity in connection with
transactions conducted by him or under his direction on behalf of the organization. A
general exculpatory provision in the constitution and bylaws of such a
labor organization or a general exculpatory resolution of a governing body purporting to
relieve any such person of liability for breach of the duties declared by this section
shall be void as against public policy.
The IHO has determined that section 501(a) was intended to prevent
misuse of union funds and to forbid union officials from receiving payments from third
parties or making a private profit from union contracts. Thus, the statute pertains only
to financial transactions. See In the Matter of Baker, IHO Order and Memorandum,
97-55D at 13 (July 21, 1998). See also, Guarnaccia v. Kenin, 234 F. Supp. 429, 442
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd sub nom. Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371 (2d
Cir. 1964) (ruling 29 U.S.C. ?501(a) not a catch-all for breaches of fiduciary duty).
The Uniform Local Union Constitution
Article III, Section 3(d) of the LIUNA Uniform Local Union
Constitution requires that all members refrain from "interfering with the proper
conduct of all the business of the Organization." Uniform Local Union Constitution,
Article III, Section 3(d).
In Baker, the IHO determined that, in order to
establish a violation of Article III, Section 3(d) of the Constitution, the GEB Attorney
must show that the charged member committed a deliberate affirmative act which would
constitute interference with the proper conduct of union business.
Baker, IHO 97-55D at 11. Mere nonfeasance on the part of the member is insufficient.
II. KNOWING ASSOCIATION WITH A MEMBER OF
THE NEW ENGLAND LCN
Barred Conduct -- Knowing Association with LCN Member: From in or
about 1981 until in or about 1987, ARTHUR A. COIA knowingly associated with a member of
the Patriarca Family, Raymond Patriarca, Jr., in violation of the barred conduct
provisions of the LIUNA EDP and EPC.
Charge II alleges:(2)
Barred Conduct -- Permitting LCN Influence: In
or about 1987, ARTHUR A. COIA knowingly permitted a member of the Patriarca Family, namely
Raymond Patriarca, Jr., to exercise control or influence over the conduct of Union
affairs, to wit: at the behest of Raymond Patriarca, Jr., Coia assisted Nino Cucinotta in
joining Local 271 and in receiving job referrals, in violation of the barred conduct
provisions of the LIUNA EDP and EPC.
Charge III alleges:
Breaching Constitutional Duties of LIUNA Members
and Officers: In knowingly associating with an LCN member and/or
permitting him to influence Union affairs, as alleged more specifically above in Charges I
and II, ARTHUR A. COIA failed to honor his obligation as a LIUNA member to refrain from
interfering with the proper conduct of LIUNA business, and breached his duty as an
Executive Board member of Local 271 to see to it that the affairs and business of his
Local Union were properly conducted, in violation of Article III, Section 3(d) and Article
IV, Section 4(H)(9) of the Uniform Local Union Constitution.
7
The following chronology(3) is relevant to
understanding the context of the above charges:
Charges I and III are based upon the following three alleged
incidents:
The GEB Attorney alleges that Coia knowingly associated with
Patriarca, Jr., a member of the LCN, from 1981 through 1987, in violation of the EPC, EDP
and the LIUNA International Union Constitution ("International Constitution").
In addition, the GEB Attorney alleges certain other incidents
which occurred outside of this 1981 to 1987 time period. These incidents are:
In his opening statement on April 14, 1998, the GEB Attorney
asserted that the core of the evidence on Charges I through III would come from the
testimony of Cucinotta, but that the context of the charges -- the
"relationship" between the Patriarca family and the Coia family -- would come
from Hillary. Transcript ("Tr.") 11. The GEB Attorney further asserted that,
"[A]t every point of tangency between Tommy Hillary and Nino Cucinotta, Mr. Hillary
[would] confirm Mr. Cucinotta in every significant respect." Tr.
15.
As demonstrated below, Hillary failed to corroborate Cucinotta on
any material point.
In his post-hearing briefs, the GEB Attorney informed the IHO that
Cucinotta was not credible on some points. GEB Attorney Response Brief ("GEB Resp.
Br.") at 2. He specifically abandoned his reliance on Cucinotta and conceded that
"Cucinotta's testimony should be credited only in certain respects" but
not all respects as originally intended. See id. (emphasisadded). The GEB Attorney
failed to identify what those "certain respects" were other than to say that Cucinotta's description of the inside of Coia & Lepore was
extremely detailed. Id. at 5. The GEB Attorney also dropped Charge II, which was
based on Cucinotta's testimony. GEB Br. at 52 n.2. The evidentiary effect of these
concessions will be discussed, infra at ??63-4.
Findings of Fact
The Hillary Allegations
In the mid 1960s, Hillary was the best man for Patriarca, Jr. at
his wedding. Tr. 401.
When Patriarca, Jr. married, his father moved out of the family home and turned it over to Patriarca, Jr. and his new wife. Tr. 401-02.
Hillary and Patriarca, Sr. then moved into a one bedroom
apartment, where they lived together for about a year. Tr. 402-03.
382-825.
The GEB Attorney asserted in his opening statement that Hillary was called as a witness
for two purposes: to establish the "context" of the Patriarca-Coia connection
and to corroborate Cucinotta's testimony. Tr. 11-15.
Coia's Association with Hillary During Lepore, Jr.'s
Campaign
The Kendall Estates Incident
Tr. 699-700; 708-09.
Coia's Meetings With Patriarca, Jr. at the Offices of
Coia & Lepore
Meetings During the Time Period From 1981 Through 1984
2716-17.
Meetings Between 1984 and 1987
FONT FACE="Courier">846-47. He knew the Patriarcas were mobsters, but began spending time at the Coin-o-matic in order to make money. Tr.
846-49. He sold sandwiches, coffee and sodas at the Bradford Club,
located above the Coin-o-matic, and Patriarca, Jr. gave him a cut of the money that was
collected from card games played there. Tr. 848-49.
[D]uring the last 10 minutes of this testimony, [Cucinotta] was
standing and it is my impression that he was very emotional, his voice broke a number of
times. He did not sit and was extraordinarily agitated, and I think the
record ought to reflect that the testimony was not in a peaceful manner.
He stood up and was extremely agitated, gestured a lot and hammered the table and broke
down several times.
Tr. 943-44.
These will be discussed seriatim.
The FBI Surveillance Files
. . . please be advised that the Rhode Island
State Police files specifically relating to Arthur A. Coia, Arthur E. Coia, Raymond
Patriarca, Jr. or the Laborers International Union of North America covering the period
1984 to 1986 do not contain any documents that would tend to indicate that Patriarca, Jr.
visited several times per week for many weeks with Arthur A. Coia or at the Arthur E. Coia
building at 226 South Main Street, Providence, Rhode Island.
The Former Secretaries of Coia & Lepore
Hermiz Full-time Secretary June, 1975-April, 1986
Aceto Full-time Secretary April, 1981-1983
Moretti Full-time Secretary 1977-1986
Menna Full-time Secretary 1981-June, 1986
Santos Receptionist then September, 1983-March, 1998
Tr. 4091, 4115-16, 4151, 4184, 4207.
Armand Sabitoni
The IHO's Site Visit to Coia & Lepore
Legal Work Performed by Coia & Lepore for
Patriarca, Jr.
Coia's Association with Patriarca, Jr. and the
Rottweiler Breeding
There is no indication that Coia had any
contact with Patriarca, Jr. during the course of the breeding.
Patriarca, Jr.'s FBI 302 Statement
. . . [although] Coia, Sr. and [Patriarca, Jr.'s] father had a
long term business relationship, he never had such a relationship with Arthur A. Coia.
Patriarca added that 'no one who reports to him [Patriarca, Jr.] has
any such relationship to Arthur A. Coia', and added that 'Arthur [A.
Coia] does not have the balls to be a gangster.
R. Ex. 49A.
Discussion
A complicating factor in
determining Charges I and III is the relationship between Coia, Sr. and Patriarca, Sr. It
is a factual element which confuses the analysis of the charges. In this proceeding and
others heard by the IHO, there was testimony that Coia, Sr. had a relationship with
Patriarca, Sr. as well as other LCN members across the country.(8) Some
allegations are credible, others are patently incorrect. Coia, Sr. died in March of 1993,
and no issue regarding his activities has been presented to the IHO for a determination.
Nevertheless, allegations of certain acts or relationships of Coia, Sr., correct or
incorrect, are necessarily present in the chronology of this and other cases.
The problem for the fact finder with the background presence of Coia, Sr. is that events are often described with
him being the actor, with an inference that his son, who was also in the union hierarchy
at the time, shared responsibility or knowledge of them. Indeed, the GEB Attorney often
makes the statement that Coia was "the son of a legendary Rhode Island labor leader
within LIUNA and himself an heir apparent for high office within LIUNA." GEB Br. at
58-59. See GEB Resp. Br. at 6. Another example of this appears in the testimony of Hillary
and Cucinotta, both of whom stated that persons were sent to Local 271 by the Patriarcas
to obtain jobs and that, allegedly, Coia, Sr. made the arrangements. No witness, however,
implicated Respondent Coia in obtaining jobs for them at Local 271 and, indeed, the GEB
Attorney abandoned this allegation. In reading the transcript, however, the questioning by
the GEB Attorney of certain witnesses implied that Respondent Coia was
deeply involved in arranging jobs for Patriarca family members and
associates merely by invoking the name Coia, Sr.
The GEB Attorney's position on Patriarca, Jr.'s visits to Coia
& Lepore should be viewed in a historical spectrum. At the outset, the GEB Attorney
contended in his opening statement that Coia met regularly with Patriarca, Jr. from 1984
through 1987 at Coia & Lepore. These meetings were to be proven by Cucinotta and then
corroborated by Hillary although Hillary had no firsthand knowledge of these matters. The
GEB Attorney said that the core of the evidence would be from Cucinotta and Hillary would
confirm Cucinotta in every significant respect. Tr. 11, 15.
Both parties agree there were visits to Coia & Lepore by
Patriarca, Jr. during the pendency of the Hauser case. The problem arose that Cucinotta,
perhaps out of simple mistake, perhaps out of his desire to testify somewhere in order to
obtain a sentencing reduction, or perhaps a combination of both, testified that the visits
continued for far beyond the period of time that any other witness recalled. As determined
above, this testimony runs contrary to the surveillance evidence, witness testimony, and
common sense.
Moreover, Cucinotta's bizarre performance on
the witness stand, and his impeachment during cross examination, caused the GEB Attorney
to distance himself from him. In fact, the GEB Attorney stated in his
post-hearing brief that the evidence did not establish ." . . the frequency of
meetings between Coia and Raymond, Jr. after 1984 as recalled by Raymond, Jr.'s driver,
Anthonio [sic] Cucinotta." GEB Resp. Br. at 2 n.1. In other words, although Cucinotta
is the GEB Attorney's witness, one cannot believe everything he said. As noted earlier,
Hillary made no contribution to the proof of this matter. Although asserted to be
probative by the GEB Attorney in his opening statement, the Hillary/Cucinotta combination
simply disintegrated once both witnesses appeared on the witness stand, and there is no
evidence of Patriarca, Jr. and Coia meeting after 1984.
Nevertheless, the GEB Attorney argues in his post-hearing briefs
that, due to Coia's position in the 1980s as an up and coming LIUNA
labor leader and Patriarca, Jr.'s position as a made member of the LCN and the son of the
Boss of the New England LCN family, "any contact between Coia and Raymond, Jr.
conveyed the unmistakable message that the LCN had significant influence within
LIUNA." GEB Br. at 59 (emphasis omitted). See GEB Resp. Br. at 5-6. He further argues
that the "unique positions" of Coia and Patriarca, Jr. send a message to the
union membership that the LCN has "easy access to the Union officers and members in
the total atmosphere [of the] labor union operation." GEB Br. at 60, citing,
Fallacara, IHO 96-65D at 6, ?210. This argument flies in the face of
his concession that the joint defense meetings between Coia and Patriarca, Jr. were
proper.
The GEB Attorney also relies extensively on the
Patriarca family influence at Local 271. Although, historically, the Patriarcas may have
had influence at that Local during Coia, Sr.'s tenure, it is not relevant to the charges
here against Respondent Coia and will not be considered by the IHO in rendering his final
decision.
The GEB Attorney also implicitly argues that
there was an improper relationship between Local 271 and the law firm of Coia & Lepore
since it shared office space with the Local and did extensive legal work for it. This
argument does not have any probative value relative to the charges in this matter.
The GEB Attorney, citing the Fallacara test for "knowing
association," also contends that the mere appearance of mob access to the union is
sufficient to discipline a union official. See supra pp. 2-3. There is no indication in
the record, however, that Patriarca, Jr. had access to the union. He visited Coia at Coia
& Lepore on only a few occasions. No credible evidence was put forth to show that he
and Coia were together at any other time.
Teamsters Case Law
The GEB Attorney offers a number of cases
decided by the Court appointed Independent Administrator of the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters ("IBT" or "Teamsters") as well as certain federal court
decisions to support his position, but the language quoted therefrom is taken out of
context. All of those cases deal with Teamster union officials who either invited LCN
figures into their union, regularly socialized with them, or sought their assistance in
union affairs. An examination of the facts in those cases reveals far
different fact patterns than the one presented here.
In all of the Teamsters' cases cited by the GEB Attorney, the
relationships between the charged persons and the LCN members and associates continued for
a number of years, on regular social and business levels.
In United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am. ("DiGirlamo"), 824 F. Supp. 410
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), DiGirlamo was the bookkeeper for IBT Local 41 in Kansas City, Missouri
and the evidence therein established that he associated with four men
-- Charles Moretina, James Moretina, Peter Simone ("Simone"), and Frank Tousa
("Tousa") -- whom he knew to be members of the Kansas City LCN. Id. at 414-416
(discussing association with C. Moretina, J. Moretina, P. Simone and F. Tousa).
DiGirlamo's car was observed by the FBI outside of Charles
Moretina's house during working hours. He also attended Charles
Moretina's criminal trial and visited him several times in prison. Id. at 416. James
Moretina and Simone hired DiGirlamo as an accountant for their business -- Be Amused
Vending Company-- and he would occasionally go to Simone's illegal gambling hall to pick
up the company's books. In fact, during his tenure as the company's
accountant, the FBI seized illegal gambling equipment which the company owned, and James
Moretina and Simone were eventually convicted for money laundering and illegal gambling.
Id.
DiGirlamo also visited James Moretina's home and spoke with him
daily on the telephone. Id.
DiGirlamo and Simone had known each other since
childhood. They had participated in community sporting and charity events together, and
had spent time at one another's homes. Id.
DiGirlamo had also prepared Tousa and his wife's personal tax
returns and had spent time in the Tousas' home while doing so. Id.
In United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am. (Adelstein), 998 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1993),
Adelstein held the positions of Secretary-Treasurer of IBT Local 813, President of IBT
Local 1034, and Secretary-Treasurer of the Executive Board of IBT Joint Council 16.
There was evidence that he had "decades-long
relationships with an entire cast of characters who were members of organized
crime'." Id. at 123-24 (quoting Independent Administrator). Adelstein assisted
Gambino family member James Failla ("Failla") in the mob's control of both the
garbage industry and of IBT Local 813 in New York City. Id. at 122. He was an
associate of the Gambino family and answered to Failla. He and Failla often attended the
same social affairs, charity affairs, and funerals. Id. at 125.
In United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am. (Yager), 761 F. Supp.
315 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), the Independent Administrator prevented the appointment of Yager to
the IBT's General Executive Board since there was evidence that he had
been seen with members of the LCN. Id. at 320. Moreover, the LCN had a history of
influence over the IBT Central States Pension Fund, of which Yager was an officer, and had
once engaged in a scheme to bribe a former United States Senator using pension fund
assets. Id. The Independent Administrator concluded that Yager knew of this, yet
did nothing to stop it. Id.
The GEB Attorney also cites Judge Edelstein's statement in United
States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am.
(Cozza), 764 F. Supp. 797, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), that "there is no such thing as a purposeful, yet innocent or non-reproachful association of an Union leader and an underworld figure." The facts of that case,
however, are far different from those herein. There, Cozza admitted that he knowingly
associated with five members of the Pittsburgh LCN. This association included daily visits
with John S. LaRocca, who was the Boss of the Pittsburgh family from 1956 until his death
in 1984. Id. at 806.
In a case brought under the Carpenters' Consent Decree, United
States v. District Council of New York City (Fiorino), 941 F.Supp. 349 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), Fiorino knowingly associated with two members of the Genovese family, Liborio
Bellomo and Ralph Coppola. Id. at 357. Although Bellomo was married to Fiorino's
sister, the Court found that their relationship went
beyond the ordinary contacts of family members. Id. at 368. For example, there were
372 telephone calls made in a ten month period from Bellomo's home to Fiorino's beeper.
Id. at 369. Fiorino also admitted that he had met with Coppola on the street, visited him
at home, and spoke with him on the telephone. Id.
The contact alleged by the GEB Attorney herein is of a far
different character than that found in the above cases. In this matter, there was no
credible evidence presented to show any contact between Patriarca, Jr. and Coia at any
time except for the joint defense meetings at Coia & Lepore.
Conclusions
III. THE TRUSTEESHIP OF LOCAL 66
Charge IV alleges:
Barred Conduct -- Permitting LCN Influence: From in or about
April, 1990 through 1994, ARTHUR A. COIA knowingly permitted members and/or associates of
the LCN to exercise control or influence over the affairs of the Union, to wit: by his
actions and failures to act, he allowed officers of Local 66 who were influenced and
controlled by the LCN to remain in power, thereby allowing the LCN to
continue its control and influence over Local 66.
38
Charge V alleges:
Violation of Duty of Loyalty: From in or about 1990 until in or
about 1994, ARTHUR A. COIA violated the obligation of undivided loyalty
incumbent upon all members, officers, and employees of LIUNA, including but not limited to
those duties set forth in 29 U.S.C. ?501(a) and the LIUNA Ethical Practices Code, to wit:
through his actions and failures to act, he did not take adequate steps
to investigate and remedy organized crime corruption at Local 66, and he participated in a
course of conduct that permitted and facilitated the continuation of that corruption
during and after the time that LIUNA placed Local 66 under trusteeship in 1990 through
1992.
Charge VI alleges:
Constitutional Duties of LIUNA Members: In
permitting the LCN to exercise influence over Union affairs, as alleged more specifically
above in Charge IV, ARTHUR A. COIA failed to honor his obligation as a LIUNA member to
refrain from interfering with the proper conduct of LIUNA business, in violation of
Article III, Section 3(d) of the Uniform Local Union Constitution.
Introduction
In Charges IV through VI, the GEB Attorney asserts that Coia
failed to take adequate measures to ensure that LCN influence was eradicated from LIUNA
Local Union 66 ("Local 66") after he was appointed as the
Hearings Panel Officer to rule upon an emergency trusteeship for the Local.
Michael LaBarbara, Jr. ("LaBarbara, Jr.")
Business Manager/Secretary-Treasurer;
James Abbatiello, Sr. ("Abbatiello, Sr.")
Assistant Business Manager and Recording
Secretary;
Peter Vario ("Vario")
Vice President of Local 66 and Administrator of
Local 66's Benefit Funds;
Benjamin DeLucia ("DeLucia")
President;
Santo Ippolito ("Ippolito")
Executive Board Member and Field Representative;
Frank Chimento ("Chimento")
Executive Board Member;
James Abbatiello, Jr. ("Abbatiello, Jr.")
Executive Board member;
Michael LaBarbara, III ("LaBarbara,
III")
Field Representative;
Gerald Losquadro ("Losquadro")
Field Representative;
Bruno Leone, Jr. ("Leone")
Field Representative.
See R. Ex. 120.
1.On December 12, 1988, a 51 count federal indictment was returned
against three officers of the Local 66 Executive Board ("the Board") -- Vario,
LaBarbara, Jr., and Abbatiello, Sr. -- charging them with using Local 66 to engage in a
course of racketeering activity for the benefit of the Luchese crime family. GEB Ex. 10.
2.At the January 26, 1989 Local 66 Board meeting, the remaining
members of the Board voted to pay for the legal expenses incurred by Vario, LaBarbara,
Jr., and Abbatiello, Sr. in their defense against the indictment. GEB Ex. 9, Tab 23; R.
Ex. 110. In all, Local 66 would eventually pay approximately $400,000
in legal expenses on their behalf. GEB Ex. 9, 11.
3.The Local's attorney, Jeffrey S. Dubin ("Dubin"),
advised the Board that it was legal for the Local to pay the attorneys' fees. Tr. 1100-01.
This advice was incorrect. Tr. 1237-38; GEB Ex. 41.
4.On December 14, 1989, LaBarbara, Jr. and Abbatiello, Sr.
resigned from the Board and, as severance packages, the Local gave each a new Lincoln Town
car. GEB Ex. 17-18 (resigning from posts), 21-23 (receiving automobiles from Local). Vario
was given a cash payment of $35,769.50 in lieu of a car.(9) GEB Ex. 24,
25. Dubin had advised the Board that it could make
this cash award to Vario. GEB Ex. 9, Tab 28.
5.On September 26, 1989, LaBarbara, Jr. and Abbatiello, Sr. pled
guilty to various federal charges and, on December 15, 1989, they were each sentenced to
14 months in prison, two years probation, and fines of approximately $37,000. GEB Ex. 14,
19, 20. On March 29, 1990, Vario was convicted and sentenced to 46 months in prison, three
years probation, and a fine of $106,360. GEB Ex. 30, 32.
6.On January 8, 1990, Samuel Caivano, the Regional Manager in
whose jurisdiction Local 66 was located, wrote a letter to General President Angelo Fosco
("Fosco") requesting that Local 66 be
placed under trusteeship. GEB Ex. 26. Samuel Caivano said:
Because of circumstances surrounding the conviction and incarceration of several key local union officials, I strongly recommend that emergency trusteeship be placed over Local Union 66, Melville, New York.
This Regional Office has been monitoring the current situation at Local Union 66, and I believe that the only way to guarantee quality representation for the membership as well as restoring the integrity of the Local Union is through the immediate imposition of emergency trusteeship.
Your immediate attention to this problem would be appreciated.
Id.
1.On March 15, 1990, in response to Samuel Caivano's
recommendation, Fosco placed Local 66 under emergency trusteeship
pursuant to Article IX, Section 7 of the International Constitution which authorizes the
General President to do so when necessary to correct corruption or financial malpractice,
assure the performance of collective bargaining agreements, restore democratic procedures,
carry out the legitimate objects of the local union or protect the organization as an
institution. International Constitution, Article IX, Section 7. See R. Ex. 31, 54, 58, 59.
2.In conformance with Article IX, Section 7, Fosco convened a
Special Hearings Panel ("the Panel") to determine if the emergency trusteeship
over Local 66 was properly imposed and if it should be continued. R. Ex. 60. Such a Panel usually consisted of one or more International Vice Presidents who acted
as Hearing Officers. International Constitution, Article VIII, Section 2(a-vii). They were
assisted by one or more attorneys from the LIUNA General Counsel's(10) office. Tr. 3584. Coia, who was then the International General
Secretary-Treasurer, was appointed to sit as the sole member of the Local 66 Panel. Tr.
1175-76. Two attorneys from the General Counsel's office, David Elbaor
("Elbaor") and Ted Green ("Green"), accompanied him to the hearing See
id.
3.As the Hearing Officer assigned to the Local 66 Panel, Coia's
sole duty was to determine whether the trusteeship was properly imposed and whether a good
faith basis existed to continue it. See International Constitution,
Article IX, Section 2(a-vii), Section 7. See id. Article X, Section 4.
4.The hearing was convened on April 10, 1990 and evidence was
presented to the Panel regarding financial malpractice and corruption at Local 66. See
generally R. Ex. 63. An audit report revealed that approximately $400,000 of the Local's
funds had been spent on legal fees for Vario, LaBarbara, Jr., and Abbatiello, Sr. See id.
at 4, 6, 39.
5.As was the practice at that time, the Panel's
report was drafted by the attorneys who accompanied Coia to the hearing. Tr. 1431, 3585,
4587, 4590. Coia approved the report, signed it, and submitted it to the GEB for its
approval. GEB Ex. 34. The report made the following findings:
1. In December, 1989, the Business Manager/Secretary-Treasurer,
and the Recording Secretary/Assistant Business Manager of the Local Union pled guilty to
indictments alleging numerous violations of RICO and Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley
involving the taking of money from contractors for personal benefit. The Business Manager and Recording Secretary/Assistant Business Manager immediately resigned
from office. In March, 1990, the Vice President, who was also an Organizer of the Local
Union and the Administrator of the Local Union Funds, was convicted for his part in the
same course of conduct.
2. The Local Union has paid the legal expenses of all three
officers.
3. The former Vice President and Fund Administrator has interfered
with the conduct of Local Union business following the resignation of the Business
Manager/Secretary-Treasurer and the Recording Secretary/Assistant
Business Manager in December, 1989 up to and beyond the point at which his own trial was
conducted.
4. The trustee has taken various steps to rectify the situation. A
full audit of Local Union affairs is being conducted and appropriate
remedial action will be taken. Through its trustees, the Local Union will see to it that
the funds not retain, as an employee or agent, any person disqualified by ERISA. Other
action is being taken to see that appropriate collective bargaining procedures are
restored.
5. Under the circumstances it is clear that the
Local Union was facing an emergency condition when the General President imposed
trusteeship on [March 15], 1990.
1.The Panel report recommended "[t]hat the General
President's decision to impose an emergency trusteeship be ratified and that a
continuation of the trusteeship be authorized." GEB Ex. 34. The
GEB adopted the recommendation. GEB Ex. 39.
2.At the time, it was the accepted policy and practice of the
International Union to appoint the Regional Manager as the trustee of a local placed in
receivership, or to defer to the Regional Manager's recommendation when selecting an
alternative trustee. Tr. 3667-68. Regional Managers, as a general rule, were and still
are, very protective of their regions and the prerogatives and
procedures that go along with their position. Tr. 3519-23, 3819-23.
3.Daniel Caivano was appointed the interim
trustee upon the recommendation of his uncle, Samuel Caivano, the Regional Manager. GEB
Ex. 31; R. Ex. 57. As Local 66's trustee, Daniel Caivano was "authorized to take full
charge of the affairs of the [Local] . . . and to take such other action as, in [his] . .
. judgement, [was] necessary for the preservation of the [Local] and its interests."
See International Constitution, Article IX, Section 7. Only General President Fosco was
constitutionally authorized to remove him from his post. Id.
4.Daniel Caivano exercised his authority as
trustee to appoint DeLucia and LaBarbara, III as deputy trustees with power only to
co-sign the checks Daniel Caivano wrote for Local 66. R. Ex. 103 at 83. He also appointed
DeLucia, LaBarbara, III, Losquadro, and himself as trustees of the Local 66 Funds, while Abbatiello, Jr. became the Administrator of the Funds.(11)
Id. at 72-73, 75-76.
5.Upon learning of these appointments, Coia admonished Samuel
Caivano and Fosco regarding the negative perception which arose from retaining the sons of
the convicted felons as Local 66 officials. Tr. 4931-33, 5313. Coia testified that he and
Samuel Caivano had an argument on this subject but that Samuel Caivano persisted by
stating, "[T]he sins of the fathers should not be put on to the kids." Tr. 4933.
6.Daniel Caivano said he appointed Abbatiello,
Jr. and LaBarbara, III to positions of authority at Local 66 because they had never been
accused of engaging in any wrongdoing. R. Ex. 103 at 95.
7.In his opening statement, the GEB Attorney stated that the
handling of the Local 66 matter was a "museum quality example of how local unions
were corrupted and controlled by organized crime and how the international union sustained
that corruption through the illusion of intervention." Tr. 22-23. He argued that
Coia, "had a legal and ethical duty to make every effort to
protect the members of Local 66 from continued corruption, and he failed to do so."
GEB Resp. Br. at 7.
8.The GEB Attorney contends that Coia violated his fiduciary duty
by not doing more to eradicate LCN influence from Local 66 after he sat as the Hearing
Officer at the emergency trusteeship hearing. The GEB Attorney's argument fails to
recognize the institutional makeup of the International Union at that time, prior to the
adoption of the EDP.
Pre-Reform Trusteeship Procedure
1.Prior to the adoption of the EDP, the International Union was
governed solely by federal law and the International and Local Union Constitutions. At the
time, the International Union's control over the local unions was limited to its power to
place the local union into trusteeship pursuant to 29 U.S.C. ?462.
2.Article IX, Section 7 of the International Constitution
conformed to 29 U.S.C. ?462 and a trusteeship could be imposed on a local union to correct
corruption or financial malpractice, assure the performance of collective bargaining
agreements or other duties of a bargaining
representative, restore democratic procedures, carry out the legitimate objects of the
local union or protect the organization as an institution. International Constitution,
Article IX, Section 7.
3.A trusteeship is presumed valid for 18 months. 29 U.S.C.
?464(c).
4.Aside from its statutory and constitutional authority to impose
a trusteeship, the International Union had no control over the local unions.
5.Historically, a parent
labor organization and its affiliates do not always share common interests. The parent
organization is limited by federal law and its constitution when exercising its authority
over a subordinate affiliate. See generally Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. v. National
Post Office Mail Handlers, Watchmen, Messengers and Group Leaders Div. of the Laborers'
Int'l Union of N. Am., 880 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The relationship between an
international union and its local unions cannot be compared to the business arena where
the head organization controls subordinate entities, but is more analogous the United
States Government's concept of our nation's federalism and separation of powers. See Ann
B. Whitley, Note, Collective Institutional Guilt: The Emergence of International Unions'
RICO Liability for Local Union Crimes, 21 Am. J. Crim. L. 291 (1994).
6.The GEB Attorney has based Charges IV through VI to a great
extent on the fact that the sons of the convicted officers remained in positions of power
after the continuation of the trusteeship, and Coia did nothing to remove them.
7.As the Hearing Officer, Coia had no authority to participate in
the operation of the trusteeship and had no power to appoint or even recommend a trustee
for Local 66. See generally International Constitution, Article IX, Section 7 (discussing
process of appointing trustee). Unlike a judicial trusteeship, where the judge has
continuing oversight, the Hearing Officer merely confirms or denies the
need for the trusteeship. Id. The General President then assumes the role of the judge and
supervises the trustee. The Hearing Officer is similar to a Special
Hearing Master whose job is to find facts with respect to very specifically defined
issues.
8.Coia's only constitutional role as the Hearing Officer at Local
66 was to determine whether the emergency trusteeship should be continued. He did all that
he was legally required to do in this position. He could not appoint or remove the trustee
and he had no legal authority over the actions of the trustee; this power was reserved for
the General President who, at the relevant time herein, was Fosco.
9.Even today, the IHO, when sitting as the
Hearing Officer in a trusteeship proceeding pursuant to his powers under the EDP, cannot
choose, remove, or intercede in the activities of a trustee once that person has been
appointed. The IHO has informally recommended that certain persons be appointed or removed
as trustees without success. It is unreasonable to think that Coia, in the International
Union structure as it existed prior to the enactment of the EDP, could have
constitutionally or legally done more.
10.The GEB Attorney's argument regarding the
supervision of the trusteeship is more properly directed at General President Fosco and
his supervision of the trustee, Daniel Caivano. Coia did not become LIUNA's General
President until February of 1993, long after the Local 66 trusteeship had ended. At that time, a local union was autonomous and the International Officers had very
limited power over it once a trusteeship had ended.
11.The Regional Manager's ability to dictate that the two sons
remain as deputy trustees was a reflection of the ineffective LIUNA organization that
existed prior to the reform. Today, such a decision would have been overridden by the IG
or the GEB Attorney, but Coia cannot now be held legally responsible for Samuel Caivano's
actions.
1.As a defense to Charges IV and V -- permitting the LCN to
influence Local 66 and failing to eradicate LCN corruption at Local 66 -- Coia placed over
30 documents into the record to show that efforts were made to protect the interests of
the Local by filing a bonding claim with Eberts & Harrison, Inc., the International
Union's bonding company, to recover the $416,078.79 in attorneys' fees paid to the three indicted, and later convicted, officers' attorneys. See R. Ex.
68-100.
2.The GEB Attorney, in rebuttal, attacked Coia's handling of the
claim.
3.In February of 1993, Coia became the General President and
Norwood became the General Secretary-Treasurer of LIUNA. The final settlement of the
bonding claim was handled by Norwood in his capacity as the General Secretary-Treasurer in
April of 1994, four years after Coia sat as Hearing Officer at Local 66.
4.The evidence of the bonding claim, and the rebuttal thereto, are
irrelevant to the Local 66 charges and will not be discussed further.
Conclusions
1.After Coia made his recommendation to the GEB to continue the
trusteeship at Local 66, he had no further constitutional duties that
permitted or required him to appoint the trustee(s) or oversee the operation of the
trusteeship.
2.The evidence in the record does not prove that Coia committed
"barred conduct" in violation of the EDP by allowing the LCN to continue its
control and influence over Local 66 after he recommended the continuation of the
trusteeship in April of 1990.
3.The GEB Attorney does not offer any suggestions as to how Coia
breached his fiduciary duty, except to assert that he could have done more. The IHO finds
that Coia did not breach his fiduciary duty during or after the Local
66 trusteeship hearing.
4.The GEB Attorney has failed to prove that Coia interfered with
the proper conduct of Local 66's union business after he recommended the continuation of
the trusteeship in April of 1990.
5.The IHO finds that the GEB Attorney has not proven Charges IV
through VI by a preponderance of the evidence.
IV. THE INVESTIGATION OF RONALD
FINO'S ALLEGATIONS
Barred Conduct -- Permitting LCN Influence:
From in or about April 1990 until in or about 1992, ARTHUR A. COIA
knowingly permitted members and/or associates of the LCN to exercise control or influence
over the affairs of the Union, to wit: through Coia's actions, LIUNA supported the defense
of LCN members and associates who had corrupted LIUNA by authorizing and approving the
expenditure of substantial Union funds to attack the credibility of Ronald Fino, but not
to determine in good faith the truth or falsity of Fino's allegations,
when Coia knew or should have known that at least some of Fino's allegations of LCN
influence over LIUNA were credible and true.
50
Charge VIII alleges:
Violation of Duty of Loyalty:
From in or about 1990 until in or about 1992,
ARTHUR A. COIA violated the obligation of undivided loyalty incumbent upon all members,
officers, and employees of LIUNA, including but not limited to those
duties set forth in 29 U.S.C. ?501(a) and the LIUNA Ethical Practices Code, to wit: he
authorized and approved the expenditure of substantial Union funds for legal aid
investigative work which benefited LCN members and associates, to the detriment of LIUNA
and its members, and failed to authorize or approve the use of Union resources to
determine in good faith the truth or falsity of Fino's allegations of LCN control over
LIUNA.
Constitutional Duties of LIUNA Members:
In permitting the LCN to exercise influence over Union affairs as alleged more
specifically above in Charge VII, ARTHUR A. COIA failed to honor his obligation as a LIUNA
member to refrain from interfering with the proper conduct of LIUNA business, in violation
of Article III, Section 3(d) of the Uniform Local Union Constitution.
Introduction
Initially, the GEB Attorney charged Coia with permitting the LCN
to influence LIUNA by authorizing the expenditure of
International Union funds to attack the credibility of Ronald Fino ("Fino"), the
former Business Manager of LIUNA Local Union 210 ("Local 210"), after the media
reported that Fino had been exposed as an FBI informant and was alleging LCN infiltration
at the highest levels of LIUNA. The GEB Attorney contended that the International Union's
attorneys were deployed by Coia to investigate Fino for the sole purpose of discrediting
him and allowing their information to be shared with attorneys representing known LCN
members. Tr. 43-45. Furthermore, he charged Coia with failing to authorize the expenditure
of Union funds to determine the veracity of Fino's allegations which had surfaced in media
reports, in his testimony in a criminal proceeding in New York, and in FBI 302 reports
obtained by the International Union. See Charges VII through IX, supra at 47-48.
In his case in chief, the GEB Attorney presented evidence that
only one investigation, conducted by attorney Anthony Traini ("Traini"), took
place after Fino surfaced as an FBI informant and this investigation was designed solely
to impugn Fino. He asserted that the International Union should have conducted an
investigation into the substance, truth or falsity of Fino's allegations. The defense then
countered and presented substantial evidence that an extensive investigation, or
"legal audit," had in fact been conducted by the LIUNA General Counsel's Office
into the substance of Fino's allegations. See R. Ex. 122, 125-26, 128, 130, 135-41,
143-63, 168-73
In his post-hearing briefs, the GEB Attorney abandoned his original position and argued that Coia was more concerned
with following the investigation into Fino's credibility than the investigation conducted
by the General Counsel. GEB Br. at 95, 100.
Findings of Fact
Fino's Allegations and LIUNA's Response Thereto
1.Fino served as the Business Manager of Local
210, in Buffalo, New York from 1973 until he retired in 1988. Tr. 2316 (undertaking
Business Manager position), Tr. 2322 (retiring in 1988).
2.In February of 1989, the Buffalo news media reported that Fino
had been an FBI informant during his entire 15 years as the Business Manager of Local 210
and had provided the FBI with substantial information of LCN infiltration of LIUNA. Tr.
1627-28. The media further reported that Fino provided information to the FBI that the
." . . Mafia controlled the parent union's operation across the country." R. Ex.
178 (Michael Beebe, Fino Goes Into Hiding, Says He Had Been FBI
Informer, The Buffalo News, February 2, 1989, at A1.). See also R. Ex. 181 (Michael
Beebe, Fino's Double Life Recalls Father's Warning on Mob, The
Buffalo News, April 17, 1989 at A1)(reporting familial involvement of Fino with mob), R.
Ex. 182 (Dan Harback, Masked FBI Agent Acts as Decoy as Threatened Fino Enters Court,
The Buffalo News, March 23, 1989 at A1)(reporting Fino's FBI contract and mob threats
against Fino).
3.LIUNA's General Counsel was aware that the federal government
was conducting an aggressive program to rid labor unions of LCN corruption using the civil
provisions of the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). Tr. 3407-08. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example, the DOJ
embarked upon a campaign of filing civil RICO suits against numerous international and
local labor unions, with the object of placing them under government trusteeship. At the
time the Fino allegations came to light, this movement was well
underway. The DOJ had been successful in placing IBT Local 560 in New Jersey under
trusteeship. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of Am., 581 F. Supp. 279 (D. N.J. 1984). The DOJ also filed a
civil RICO complaint against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters on June 28, 1988
and, after a year of intense litigation, entered into a voluntary Consent Decree with the
international union in March of 1989, placing it under trusteeship. See United States
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am., 831 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The trusteeship over Local 560 was
lifted in February of 1999; the trusteeship over the Teamsters remains in place. Similar
suits were also filed against the Roofers Union, United States v. Local 30, United
Slate, Tile, and Composition Roofers Damp and Waterproof Workers Ass'n, 686 F. Supp.
1139 (E.D. Pa. 1988); the Carpenters Union, United States v.
District Council of New York and Vicinity of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters &
Joiners of America, 778 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); and the International
Longshoremens' Association, United States v. Local 1804-1 International Longshoremens'
Ass'n, 812 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Each of these suits resulted in some form of
trusteeship over the defendant union.
4.Also relevant at this time was LIUNA's
experience in 1981 in what is described as the Hauser case wherein Coia, his father,
Lepore, Jr. and Patriarca Sr. were indicted for allegedly receiving kickbacks in return
for awarding a union contract to a Florida insurance company operated by Joseph Hauser. United
States v. Coia, 81-417-King (S.D. Fla. 1984.) See also R. Ex. 124.
Hauser surfaced in the early 1980s as an FBI government witness and had testified in a
number of federal prosecutions, including United States v. Accardo, No.
81-23-CR-JWK, (S.D. Fla. June 7, 1982), which involved the receipt of kickbacks from a
LIUNA welfare fund. R. Ex. 123 at 1 n.1. In the case involving Coia, the court dismissed
the charges. R. Ex. 124.
5.In response to Fino's allegations and in
anticipation of possible litigation filed by the DOJ, LIUNA began two separate
investigations in April of 1990. Elbaor, on behalf of LIUNA's General Counsel, began an
inquiry to determine the substance, truth or falsity of Fino's allegations and Traini
commenced an investigation into Fino's background and credibility for use as future
impeachment material. These two investigations ran simultaneously but
on separate tracks, and will be discussed seriatim.
1.During 1990 and 1991, the General Counsel of LIUNA was Robert
Connerton of the Connerton firm. Tr. 1631. Elbaor, an experienced labor lawyer and former
prosecutor, was employed by the Connerton firm. Tr. 2981.
2.On April 5, 1990, Elbaor held a telephone
conference with Harold Boreanaz ("Boreanaz"), an attorney in Buffalo, New York.
R. Ex. 122 at 1. Boreanaz represented Joseph Rosato ("Rosato"), a steward at
Local 210, who was a defendant in a federal criminal case in Buffalo. Tr. 1631. Fino was
scheduled to be a witness against Rosato.(12)
Boreanaz told Elbaor that he would be willing to supply the International Union with
copies of eighteen FBI 302s on Fino, in exchange for assistance from the International
Union in investigating Fino. R. Ex. 122 at 1.
3.As reflected in his memorandum to Connerton on April 6, 1990,
Elbaor emphasized to Boreanaz that the International Union was his client and he would
only participate in the proposed sharing of information if it would
serve the institutional interests of the International Union. R. Ex. 122 at 2.
4.It should be noted that FBI 302s are not public documents of the FBI or the DOJ. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ?3500, they are only given to defense counsel in criminal cases where a witness, whose interview is the subject of the 302, testifies at trial. Since Fino was under FBI protection and unavailable, the only legitimate means of obtaining his allegations were from the 302s which were provided to defense counsel in cases where Fino was scheduled to testify. Moreover, the 302s released to