6 Cal. Crim. Law Rev. 3
Copyright (c) 2004 The Regents of the University of California on
behalf of Boat Journal of Criminal Law
Boalt Journal of Criminal Law
January 2004
6 Cal. Crim. Law Rev. 3
LENGTH: 21027 words
ARTICLE: Ten Years of Court-Supervised Reform: A Chronicle and
Assessment
NAME: James B. Jacobs * and
Kristin Stohner **
BIO:
* Warren E. Burger Professor of Law and Director, Center for Research in
Crime and Justice, NYU School of Law
** NYU School of Law, Class of 2003. The authors are very grateful to
Sarah Marcus for superb research assistance.
SUMMARY:
... Since the Newark (federal) Organized Crime Strike Force brought the
first civil RICO suit against an organized-crime dominated union in
1982, the Department of Justice has brought approximately twenty more
suits against mobbed-up locals, district councils, and international
unions. ... IRO Conboy announced three basic objectives for the
trusteeship: to cleanse the union of corrupt individuals; to reform the
job referral system; and to conduct a direct rank and file election. ...
Harvey "could hardly be viewed as a reform candidate," however, because
he invoked the Fifth Amendment during the 1990 RICO case and was
connected to Pascal McGuinness. ... How do we define success? Do we mean
whether the trusteeship achieved the goals set out in the consent
decree? Some observers might conclude that while a trusteeship failed to
meet
all of the government's goals, embodied in the consent
decree, it did substantially succeed in achieving the most important
goal: eliminating organized crime's influence over union affairs. ...
TEXT:
I. Introduction
Since the Newark (federal) Organized Crime Strike Force brought the
first civil RICO suit against an organized-crime dominated union in
1982,
the Department of Justice has brought approximately twenty more suits
against mobbed-up locals, district councils, and international unions.
The government has prevailed in each of these suits, usually by means of
a negotiated settlement that results in a court-appointed trustee
designated to purge organized crime's influence from the union and
restore union democracy. Taken together, these suits may constitute the
most ambitious effort at government-sponsored court-supervised
organizational change in U.S. history. They also provide an important
test of the effectiveness of a new form of non-traditional law
enforcement that relies on civil remedies rather than on prosecutions.
Strangely, however, this massive legal effort has attracted little
attention from labor law or criminal law scholars.
Consequently, we know practically nothing about what works and what does
not work in reforming mobbed-up unions. This article seeks to begin
documentation and analysis of this extraordinary chapter in U.S. labor
and law enforcement history through a case study of one large organized
crime-controlled union, the New York City District Council of Carpenters
("District Council").
Organized crime penetrated the District Council through the District
Council's some two dozen constituent locals, several of which have
documented histories of organized crime infiltration and even
domination.
What is also noteworthy is that at least four La Cosa Nostra (LCN)
organized crime families (Colombo; DeCavalcante; Gambino; Genovese) have
exerted influence over the District Council's local affiliates. In the
early 1970s, Genovese capo Pete DeFeo and his lieutenant, Alexander
Morrelli, represented the Genovese Family's interest in the District
Council. By the late 1970s, the Genovese Family's interest in the
District Council was represented and expanded by Vincent DiNapoli, a
capo in the crime family and a powerful figure in the drywall industry.
In 1976, Danny Evangelista was shot to death while sitting at his desk
at Local 385 headquarters. Evangelista had opposed Genovese candidate
Theodore Maritas' candidacy for the District Council presidency.
In 1978, Willie Nordstrom, president of Local 488, was shot to death.
Nordstrom was a "dissident" who vociferously criticized the union's
leadership. In 1981, the home of Shaun Toner was firebombed. Toner was
an open critic of the officers of Local 17 and of the District Council.
In July 1984, Gaetano Macaluso was attacked with an iron pipe.
Macaluso was a dissident in Local 531. In 1988, Genovese Family
associates beat up Marcello Svedese, treasurer of Local 17.
In 1989, Thomas Maikowsi, who opposed Edward Walaski's candidacy for
business agent of Local 531, was stabbed outside a union nominating
meeting.
The FBI's and U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ's) crackdown on
organized crime resulted in convictions of a number of Carpenter Union
officials and organized crime figures, including those in Table I of the
Appendix.
In 1986, the President's Commission on Organized Crime concluded that
LCN exerted pervasive influence over the District Council.
In 1987, John O'Connor, a top official in Local 608, one of the District
Council's constituent locals, was indicted on 127 counts of bribery and
extortion.
144
In 1990, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York,
brought a civil RICO suit against the officers of the District Council
and organized crime figures who allegedly exerted influence on the
District Council. In addition to broad discovery opportunities and a
lower burden of proof, one great advantage of the civil RICO suit was
the possibility of obtaining wide-ranging equitable relief, including a
court-appointed trustee empowered to reform the union.
The civil RICO complaint against the District Council alleged that the
union was being run on behalf of organized crime.
It described the manner in which the District Council was dominated by
the Genovese Crime Family and the large profits that LCN derived from
illegal payoffs for labor peace. It asserted that "corrupt officers have
systematically traded the union members' contractual rights in return
for the officers' personal gain" and that "economic coercion, threats,
violence and the known ties between union officers and organized crime"
silenced the opposition of the rank and file to such an extent that "the
members have been deprived of their right to participate in and control
their union."
The suit was resolved by a settlement providing for a court-appointed
trusteeship over the union.
For almost six years, the trustee (known as the Investigative Reporting
Officer) investigated the District Council, brought disciplinary charges
against mob-associated members, sought to reform the hiring hall, and
conducted the first rank and file election in District Council history.
In 1999, the court found that the trusteeship had succeeded and restored
the union to self-governance. However, a number of investigations and
criminal prosecutions since then suggest that the District Council
continues to be plagued by corruption and racketeering.
Part II of this article provides a background on the nature, depth, and
extent of racketeering in the District Council. It also examines in
detail the civil RICO suit, the consent decree, and the trustee's
efforts to reform the union. Part III analyzes the successes and
failures of the court-appointed trusteeship over the District Council.
Furthermore, it draws some lessons about the potential and limits of
court-supervised strategies for reforming corrupted organizations
generally. Part IV concludes this article by suggesting future actions
necessary to reform the District Council fully and by highlighting the
need for further documentation and analysis of this subject matter.
II. The Case Study: The New York City District Council of Carpenters
A. Background
The United Brotherhood of Carpenters (UBC) International Union,
headquartered in Washington, D.C., has approximately 520,000 members in
the U.S. and Canada.
Its Constitution requires a regional ("district") council whenever two
or more locals exist in the same locality.
Each district council has its own by-laws, officers, treasury and
jurisdiction over contracts, grievances, and benefit funds. The
affiliated local unions elect delegates to the district council in
proportion to the size of their memberships.
The District Council, located in Manhattan, is one of New York City's
largest unions, representing approximately 30,000 members.
At the time the U.S. Attorney's Office brought the 1990 civil RICO suit,
the District Council negotiated, implemented, and enforced collective
bargaining agreements, and handled disputes, grievances and arbitrations
on behalf of 22 local unions.
The District Council's collective bargaining agreements require
employers to make contributions on behalf of their union-member
employees to pension and welfare funds. While these funds are governed
by an equal number of employer-appointed and union-appointed trustees,
in reality, the District Council controls and administers these funds.
These funds include: the New York City District Council of Carpenters'
Pension Fund; Welfare Fund; Vacation Fund; Annuity Fund; Apprenticeship,
Journeyman Retraining, Educational and Industry Fund; Supplemental Fund;
and the Retirement and Pension Plan Fund.
These funds are worth hundreds of millions of dollars and are attractive
targets for racketeers.
Until the 1990 civil RICO settlement was implemented, all District
Council officers also served as officers in their home locals.
For example, Frederick Devine, president of the District Council
(1991-96), also served as president of Local 1456.
28
The Genovese Crime Family controlled the District Council through its
capo, Vincent DiNapoli. According to the FBI, Teddy Maritas, District
Council president from 1977 to 1981, was a Genovese Crime Family
associate.
Eventually, Maritas disappeared. Presumably, he was murdered because the
organized crime bosses suspected that he was cooperating with federal
prosecutors. Thereafter, the mob continued its control over the District
Council through Paschal McGuinness, president from 1982 to 1991, and
then Fred Devine, president from 1991 to 1996.
The Genovese Family maintained its grip on the District Council by
intimidation and violence and by its control over carpenters' job
opportunities. Because construction work is usually short term,
carpenters often depend upon their union to get them jobs. Since
collective bargaining agreements require contractors to call the union's
hiring hall when they have a construction contract to perform, the union
can blackball "troublemakers" and reward loyal supporters through its
control of choice job assignments.
For many years, the Genovese Crime Family used the District Council to
create and maintain a drywall cartel.
The union could thwart uncooperative contractors (who failed to pay off
organized crime) from performing their contracts by assigning
incompetent workers, calling strikes and slowdowns, picketing, or
otherwise sabotaging the worksite. What is more, the cartel rigged bids,
allocated contracts, and fixed prices.
In the early 1980s, a federal RICO prosecution of Maritas, DiNapoli
and others based on the drywall cartel resulted in a mistrial.
The jury hung 10-1 for conviction.
On the evening before the scheduled retrial in March 1982, Maritas
disappeared.
DiNapoli plead guilty. While DiNapoli served a five year prison term,
his brother, Louis, represented the Genovese Crime Family's interest in
the District Council. Soon after DiNapoli's release from prison, he was
tried and convicted in the "Commission case," and this time he was
sentenced to one hundred years in prison.
UBC International placed the District Council under trusteeship.
Allegedly with organized crime's blessing, Pat Campbell was appointed
trustee.
He reorganized the New York City locals. For example, he merged four
locals to create Local 17 and purposefully or inadvertently consolidated
the Genovese Family's influence over jobs in upper Manhattan and the
Bronx.
39
McGuinness placed John O'Connor in charge of the District Council's
daily operations. O'Connor was subsequently charged with 127 counts of
racketeering,
and, in 1990, he pled guilty to receiving a bribe from an employer. He
was sentenced to one to three years in prison and fined $ 25,000.
Violence and corruption flourished under McGuinness's presidency.
According to the U.S. Attorney, when the Javits Exhibition Center opened
in Manhattan in 1986, McGuinness gave preference to Genovese Family
associates for high paying and desirable Center jobs.
Six out of ten violent acts, which were later cited as predicate
offenses in the 1990 civil RICO suit, occurred during McGuinness'
presidency, including an assault with an iron pipe against a dissident
member at a job site and the non-fatal shooting of John O'Connor.
Further, McGuinness himself allegedly committed seven of the
racketeering acts listed in the civil RICO complaint. All involved
bribery. In a deposition, Marcello Svedese, a District Council officer
from 1981 to 1989 and a cooperating government witness, explained
McGuinness' ties with organized crime:
I have known Paschal McGuinness to associate with various
organized crime figures in connection with the District
Council. I was present at a meeting between McGuinness and
Louis DiNapoli, a made member of the Genovese Family, and I
have discussed organized crime and the District Council with
McGuiness on many occasions.
C. The 1990 Civil RICO Suit and Settlement
1. The Suit
In September 1990, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, filed a civil RICO
complaint against the District Council, its former and current officers,
and six LCN figures.
The complaint named the District Council, its constituent local unions,
and its benefit funds as the RICO enterprise.
It alleged two separate RICO violations: (1) that the LCN defendants,
aided and abetted by past and present District Council officers,
violated RICO by acquiring an interest in and control over the union
through a pattern of racketeering activity,
and (2) that the defendants participated in the affairs of the union
through a pattern of racketeering activity.
The first RICO charge alleged that "the defendants . . . unlawfully . .
. affected commerce . . . by extortion . . . in that they obtained and
attempted to obtain property."
The "property" that the defendants allegedly "obtained and attempted to
obtain" included the union members' Landrum-Griffin-guaranteed rights,
such as the right to elect officials and the right to free speech.
In other words, the government alleged that LCN labor racketeers and
union officials committed Hobbs Act extortion when union members were
forced, through violence and intimidation, to surrender their rights to
union democracy.
The complaint listed 54 predicate acts that constituted a pattern of
racketeering activity and contributed to a climate of intimidation and
fear among the rank and file members of the District Council, thereby
enabling the defendants to acquire an interest in the union.
These acts included murders;
assaults with firebombs, iron pipes, brute force, knives and guns;
appointments to union leadership positions of inexperienced, incompetent
and corrupt individuals;
union officials' associations with known organized crime members;
the defendant union officers' failure to take action to rid the union of
corruption;
and abuse of union office.
The government also charged the defendants with conspiracy to violate
RICO § 1962(b).
The second RICO charge was based upon § 1962(c) (participating in the
affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity) and
it cited 54 predicate racketeering acts
including extortion,
illegal labor payments,
mail fraud,
and unlawful welfare payments.
The government also alleged that the defendants were guilty of violating
§ 1962(d) by conspiring to violate § 1962(c).
The government sought preliminary and permanent injunctions (1) to
prohibit organized crime defendants Anthony Salerno, Vincent DiNapoli,
Louis DiNapoli, Peter DeFeo, Alexander Morelli, Liborio Bellomo and all
others in active concert or participation with them from having contact
with the District Council or any other labor organization; (2) to enjoin
current, former and future officers of the District Council and those
participating with them from committing any acts of racketeering
activity
and from associating with any member or associate of LCN; (3) to
appoint a court liaison officer to have all necessary authority to
prevent racketeering activity
and to ensure union democracy; (4) to enjoin all members and officers
from interfering with the court liaison officer's execution of her
duties; and (5) to grant the government further preliminary relief as is
necessary.
The government also sought a court-implemented election of District
Council officers.
2. The Settlement
The trial began on September 13, 1993 and continued through October 18,
1993, when it was temporarily recessed.
In March 1994, the parties reached a settlement, the terms of which are
manifested in a consent decree.
The U.S. Attorney agreed to drop the civil RICO complaint in exchange
for significant District Council reforms designed to purge organized
crime and promote union democracy. The parties agreed that the consent
decree's dominant purpose was to ensure a democratic union and, toward
that end, that there should not be any criminal element or LCN
corruption in the District Council and its constituent locals. All union
officers were permanently enjoined from: (a) committing any act of
racketeering activity as defined by the RICO statute; (b) knowingly
associating with any member or associate of any LCN crime family or any
other criminal group, or with any person prohibited from participating
in union affairs; and (c) obstructing or otherwise improperly
interfering with the court-appointed officer's efforts to enforce the
consent decree.
The parties agreed that the consent decree would be implemented by a
court-appointed Investigations and Review Officer ("IRO") and a five
person "Independent Hearing Committee" ("IHC").
The consent decree named former Federal District Court Judge Kenneth
Conboy
as the IRO and five individuals as the IHC.
The District Council would pay $ 65,000 each month to cover the
compensation and expenses of the IRO and the IHC.
If the IRO's expenses exceeded $ 65,000, UBC International would
contribute up to an additional $ 15,000.
The IRO's powers included: investigating District Council operations and
individuals; bringing disciplinary charges; exercising veto authority
over officer decisions; recommending organizational reforms; formulating
and implementing new job referral rules; and organizing and supervising
the District Council's 1995 elections.
The IRO's decisions would be final and binding unless the court found
them to be arbitrary and capricious.
The IRO's term of office was set at 30 months, renewable by the court
for up to an additional six months upon a showing of good cause.
The IRO's supervisory authority over elections would terminate after
certification of the 1995 election results.
The IRO could initiate a disciplinary action against a union officer or
member by serving a written and specific charge on that person.
Within a week after service of the charge, a panel composed of three
IHC members would be selected. The IRO would choose one panel member,
the charged party would choose another, and the two members would choose
the third member.
A hearing would be conducted within 30 to 60 days according to the rules
and procedures applicable to labor arbitration hearings.
In order to "eliminate the corruption, favoritism and cronyism that
existed under the old system,"
the consent agreement further required that within 30 days each local
union within the District Council implement new job referral rules.
These new rules had to include: non-discriminatory and non-exclusive
job referrals; a method of registering members' availability for job
referral; a procedure that refers jobs to members whose names have been
on the waiting list the longest; effective dissemination of the job
referral rules; maintenance of accurate job referral records; and member
access to job referral information.
The consent decree ended the long-time practice of union officials
drawing two salaries--one as an officer of their local and one as an
officer of the District Council.
The decree also required the District Council, for a period of seven
years, to give prior written notice to the government and to the IRO of
changes in any rules or procedures adopted or implemented pursuant to
the consent decree.
The consent decree authorized the IRO to implement and supervise the
first rank and file election of District Council officers in that
union's history.
Toward that end, IRO Conboy would draft rules for conducting a
secret-ballot election, including guidelines for "nomination of
candidates, dissemination of information about nominated candidates to
the membership at union expense, and the conduct of the final secret
ballot election."
Additionally, the consent decree empowered the IRO to hire or designate
other persons or entities to assist in carrying out the rules,
to resolve all election disputes, and to certify the election results.
To summarize, the consent decree empowered the IRO:
. to initiate and serve disciplinary charges against any member of
the District Council and its constituent locals for any matter
constituting an offense under any applicable law, union
constitution, by-law, working rule or obligation;
. to take such reasonable steps as are lawful and necessary to be
fully informed about the activities of the District Council;
. to study the operations of the District Council and its locals and
recommend changes to improve those operations (including but not
limited to the procedures used to investigate and discipline
misconduct and those used to fill vacancies in union offices);
. to supervise the adoption, implementation and operation of the job
referral rules;
. to supervise all phases of a secret ballot election of the
District Council Executive Board scheduled for June 1995 and any
special elections that might occur before then;
. to employ or engage the services of any personnel necessary to
assist in the proper discharge of the IRO's duties.
C. Implementing the Consent Decree
IRO Conboy announced three basic objectives for the trusteeship: to
cleanse the union of corrupt individuals; to reform the job referral
system; and to conduct a direct rank and file election.
Recognizing the importance of obtaining rank and file support, he
addressed an open letter to the membership in the union's newsletter,
The Carpenter, explaining his responsibilities and his goal of returning
a reformed union to the membership: "I hope to have your support and
cooperation as I oversee the enactment of these important reforms over
the coming months. I would also encourage any member to contact me . . .
on an entirely confidential basis, with any suggestions or information
that would enable me to perform my duties more effectively."
Subsequently, the District Council sought to stop Conboy from publishing
in The Carpenter reports that cast the union's officers in a bad light.
Judge Charles Haight ruled in Conboy's favor.
The new job referral rules referred union members to jobs according to
the length of their unemployment. Conboy and his staff had to spend
significant time attending local union meetings, answering questions,
and making necessary adjustments. Five months after the rules were
implemented, Conboy reported that complaints about job referrals had
decreased dramatically.
He stated that "the rules are generally being followed most of the
time."
However, some locals, especially Local 17, continued an "informal
system" that referred the best jobs to favored members.
1. The Local 17 Trusteeship
Local 17, the largest local in the District Council, was created by
the 1981 merger of four local unions, ostensibly in order to resist
corruption and racketeering. Ironically, however, organized crime had a
strong presence in Local 17 from the outset.
In 1987, a jurisdictional dispute occurred between the two Genovese
Crime Family crews with influence over the District Council, Peter
DeFeo's crew, and Liborio "Barney" Belommo's crew.
The Genovese Family consigliere awarded Bellomo's crew "jurisdiction"
over Local 17.
The June 1989 election generated a slate of candidates consisting of
Genovese Family associates. Enrico Ruotolo was elected business manager
and, in 1992, selected as Local 17's delegate to the District Council.
The IRO's investigation of Local 17 illuminated the local's financial
crisis, frequent job rule violations, and links to organized crime.
Conboy filed disciplinary charges against Ruotolo, alleging that he
routinely associated with LCN members, lied about that fact in a
deposition, referred union members to a nonunion contractor, fired one
union member, threatened to move another union member to the bottom of
the Local's work list in response to his recalcitrance, accepted a gift
from a contractor, and referred ineligible union members to jobs.
He also requested that UBC International impose a trusteeship over Local
17. UBC's general president complied in April 1995
and appointed a trustee whom Conboy found cooperative.
2. The Javits Center Investigation
Vincent "the Fish" Cafaro, a close ally of Genovese Crime Family's
acting boss "Fat Tony" Salerno, stated in a deposition in 1990 that "the
Genovese crime family controlled the hiring of carpenters, first at the
old exhibition center, the New York Coliseum, and later at the new
exhibition center, the Javits Convention Center."
In July 1994, Conboy began investigating LCN's control over carpenters'
jobs at the Javits Center.
He soon determined that Anthony Fiorino
and Lenard Simon, the two District Council officers who represented the
District Council at the Javits Center, filled all carpenter jobs at the
Center from a "pool list" of 100 carpenters.
An investigation revealed that more than half of the individuals on the
pool list had a criminal record, ties to organized crime, or both.
Fiorino and Simon were both associates of the Genovese Family; Fiorino
was Genovese Family acting boss Barney Bellomo's brother-in-law and
Simon was Genovese Family capo
Ralph Coppola's brother-in-law.
President Fred Devine, who himself had been linked to the Colombo
Family,
appointed Fiorino and Simon to their positions.
In September 1994, Conboy attempted to implement a non-discriminatory
job referral system that would fairly assign Javits Center jobs.
Fiorino and Simon, with Devine's support, opposed Conboy's plan. They
proposed instead that the collective bargaining agreement be amended to
insulate the pool list from the job referral rules.
Devine refused Conboy's demand to replace Fiorino and Simon. After some
fruitless efforts at dispute settlement, Devine wrote a letter to Conboy
cutting off negotiations.
In October 1994, Simon resigned his position as head of carpenters at
the Javits Center, but he remained there as a highly paid shop steward.
Conboy served Simon with notice of disciplinary charges alleging that he
brought discredit to the union by using a pool list, allowing
non-union-members to work at the Center, submitting a false application
to the UBJCA, and receiving compensation from an employer in violation
of the Taft-Hartley Act.
These charges led Simon to resign from the union.
In December 1994, Conboy filed disciplinary charges against Fiorino,
alleging eight violations of the UBC's Standards of Conduct, including:
knowingly associating with members of the Genovese Crime Family,
discriminating against rank and file members,
threatening a union member with physical harm, acting on behalf of a
contractor seeking to hire non-union members, participating in a labor
bribery scheme,
allowing suspended men to work at the Javits Center, falsely
representing his own qualifications as a carpenter when applying for
union membership, and violating the District Council bylaw against
invoking the Fifth Amendment before a committee of investigation.
The IHC panel that presided over the disciplinary hearings found most of
the charges proved and decided that Fiorino should be expelled from the
union for life.
Judge Haight affirmed.
In light of the District Council's and Devine's unwillingness to reform
job referrals at the Javits Center, Conboy filed an application with
Judge Haight seeking an order to: (1) invalidate portions of the
collective bargaining agreement governing District Council job referrals
in the trade show industry and the manner by which the District
Council's representatives at the Center are compensated; (2) require the
District Council to refer trade show industry jobs in accordance with
the Consent Decree; and (3) authorize the IRO to oversee District
Council activities in the trade show industry.
Judge Haight again ruled in Conboy's favor.
Fiorino's disciplinary hearing was well-covered in the media. It
generated political momentum to address the influence of organized crime
at the Javits Center, which is owned and operated by a public
corporation.
The Governor's office announced a plan for eliminating the Genovese
Crime Family's control over carpenters' jobs at the Center. The plan
called for the Center to hire its own permanent work force; workers
would be screened for criminal records and ties to LCN.
In July 1995, current employees were forced to reapply for their jobs,
and the Center accepted job applications from non-incumbents.
The Center hired five hundred workers, half of whom had not worked there
before, and though new "exhibit workers" became members of the
Carpenters Union, they were covered, as state employees, by a new
collective bargaining agreement.
As a consequence, the Javits Center has experienced a "complete
turnaround" and has been described as "an emerging 'hot' destination for
conventions."
3. The 1995 District Council Election
Consistent with its resistance to the trusteeship, the District Council
claimed that in promulgating Final Election Rules (FERs), Conboy
"exceeded his authority under the consent decree" and "abused his
discretion in making injudicious decisions."
The District Council argued that the IRO's power to supervise the
election did not include the right to run it, but merely to oversee the
District Council's administration of it. In determining the intended
meaning of "supervise" in the Consent Decree, Judge Haight looked to an
earlier International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) civil RICO case,
to the parties' intent in the consent agreement, and to the meaning of
"supervise" in the Landrum-Griffin Act. Judge Haight held that the word
should be interpreted broadly, and found that Conboy had not assigned
himself too much power.
Furthermore, he held that none of the District Council's objections to
the IRO's conduct of the election was valid.
The District Council also objected to: the lack of exceptions to
certain rules in cases of candidates running unopposed; providing
candidates with access to union membership lists, including addresses;
the expense of required mailings; the lack of restrictions on the
content of campaign literature; the complexity of the rules; the method
of listing candidates' names on the ballots; the confidentiality of
nominating petitions; the prohibition on local unions' endorsements of
candidates; the inclusion of the position of second vice-president; and
in-person voting.
Judge Haight ruled against each of these objections, broadly concluding
that none of Conboy's FERs was arbitrary or capricious in light of his
having so conscientiously considered the comments regarding the draft
FERs he received from District Council members and leaders.
He also ruled against Local 608's request to delay the election because
"the Consent Decree was meant to eradicate corruption, not the inherent
advantages attendant to incumbency." He stressed the importance of
holding the election promptly so the results could be studied.
Conboy drafted candidate eligibility requirements in order to keep
corrupt candidates off the ballot. To be eligible to run for office, a
candidate had to have been in good standing for 12 consecutive months
prior to nomination and a member of the UBC for two consecutive years
immediately prior to nomination and never to have been convicted of a
crime that would make him or her ineligible to hold union office.
A member who satisfied the eligibility requirements had to submit to the
IRO a nominating petition with at least 125 signatures of members in
good standing.
Once the IRO certified his candidacy, the candidate would have access to
membership meetings to give speeches and to membership lists in order to
mail campaign literature to the rank and file.
Each candidate had the right, at his or her expense, to hire an observer
to witness the distribution of campaign literature and to observe
conduct at the polling site.
The rules provide candidates equal opportunity to mail campaign
literature and to place campaign material in The Carpenter.
To promote fairness, Conboy limited campaign contributions to $ 250 per
member and mandated disclosure of campaign finances.
There would be in-person voting by machine ballot except that a member
living 75 miles or more from headquarters could use a mail ballot.
The rules provided for an election committee to examine and approve the
ballot and to be present when ballots were counted. Each nominated
candidate could name one member in good standing to the election
committee. The committee's decision would be subject to review by the
Election Officer (an assistant appointed by the IRO) or the IRO.
The rules define election misconduct (including but not limited to
voting fraud, ballot tampering, and forgery) for which the IRO can bring
disciplinary charges.
The IRO rejected only two of nineteen prospective candidates' nominating
petitions. Fifteen of the seventeen candidates who formally accepted
nomination were affiliated with one of four slates. The Unity &
Experience slate put forth candidates for all five executive committee
positions (president, first vice president, second vice president,
secretary-treasurer, and chairman of the trustees),
and included District Council incumbents Fred Devine and Robert
Cavanaugh. The Membership's Choice slate also put forth candidates for
all five positions. Conboy believed that its presidential nominee, Local
608 President Patrick Harvey, was the only one of three candidates with
enough support to truly challenge Devine for the presidency. Harvey
"could hardly be viewed as a reform candidate," however, because he
invoked the Fifth Amendment during the 1990 RICO case and was connected
to Pascal McGuinness.
The other two candidates for president also had blemished records: John
Abbatemarco was an associate of Attilio Bitondo, a convicted briber, and
John Greany had used three Social Security numbers.
Greany, however, ran as an anti-corruption candidate. His Carpenters for
a Stronger Union slate (which also included nominees for second vice
president and chairman of the trustees) promised to return the union to
the membership by eradicating mob ties, reducing officer salaries, and
creating a fair working environment. The American Dream slate promised
that its candidates for first and second vice presidents would replace
corruption with honesty.
According to Conboy, his most important and time-consuming task with
respect to the election was compiling a master list of eligible voters.
In 1994, the District Council provided him with a list of 40,000 names.
After investigating, Conboy pared the list down to 16,719 union members
in good standing.
Conboy hired a temporary staff to assist the IRO office with voting
procedures.
The election was conducted primarily by voting machines.
No individuals, other than the temporary election staff and two election
observers from each slate, were allowed into the voting room.
7,684 union members, about 46 percent of eligible voters, cast ballots.
Each candidate on the Unity and Experience slate, which received 58.7
percent of the total vote, won his election, thereby returning to
office incumbents and others associated with the clique that had long
dominated the union.
Each candidate was required to disclose information each month regarding
campaign contributions, expenditures, legal services, and campaign bank
accounts.
Not surprisingly, the Unity & Experience slate spent significantly more
than its challengers. It reported spending over $ 55,000 and receiving $
52,000 of donated legal services. It was principally financed by
personal contributions from candidates on its slate.
The Membership's Choice slate, financed largely by contributions from
slate members and Local 608 members, spent approximately $ 35,000. John
Abbatemarco, who was not affiliated with any slate, spent $ 13,000 of
his own money. The American Dream slate spent $ 10,000, also of its
candidates' own money.
The IRO's post-election report did not raise any questions about
campaign donations or expenditures.
However, Conboy did find some election rule violations.
As chairman of the trustees of the benefit funds, incumbent District
Council president and Unity and Experience candidate Fred Devine's
responsibility was to ensure that the funds did not support or oppose
any candidate. Conboy found that the funds' resources were used to
retaliate against a candidate critical of Devine and to promote Devine's
candidacy in a publication.
After a full hearing, Conboy concluded that Eugene Clarke had been fired
because of his opposition to Devine's policies. Conboy ordered him
reinstated and ordered Devine to reimburse the benefit funds $ 5,760,
the cost of the pro-Devine mailings.
Nevertheless, Conboy concluded that the 1995 election had been "honest
and fraud-free"
and that Devine's two violations did not affect the election's outcome.
Therefore, he certified the results.
How can we explain the seemingly shocking victory of the same clique
that had been mismanaging the District Council for many years? Labor
racketeers are very deeply entrenched in mobbed-up unions. They rule by
both sticks and carrots. The pervasive culture of intimidation may
convince rank and file members that the mob-backed faction is too strong
ever to be dislodged and that rebellion will ultimately be punished.
Likewise, the labor racketeers operate a pervasive patronage system that
provides many kinds of benefits to loyalists who then have a vested
interest in the regime's continuation. In addition, many labor
racketeers are charismatic personalities whom rank and filers find
attractive. Finally, most union members are apathetic, paying little
attention to union activities and personalities.
4. Other Investigations
After the election, Conboy's investigations continued. In 1996, his
office charged five local union officers with improperly (under District
Council bylaws) invoking the Fifth Amendment when questioned during the
RICO suit. In 1997, four of them (including 1995 presidential candidate
Patrick Harvey) resigned rather than go through the disciplinary hearing
process.
(The fifth officer ultimately signed a settlement agreement barring him
from union office for life.)
After Conboy's office received information about a member of Local 257
extorting payments from a contractor, his staff and the District
Attorney's office persuaded the contractor to cooperate in an
investigation. The union member was arrested in October 1996 when he was
caught taking a subsequent payoff.
He was later convicted of misdemeanor charges and settled the IRO's
charges by agreeing to be barred from union office.
Conboy also brought charges against a former delegate and trustee of
Local 348 for refusing to give deposition testimony to the IRO's staff
about his association with a Colombo family capo.
In 1997, the IRO's office began investigating the connections between
two benefit funds employees and LCN members.
Also in that year, the IRO vetoed the purchase of expensive cars and
life insurance policies for Local 135's business agents.
(UBC International subsequently imposed a trusteeship on Local 135.)
In April 1997, the IRO's office charged the president of Local 531 for
interfering with the IRO's work and with purchasing a vehicle with union
funds without following appropriate procedures.
The official accepted a settlement barring him from union office for
life.
In 1998, a former Local 257 officer paid a fine to settle charges that
he knowingly accepted shop steward referrals for which he was
ineligible.
The former president of Local 257 was investigated for receiving illegal
payments from contractors, violating District Council trade rules, and
putting himself on the out-of-work list although he was employed at the
time.
Conboy's office also found misconduct in the operation of the District
Council's apprenticeship school. The school's funds were used to pay for
expensive retirement gifts and apparently fraudulent consulting fees.
The school's director also required school employees to carry out
renovations on his home. Conboy reported to Judge Haight that these and
other school expenditures constituted a pattern of unnecessary and
lavish spending.
5. UBC International's Trusteeship over, and Restructuring of, the
District Council
Because the victors in the 1995 election represented the same faction
that had been allied with organized crime for many years, Conboy
encouraged UBC International President Douglas McCarron to impose a
trusteeship on the District Council.
Conboy stated, "In light of such entrenched corruption, it was clear to
us that the only realistic hope of returning the District Council to its
membership required the intervention of the International."
He stressed the importance of replacing the District Council's incumbent
officers with "strong and independent outside leadership."
McCarron complied on June 25, 1996, and appointed Douglas Banes as
supervisor of the District Council.
UBC International's general executive board conducted a hearing,
pursuant to the UBC constitution, to determine whether President
McCarron had acted properly. Over 100 people testified, including Vice
President Banes and IRO Conboy.
Conboy testified about Devine's taking cash payoffs, his appointment of
Fiorino, his refusal to dismiss Fiorino, his corrupt job referrals, and
his abuse of the chairmanship of the District Council's benefit funds.
The committee made various findings of wrongdoing. Among other things,
it concluded that: Devine and the other officers mismanaged the District
Council's cash reserve so that its net worth dropped from $ 6.45 million
in 1991 to $ 224,060 in 1996; Devine spent $ 389,000 on private jets in
a period of 30 months; Devine supplied the staff with luxury cars and
paid twice what legitimate automobile dealers would charge; Devine's $
25,000 car allowance did not include gas, oil, maintenance or insurance;
the union paid Devine's girlfriend $ 60,000 as a "consultant;" Devine's
chauffeur was paid $ 60,000 a year out of trust fund money; and Devine
used trust fund money to employ Genovese Family associates.
The hearing committee concluded that the trusteeship had been properly
imposed and extended its duration.
Devine and Cavanaugh filed a lawsuit against McCarron and Banes seeking
to dissolve the trusteeship
which, they claimed, violated the UBC constitution and the
Landrum-Griffin Act.
Judge Haight ruled that the Plaintiffs had the burden of showing "clear
and convincing evidence that the trusteeship had not been established or
maintained in good faith or for a legitimate reason."
When they subsequently attempted to produce such evidence, Judge Haight
was not persuaded.
The Banes trusteeship seemed to make some significant reforms aimed at
remedying the financial crisis and combating corruption. Certain
individuals tied to Devine, including his son
and Bernard Cohen, the District Council's general counsel, were
terminated.
Devine was convicted on March 24, 1998 on six felony grand larceny
counts for spending money from the union's operating and
labor-management trust funds on personal goods and services.
Banes and his team moved to put the District Council back on sound
financial footing by eliminating unnecessary and inflated salaries,
cutting costs, and rationalizing operations.
In May 1997, UBC International submitted to the IRO a tripartite plan to
restructure the District Council. First, the plan called for the
District Council to become a "Full Service District Council." This would
mean that there would be centralized oversight over the District
Council. Its officers would be accountable to a delegate body which
would be elected by the rank and file. Second, the job referral system
would be run by business agents employed by and subject to removal by
the District Council. Third, some local unions would be merged.
UBC International President Douglas McCarron said, in support of the
plan, "Despite the [IRO's] supervision, the Consent Decree and federal
investigations, corruption continues in many local unions throughout the
District Council. Only a fundamental structural change . . . can
eradicate the problem and return the Union to its members' control."
McCarron stated that the "membership has been poorly served by the
present structure," and noted that the District Council had lost
approximately 5,000 union members in 5 years, depleted its $ 6 million
treasury, and incurred over $ 5 million in debt.
McCarron argued that greater concentration of authority was the only
solution to the "splintered, whipsawed, and ineffective" power of the
fragmented organization of the NYC District Council.
Lawsuits by local unions and individual carpenters significantly delayed
the restructuring plan's implementation. Ultimately, the court held that
the plan did not violate the consent decree
and that prior court approval of the restructuring plan was not
required.
UBC International's restructuring plan for the District Council included
an election proposal more closely resembling the pre-consent-decree
election procedures than Conboy's 1995 procedures. McCarron rejected
Conboy's preference for direct rank and file election of Council
officers, pointing out that the 1995 direct election had resulted in
Devine's reelection.
Under UBC International's restructuring plan, the District Council would
employ the business agents and organizers, supervise their work, and
coordinate all collective bargaining, contract enforcement, and
organizing activities.
District Council officers would also have the option to merge trust
funds.
According to McCarron, this plan constituted a form of representative
democracy that gave members "increasingly meaningful participation
because it makes their collective decisions and actions more viable in
the industry and more productive in collective bargaining."
Some union members disagreed, labeling the consolidation of the District
Council's power at the expense of the local unions anti-democratic.
Conboy concluded that the selection of the executive committee by
delegates rather than the rank and file might violate the consent
decree, but he "broadly endorsed" the other election procedures.
Indeed, he applauded the reallocation of power to a District Council
delegate body and an executive committee, opining that "a delegate body
. . . would be a sound and positive reform . . . the openness and
accountability of such a system would make it difficult for corrupt
individuals to influence the affairs of the District Council, and would
. . . protect . . . its members from exploitation and abuse at the hands
of such members who may ascend to positions of managerial authority in
the future."
The IRO, the government, and counsel for UBC International met
frequently to resolve differences of opinion. The final rules adopted
McCarron's plan for a delegate body and executive committee, but
provided for direct rank and file election of executive committee
members. Except for the new delegate body, the rules of governance were
similar to the 1995 rules. Each local union would elect a number of
delegates based on that local's membership.
The executive committee would consist of one member from each local and
the president, vice-president and executive secretary-treasurer. The
election committee, consisting of one member from each local union,
selected by majority vote,
would oversee elections,
select the election monitor, investigate charges of wrongdoing, and hold
hearings on suspicious activity. Any party aggrieved by the committee's
decision on an election-related matter could appeal to the election
monitor.
The government urged the judge to reject the proposed rules on number of
delegates, multiple officeholding, nominating procedures, and access to
the membership list. Furthermore, it argued for the use of nomination
petitions to encourage individuals who, due to intimidation or fear,
would prefer not to be nominated at a meeting and because of the
importance of demonstrating membership support.
The IRO, who had required nominating petitions in the 1995 elections,
now sided with UBC International, stating that the cost and time
associated with petition drives outweighed speculative concerns about
corrupt and non-bona fide candidates getting on the ballot.
Judge Haight approved the procedure for nominating candidates from the
floor.
Despite the IRO's concern that lifting the cap on the number of
delegates that any one local could elect
would "only serve to increase the already significant influence of the
largest locals," Judge Haight concluded that a proportional delegate
body would promote, not obstruct, union democracy.
He also agreed with UBC International that the distribution of
membership lists, as the IRO proposed, could lead to intimidation of
members, and he therefore deleted that part of the proposal.
UBC International argued that the ban on holding multiple offices should
also be lifted because "through the vehicle of trusteeship, it has
cleaned out the Augean stables of those old days, so that no present
circumstances exist which justify a continuation of that prohibition."
Judge Haight, finding "it is too early to tell," rejected the UBC's
position.
6. Terminating the IRO and the UBC Trusteeship
In October 1996, the court approved another six-month extension of the
IRO's tenure. Due to the District Council's shaky financial status,
Conboy consented to a reduction in compensation from $ 65,000 per month
to $ 45,000 and agreed not to seek further extensions.
On March 3, 1997, President McCarron, who was not precluded from seeking
extensions, extended the IRO's tenure through March 4, 1998. Then,
pursuant to the Third Stipulation of Extension, the IRO's tenure was
extended to June 5, 1998. Finally, on June 4, 1998, the parties agreed
to a final twelve-month extension.
One year later, Judge Haight wrote, "The District Council's refusal to
extend the IRO's tenure means that the IRO will not be able to discharge
the last vestiges of his previously delineated responsibilities.
Accordingly, this is likely the last opportunity that the Court will
have to address former Judge Conboy in a formal opinion. I seize the
opportunity to thank him for his tireless and invaluable service to the
parties and to the Court during the course of an arduous, complex and
challenging case. The Court's IRO has been the very model of a modern
Court-appointed officer. Ave atque vale."
In 1999, UBC International dissolved its trusteeship over the New York
District Council, stating that it had accomplished its goals.
In January 2000, almost ten years after the civil RICO case was filed,
Michael Forde, the president of Local 608, was elected president of the
District Council.
Ominously, perhaps, Forde's father, who preceded Forde as president of
Local 608, had been convicted of Taft-Hartley crimes a decade before.
Even more ominous, Conboy had charged Forde himself in May 1997 with
violating job referral rules in assigning jobs to members of Local 608.
III Analysis
A. The Necessity and Difficulty of Evaluation
Evaluating the success of the RICO union trusteeships is essential.
There is no point in bringing such suits, or at least in structuring
such relief, if trusteeships do not solve the problems that provoked the
suits in the first place. Moreover, in order to make sound decisions
about how to attack corrupted unions and other organizations in the
future, we should know what worked best in the past.
How do we define success? Do we mean whether the trusteeship achieved
the goals set out in the consent decree? Some observers might conclude
that while a trusteeship failed to meet
all of the government's
goals, embodied in the consent decree, it did substantially succeed in
achieving the most important goal: eliminating organized crime's
influence over union affairs.
Obviously, in the starkest terms, a trusteeship has not been successful
if the union remains in the hands of, or under the influence of,
organized crime or a clique that for many years was closely connected to
organized crime. Contrariwise, a trusteeship that purges organized crime
figures and their allies from the union, institutes competitive
elections, and achieves regime change can be called a success. However,
in reality, analysis of union trusteeships does not lend itself to such
black or white conclusions. The possibility of clandestine ties between
union officials and organized crime impedes definitive scholarly
evaluation of trusteeships in labor racketeering cases. While it is easy
to determine that a major organized crime figure has been expelled from
the union, it is very difficult to determine whether all organized crime
associates have been expelled and whether those who have been expelled
still directly or indirectly exert influence over union officers. FBI or
Department of Labor agents may not even know whether such relationships
continue. Relationships may be too well hidden. And, even if the agents
do know, or at least believe that they know, they will almost certainly
refuse to share such information with university-based researchers.
While evaluation is a hazardous undertaking and may be more art than
science, it is essential for a policy initiative as important as the now
20-year-long effort to reform labor unions plagued by organized crime
racketeering. The accumulation of studies like this one will make it
possible to analyze, debate, and test what works and what does not work
in the remediation of entrenched labor racketeering.
B. Successes and Failures
1. Successes
Conboy judged the trusteeship successful in purging the District Council
of mob-affiliated and corrupt officials, conducting a free and fair
election in 1995, cleaning up the Javits Center, and revamping the job
referral system.
A number of officials connected to organized crime were purged from the
union. Conboy filed disciplinary charges against many union officials
reputed to be linked to organized crime, including Anthony Fiorino,
Lenard Simon, and Enrico Ruotolo. Under the UBC International
trusteeship, all of the 1995 incumbents, including President Fred
Devine, were removed from office.
The 1995 election gave members the right to vote directly for officials.
Free and fair elections are surely a prerequisite to reform mobbed-up
unions. According to Conboy's reports, many union members welcomed
direct voting as an important step in the direction of union democracy.
The job referral system has been improving, but it is not fixed. The
changes to the hiring procedures at the Javits Center were thoroughly
successful, but they impacted only some jobs held by union members. As
for the remainder of job referrals, Conboy wrote in March 1996 that "it
can safely be said, given the high volume of carpenters referred from
the out-of-work lists, and diminishing number of complaints we receive
concerning the referral process, that the average rank and file member
has greatly benefited from the implementation of the job referral
rules."
A year later, Conboy reported that complaints had declined to an average
of two or three per month, which his office typically resolved
informally.
In July 2001, however, Eugene Clarke, a member of Local 608, filed a
complaint with the District Council's executive committee alleging
violation of referral rules in the Local's appointment of shop stewards.
He complained that some employees who supported Michael Forde had
received job assignments out of turn and that he had been passed over
because of his public opposition to Forde.
Though the District Council did not admit wrongdoing, it agreed to
change the job referral rules to require more oversight of shop steward
appointments.
Pursuant to the same agreement, the District Council appointed former
Assistant U.S. Attorney Walter Mack as Independent Investigator.
His responsibilities include operating a toll-free anti-corruption
hotline and investigating allegations of violations of the job referral
rules
in order to "improve the fair and equitable operation of those rules"
and to "reduce the opportunity for their abuse and corruption."
It is hard to say whether the reorganization that shifted power to the
District Council at the expense of the locals should count as a success.
We are inclined to think so because the District Council can be more
easily monitored and held accountable for racketeering in its
constituent locals. However, there are those who predict the opposite. A
leading advocate for union democracy commented at a 1988 congressional
hearing on union democracy:
The delegate system is no substitute for direct elections. A
membership of thousands armed with the right to vote, cannot be
easily manipulated by the officers above. But a delegated body of
150 can reasonably be dominated by an officialdom which dispenses
favors and perks to only 76 lucky delegates. Direct elections allow
the member-voters to control the officers. Election by delegates
allows the officers to control the delegate-voters.
The delegate system may be a step in the wrong direction for union
democracy.
2. Failures
Although the 1995 election appeared to be conducted fairly, Fred Devine
was re-elected president, thereby perpetuating the old regime's control.
Fraud, corrupt practices, and racketeering continued. The IRO and UBC
properly negated the 1995 election by imposing an International
trusteeship on the District Council and terminating Devine. But in the
1999 election, Michael Forde's slate won. Just months later (on
September 6, 2000), the Manhattan District Attorney charged Forde with
taking bribes from a mobbed-up contractor in exchange for allowing the
contractor to use nonunion labor on a hotel renovation project.
The 38 codefendants included union officers, contractors, and 11 reputed
mobsters.
Steven L. Crea, the Lucchese Crime Family boss, was the leading
organized crime figure among the defendants.
According to the District Attorney, the Lucchese Family extorted (or
solicited bribes from) contractors by promising protection from other
criminal extortions and by buying off corrupt union officials. Forde
thus became the fourth consecutive District Council president since 1980
to be charged with labor racketeering.
Nevertheless, he was elected in 2002 as executive secretary treasurer
(the new title for the top position in the District Council) with 80
percent of the vote.
A number of the defendants have pleaded guilty; Forde's case is still
pending as of February 2004.
The goal of the 1994 RICO suit, that organized crimes' influence be
purged from the District Council, has clearly not been achieved. The
alliance between labor racketeers and corrupt union officials has proved
resilient and adaptable. As long as rank and file members see or
perceive "business as usual" in the District Council, they will be
cynical about prospects for reform and therefore unwilling to stand up
against the old regime.
Not only have the government, the court, and the court-appointed trustee
been unable to end mob influence in the District Council, it has been
unable to prevent LCN labor racketeers from expanding their influence to
Westchester County (just north of New York City). In December 2001,
the Department of Justice indicted 73 members of the Parrello Crew of
the Genovese Crime Family on 98 counts, including extortion, labor
racketeering, loan-sharking, illegal gambling operations, selling
counterfeit money and gun trafficking.
Nine were accused of labor racketeering involving Locals 11 and 964,
which together comprised the Suburban New York Regional Council of
Carpenters. These defendants allegedly arranged for nonunion workers to
complete carpentry jobs, allowing them to embezzle more than $ 1 million
that should have been paid into of the Suburban Council's pension funds.
Whether the IRO could have done anything differently that would have
sparked the emergence of a viable reform movement among the NYC
carpenters is an important question. In the IBT Local 560 trusteeship,
which lasted a decade, the trustee reached out to the rank and file,
appointing some individuals to steward positions and other offices and
encouraging others to become involved in union governance and politics.
That seemed to have helped in bringing a true reform slate to power.
Stimulating reform in the building trades is undoubtedly more difficult
because work is seasonal and insecure; workers move from one job to
another and one contractor to another. The union-run hiring hall can
determine whether an individual carpenter gets a job. Thus, it is risky
for a rank and filer to challenge the incumbent clique. Of course, it is
also harder for reformers to win back a district council than a local,
even a large one like IBT Local 560. The District Council is made up of
some twenty locals spread out across the NYC metropolitan area. It is
difficult for an insurgent candidate to achieve the name recognition
equal to that of incumbent officers.
IV. Conclusion: The Need for Further Documentation and Analysis
The government's and the court's effort to reform the District Council
by purging mobsters and their allies from the union and its constituent
locals and by stimulating union democracy is a work in progress. The
effort has been on-going for more than ten years. It has consumed
millions of dollars and enormous legal resources, including countless
hours of work by Judge Haight,
IRO Conboy and his assistants, Assistant United States Attorneys in the
Southern District of New York, Labor Department investigators, Walter
Mack, as well as, of course, union officials and their attorneys. At
best, this is a very expensive way of correcting a corruption and
racketeering problem that has festered for decades. Failure in reforming
the District Council would cast a pall over the broader effort to
relegate organized crime labor racketeering to twentieth century
history.
At this point (summer 2003), in light of recent state and federal
prosecutions, we cannot yet call the extraordinary remediation effort
directed at the District Council a success. Still, there is more hope
now than there was a decade ago. The corrupt elements in the District
Council are clearly under pressure. The membership has had a taste of
free elections and much fairer work assignments. The union's finances
have been made much more transparent and accountable. The pension and
welfare funds are more secure. But to get to the next level will require
the emergence and triumph of a strong reformist leadership cadre among
the rank and file carpenters themselves. Any sign that the government
and court are losing interest and readying to withdraw might doom the
entire remediation project. Thus, it is essential for the government and
the court to make it absolutely clear that the old corrupt regime will
not be allowed to return to operate as it had in the past. Beyond that,
encouraging new leadership, and stimulating a reform movement among the
rank and file, are vital.
A contribution from the academy would be welcome as well. It remains a
mystery why such a massive and extraordinary legal effort, in the
District Council and in many other union locals, joint councils, and
internationals, has attracted so little scholarly attention. Reform
efforts, like the one described in this article, need to be documented
and analyzed. We need to identify what works and what does not work.
Furthermore, we need to stimulate new ideas about how to successfully
carry out the goal of organizational reform, especially the reform of
organized-crime dominated labor unions.
Appendix
Table I: Labor Racketeering Prosecutions Related to the NYC District
Council of Carpenters
| United States v. Maritas, |
Former District Council president |
| Cr. No. 81-122 (E.D.N.Y.) |
Theodore Maritas and Genovese capo |
| |
Vincent DiNapoli were indicted for |
| |
RICO violations. |
| |
| United States v. Giangrande, |
District Council officer Artie |
|
805 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1986) |
Giandrande, convicted after trial for |
| |
conspiracy, mail fraud and illegal |
| |
labor payoffs. |
| |
| People v. Bitondo, Ind. No. 7952/87 |
Local 257 officers Attilio Bitondo and |
| (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.) |
Gene Hanley were indicted for receving |
| |
illegal payoffs and engaging in |
| |
extortion. |
| |
| United States v. Cervone, et al., |
Henry Walaski, an officer of Local 531 |
| Cr. No. 87-579 (E.D.N.Y) |
and District Council delegate, was |
| |
convicted for violating RICO and |
| |
receiving illegal payoffs. |
| |
| People v. Holden, Ind. No. 9352/87 |
Local 608 shop steward William Holden |
| (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.) |
was convicted of criminal contempt and |
| |
perjury in an investigation of the |
| |
Carpenters Union. |
| |
| People v. Forde, Ind. No. 7951/87 |
Martin Forde, an officer of Local 608, |
| (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y.Co.) |
was convicted for receiving an illegal |
| |
labor payoff |
| |
| People v. Zeidman, Ind. No. 7950/87 |
District Council first vice president |
| (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. |
Irving Zeidman was indicted for |
| |
accepting labor payoffs. |
| |
| United States v. Waller, Cr. |
Local 531 officer Robert Waller, Jr. |
| No. 88-466 (E.D.N.Y.) |
was convicted of extortion. |
| |
| People v. Hubelbank, Crim. Complt. No. |
District Council Trustee and former |
| 9N072405/89 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. N.Y. Co.) |
Local 135 officer Israel Hubelbank was |
| |
convicted of accepting illegal labor |
| |
payoffs. |
| |
| People v. Moscatiello, Ind. |
Local 17 businss manager Benedetto |
| No. 8081/89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. |
"Benny" Schepis was indicted for |
| |
crimes involving Local 135 |
FOOTNOTES:
n1 James
B. Jacobs & David N. Santore,
The Liberation of IBT Local 560, 37
CRIM. L. BULL. 125 n.2 (Mar.-Apr. 2001).
n2 James
B. Jacobs & Ellen Peters,
Labor Racketeering: The Mafia and the
Unions, 30 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 229
(Michael Tonry ed., University of Chicago Press 2003).
n3
But
see supra notes 1-2; Michael H. Belzer & Richard Hurd,
Government
Oversight, Union Democracy & Labor Racketeering; Lessons from the
Teamster Experience, 20 J. LABOR RESEARCH 343 (1999); Andrew B.
Dean,
An Offer the Teamsters Couldn't Refuse: The 1989 Consent Decree
Establishing Federal Oversight and Ending Mechanisms,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 2157 (2000); Michael J. Goldberg,
Cleaning
Labor's House: Institutional Reform Litigation in the Labor Movement,
1989 DUKE L.J. 903 (1989); and James B. Jacobs, Eileen
Cunningham & Kimberly Friday,
The RICO Trusteeships After Twenty
Years--A Progress Report, 19 THE LABOR LAWYER ___ (forthcoming
Winter/Spring 2004).
n4
E.g. Locals 17, 20, 135, 246, 257, 296, 348, 531, 608, 902, 1456,
and 2287.
See Government's Supplemental Complaint at 20-34 (filed
on July 16, 1994), United States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL 704811
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994) (No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)) [hereinafter
Government's Supp. Compl.].
n5
Id.
at 36.
n6
Id.
n7
Id.
at 37.
n8
Id.
n9
Id.
at 38.
n10
Id. Edward Walaski is the son of Henry Walaski, a labor racketeer.
See Table I.
n11
See also Government's Motion for Preliminary Relief,
supra
note 6, at 20-23.
n12
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE EDGE: ORGANIZED CRIME,
BUSINESS, AND LABOR UNIONS xvii-xxi (1986).
n13
People v. O'Connor, No. 7953/87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 6, 1989). In a
different case, Gambino crime family boss John Gotti was prosecuted for
shooting O'Connor because O'Connor allegedly ordered his men to trash a
remodeling job at a Manhattan restaurant connected to the Gambino
family. O'Connor testified
on Gotti's behalf. See JAMES JACOBS ET
AL., BUSTING THE MOB: UNITED STATES V. COSA NOSTRA 211-40 (New York
University Press 1994).
n14
Vincent Carafo Aff. at 12, United States Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations of the Committee of Governmental Affairs (1988) ("Vinnie
DiNapoli is a solider in our brugad [i.e., Genovese Family]. In fact, I
sponsored him into the LCN. DiNapoli controls the District Council of
Carpenters . . .").
n15 This
strategy had been deployed in a number of previous cases including suits
against three international unions (International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Laborers International Union of North America, and Hotel
Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union) and some 17
district councils and locals.
See Jacobs et al.,
supra
note 3.
n16
Government's Motion for Preliminary Relief,
supra note 6, at 1.
n17
Id. at 2-3.
n18
Consent Decree (filed on Mar. 4, 1994), United States v. Dist. Council,
1994 WL 704811 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)).
n19
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
http://www.carpenters.org/home.html.
n20
Constitution of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, § 26(B).
n21
United States v. Dist. Council, 778 F. Supp. 738, 743 (S.D.N.Y 1991).
An individual who serves as an officer of a local and of the District
Council draws two salaries.
n22
Government's Motion for Preliminary Relief,
supra note 6, at 4.
n23
Id.
n24
Id. at 5; Government's Supp. Compl.,
supra note 4, at 4.
n25
See NEW YORK STATE ORGANIZED CRIME TASK FORCE, CORRUPTION AND
RACKETEERING IN THE NEW YORK CITY CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY: THE FINAL
REPORT 27-29 (New York University Press 1990). For an intereseting
history of the etymology of the word "racketeer," see Andrew Cohen,
The Racketeer's Progress, 29 JOURNAL OF URBAN HISTORY 575 (2003).
n26
See
United States v. Dist. Council, 778 F. Supp. 738, 743 (S.D.N.Y 1991).
n27
Id.
n28
Id.
n29
Government's Motion for Preliminary Relief,
supra note 6, at 12.
n30
Second Interim Report of the Investigations and Review Officer at 41-42,
United States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL 704811 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994)
(No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)) (Mar. 13, 1995) [hereinafter Second Interim
Report].
n31
See Government's Motion for Preliminary Relief,
supra note 6,
at 12-14.
n32
Government's Motion for Preliminary Relief,
supra note 6, at 15;
United States v. Maritas, Cr. No. 81-122 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
n33
Government's Motion for Preliminary Relief,
supra note 6, at 15;
see also Government's Supp. Compl.,
supra note 4, at 37.
n34
Government's Motion for Preliminary Relief,
supra note 6, at 15;
see also Government's Supp. Compl.,
supra note 4, at 37.
n35 The
"Commission case,"
United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d. 524 (2d Cir. 1989), was perhaps
the most famous organized crime prosecution of all times. The U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York charged the bosses for
four New York City LCN families, plus a number of important capos, with
participating in the affairs of a mafia governing council ("the
Commission") through a pattern of racketeering activity. All the
defendants were convicted. Jacobs,
supra note 14, at 86.
n36
Government's Motion for Preliminary Relief,
supra note 6, at 16.
n37
See Marcelo Svedese Aff. P12, at 6, United States v. Dist. Council,
1994 WL 704811 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994) (No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)) (August
9, 1990) ("Vinnie DiNapoli took me aside and told me to do whatever Pat
Campbell told me to do").
n38
Government's Motion for Preliminary Relief,
supra note 6, at 16;
Svedese Aff.,
supra note 38, P3, at 2.
n39
See Svedese Aff.,
supra note 38, P30, at 13, ("I have known
Paschal McGuinness to associate with various organized crime figures in
connection with the District Council").
n40
See People v. O'Connor, Ind. No. 7953/87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
Sep. 6, 1989).
n41
McGuinness was also tried but was acquitted.
n42
Second Interim Report,
supra note 31, at 18; Salvatore Miciotta
Decl. PP3-11, United States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL 704811 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 16, 1994) (No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)) (Nov. 9, 1994).
n43
According to government investigators, John Gotti, boss of the Gambino
Crime Family, ordered the assault on O'Connor because O'Connor had his
men trash a restaurant in which Gotti held an interest. At Gotti's
trial, O'Connor testified
for the defense.
n44
Svedese Aff.,
supra note 38, P30, at 13.
n45
18 U.S.C § 1964 (2000).
See Jacobs & Santore,
supra
note 1, at 131. The first civil RICO suit attacking labor racketeering
was
United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279
(D.N.J. 1984).
n46
See Government's Motion for Preliminary Relief,
supra note 6,
at 1; Government's Supp. Compl.,
supra note 4, at 1 (adding newly
sworn officers to the list of defendants).
n47
18 USC § 1961(4) (2000) (providing that an "enterprise includes any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity").
n48
See
18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (2000).
n49
See
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000).
n50
Government's Supp. Compl.,
supra note 4, at 10.
n51
Id. at 35-49;
29 U.S.C. § 401-531 (1976), 73 Stat. 517 (1959).
n52 This
argument was first used by the Government in
United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279
(D.N.J. 1984). The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, 123 S. Ct. 1057 (2003), casts
doubt on whether the Hobbs Act can be used to punish interference with
existential rights.
See Bellomo v. United States, 2003 WL
22331878 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2003),
and
United States v. Bellomo, 263 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
n53
Government's Supp. Compl.,
supra note 4, at 11-49.
n54
Id. at 37.
n55
Id. at 37-38.
n56
Id. at 39-45. For example, defendant Irving Zeidman was indicted for
receiving illegal labor payoffs before he was elected as first vice
president of the District Council.
See
People v. Zeidman, 224 A.D. 669 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1928)
n57
Government's Supp. Compl.,
supra note 4, at 39-45.
n58
Id. at 48-49.
n59
Id. at 49.
n60
Id. at 50.
n61
Id. at 11-34.
n62
Government's Supp. Compl.,
supra note 4, at 22, 25, 27-28, 29-30;
see also
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000).
n63
Government's Supp. Compl.,
supra note 4, at 11-34;
see also
29 U.S.C. § 186 (2000).
n64
Government's Supp. Compl.,
supra note 4, at 17-18;
see also
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
n65
Government's Supp. Compl.,
supra note 4, at 15, 19;
see also
18 U.S.C. § 1954 (2000).
n66
Government's Supp. Compl.,
supra note 4, at 52.
n67
See
18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000).
n68
See id.
n69
Government's Supp. Compl.,
supra note 4, at 54-59.
n70
Id.
n71
See Consent Decree,
supra note 19, at 1 ("whereas, trial of
the case began on September 13, 1993 and continued through October 18,
1993, when it was temporarily recessed"). At trial, testimony by Hermon
Brot and Armand Valenzi and affidavits of Marcello Svedese and Vincent
Cafaro proved valuable to the government's case.
n72
Id.
n73
Id. at 3.
n74
Id. at 4-5.
n75
Before being appointed a federal judge in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York in 1987, Conboy served as
Executive Assistant District Attorney in the Manhattan District
Attorney's Office, Deputy NYPD Commissioner, and Commissioner of
Investigation of the City of New York. In 1994, he became a partner at
the law firm of Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, Alexander & Ferndon. He is now a
litigation partner at Latham and Watkins in New York.
n76
Consent Decree,
supra note 19, at 5. The five named individuals
were Patrick Barth (former Assistant United States Attorney, Southern
District of New York), Paul Curran (former United States Attorney,
Southern District of New York), John Fried (former Chief of Trials,
Manhattan District Attorney's Office), Helen Gredd (former Assistant
United States Attorney and First Deputy of Criminal Division, Southern
District of New York), and Alan Kaufman (former Assistant United States
Attorney and Chief of Criminal Division, Southern District of New York).
n77
Id. at 13-14. The IRO must file an accounting for all expenditures
with the court on a quarterly basis.
n78
United States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL 704811 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6,
1994) (No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)).
n79
Consent Decree,
supra note 19, at 5;
see also id. at 5-12.
n80
Id. at 13;
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) provides the applicable standard of review:
"The reviewing court shall-- . . . (2) hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings and conclusions found to be-- (A) arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law; . . . (B) without observance of procedure required by law."
n81
Consent Decree,
supra note 19, at 15.
n82
Id. at 10.
n83
Id. at 6-7.
n84
Id.
n85
Id.
n86
Interim Report of the Investigations and Review Officer at 9, United
States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL 704811 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994) (No. 90
Civ. 5722 (CSH)) (Oct. 4, 1994) [hereinafter Interim Report].
n87
Consent Decree,
supra note 19, at 12-13.
n88
"Non-exclusive" means that an employer does not have to hire employees
exclusively through the hiring hall.
n89
Consent Decree,
supra note 19, at 12-13 & app. A ("Job Referral
Rules").
n90
Consent Decree,
supra note 19, at 16 ("No District Council
officer shall simultaneously hold any elected, appointed or salaried
position in any local union").
n91
Id. at 17.
n92
Second Interim Report,
supra note 31, at 40 (Mar. 13, 1995). The
former process was susceptible to corruption because delegates,
handpicked by the local union leaders, elected the officers. Each
delegate had one vote for every hundred union members he represented,
and candidates bargained for support, often by engaging in "back-room
deals and political horse trading."
Id.
n93
Consent Decree,
supra note 19, at 10.
n94
Id. at 11.
n95
Id. at 10.
n96
Id. at 5-16.
n97
Kenneth Conboy,
An Open Letter to the Members of the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America from Judge Kenneth
Conboy, THE CARPENTER, Jan./Feb. 1994.
n98
Id.
n99
United States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL 704811 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994)
(No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)).
n100
Interim Report,
supra note 87, at 19.
n101
Id.
n102
Id. at 19-22.
n103
Government's Motion for Preliminary Relief,
supra note 6, at 16.
n104
Svedese Aff.,
supra note 38, P21.
n105
Id. P22.
n106
Second Interim Report,
supra note 31, at 29.
n107
Id. at 30-36.
n108
Investigations and Review Officer's Charges at 1-5, Investigations and
Review Officer v. Ruotolo, (Mar. 13, 1995). Conboy also charged
Benedetto Schepis, a member of Local 17, with associating with members
of Cosa Nostra, receiving a bribe, and bribing a union official.
Investigations and Review Officer's Charges at 1-3, Investigations and
Review Officer v. Schepis, (Mar. 13, 1995).
n109
Third Interim Report of the Investigations and Review Officer at 48,
United States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL 704811 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994)
(No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)) (Oct. 30, 1995) [hereinafter Third Interim
Report].
n110
Id. at 48-50.
n111
Second Interim Report,
supra note 31, at 18.
n112
Interim Report,
supra note 87, at 23.
n113
See JAMES B. JACOBS, GOTHAM UNBOUND 294 (New York University Press
1999). Fiorino, a Genovese Family associate and Liborio Bellomo's
brother-in-law, became a Local 257 member in 1982. He was assigned to
the Javits Center in 1988 and soon made chief of carpenters at the
Center. Devine appointed him as District Council representative in 1994.
n114
Second Interim Report,
supra note 31, at 8.
n115 John
Mitchell Aff. Exhibit M, United States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL 704811
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994) (No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)) (Mar. 17, 1995)
("Criminal History and Affiliation of Carpenters on the Javits Center
Pool List").
n116
Jerry Capeci,
Death Returns to 'The Life', GANG LAND: THE ONLINE
COLUMN, Nov. 2, 1998,
available at
http://www.ganglandnews.com/column99.htm.
n117
Miciotta Decl.,
supra note 43, at 3.
n118
Marcello Svedese testified to Devine's relationship with the Colombo
Crime Family: "A number of times, Freddie Devine told me that he had
connections in the Colombo Organized Crime Family. On one occasion, I
saw Vincent 'Jimmy' Angellino meeting with Freddie Devine in Devine's
District Council office . . . Angellino . . . was a Capo in the Colombo
Organized Crime Family." Svedese Aff.,
supra note 38, at 17.
Salvatore "Sammy the Bull" Gravano knew of another connection: "I am
aware that Fred Devine is associated with Thomas Petrizzo, a capo in the
Colombo Organized Crime Family." Salvatore Gravano Decl. at 4, United
States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL 704811 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994) (No. 90
Civ. 5722 (CSH)) (Feb. 10, 1993).
n119
Devine had ostensibly removed the previous chief steward at the Javits
Center, Ralph Coppola, in part because of his connection to organized
crime. Letter from Frederick Devine to Ralph Coppola of Aug. 6, 1991.
Barney Bellomo's understanding of the situation, however, was that
Coppola would continue to supervise Genovese operations at the Center
even though he technically no longer worked there. Alphonse D'Arco Decl.
at 7, United States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL 704811 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,
1994) (No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)) (May 24, 1994). Devine also denied
knowing about Fiorino's association with organized crime when he
appointed him to oversee hiring at the Center. Frederick Devine Dep. at
140-42, United States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL 704811 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
16, 1994) (No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)) (Sept. 1, 1994).
n120
Second Interim Report,
supra note 31, at 14.
n121
Id. at 13. "Proposal 14" would have required 90% of the carpenters
referred to Javits Center jobs to have three years of experience working
in the trade show industry and allowed exhibition companies to select
50% of the carpenters they hired from "a labor pool of experienced
carpenters." It was later withdrawn, partly because of Conboy's
opposition, but the final agreement included provisions with
qualifications that strongly favored pool list members anyway.
n122
Id. at 15;
see also id. Exhibit 13 (Letter from Frederick
Devine to Kenneth Conboy of Oct. 3, 1994).
n123
Second Interim Report,
supra note 31, at 22.
n124
Id. at 23.
n125
Third Interim Report,
supra note 110, at 48.
n126
See
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (2000).
n127
See
29 U.S.C. § 186(b)(1) (2000).
n128
Second Interim Report,
supra note 31, at 21-22.
n129 IHC
Panel's Decision at 35-36, Investigations and Review Officer v. Fiorino,
(Sept. 28, 1995).
n130
Fifth Interim Report of the Investigations and Review Officer at 6,
United States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL 704811 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994)
(No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)) (Sept. 30, 1996) [hereinafter Fifth Interim
Report].
n131
Third Interim Report,
supra note 110, at 39.
n132
Id. at 40.
n133
Id. at 41.
n134
Id.
n135
JACOBS,
supra note 114, 185-186. Workers in the "freight unit"
became members of the Teamsters Union.
n136
Id. at 189 (quoting the Office of the State Comptroller praising the
reforms at the Javits Center).
n137
United States v. Dist. Council, 880 F.Supp. 1051, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
n138
United States v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 723 F. Supp. 203, 206
(S.D.N.Y 1989).
n139
United States v. Dist. Council, 880 F.Supp. at 1060-1065.
n140 "The
District Council makes the following general objections to the those
rules in which the IRO 'conducts' the election: (1) It sends a message
to the membership that the current officers cannot be trusted to run a
fair election; (2) The IRO is 'posturing, posing, and grandstanding';
(3) The IRO seeks to move as many possible functions over to his staff
so that he may enhance the financial position of his firm; (4) The
election rules were meant to guide and prepare the District Council to
conduct future elections, but will not do so, if the IRO does everything
himself; (5) There is no history of corruption or intimidation in
District Council elections, and the only suggestion of such a climate,
detailed in the IRO's Interim Report of October 4, 1994, was based on
hearsay and innuendo, and motivated by the IRO's anti-incumbent bias."
Id. at 1067; see also
id. at 1067-1070.
n141
Id. at 1070-1075.
n142
Id. at 1066-1067.
n143
Id. at 1059.
n144
Final Rules for the 1995 Election of the Executive Committee of the
District Council of Carpenters of New York City and Vicinity at § 2, P1
(March 1995) (crimes include extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny,
burglary, arson, etc.).
n145
Id. at § 2, P2(B).
n146
Id. at § 3, PP3-4.
n147
Id. at § 3, P8.
n148
Id. at § 3, PP5-6.
n149
Id. at § 4, PP1-2.
n150
Id. at § 5, PP1-5.
n151
Id. at § 9, P1.
n152
Id. at § 7.
n153
Third Interim Report,
supra 110, at 10.
n154
Id. at 3.
n155 Jack
Newfield,
Sleazy does it in vote for carpenters' prez, N.Y. POST,
June 13, 1995 (in Third Interim Report,
supra note 110, Exhibit
2).
n156
Third Interim Report,
supra note 110, at 23.
n157
Id. at 23-24.
n158
Id. at 25. Ecco Staffing, Inc., a company recommended by the
American Arbitration Association, provided the assistants.
n159 Mail
ballots were used by disabled members or members living more than 75
miles away.
Id.
n160
Id.
n161
Id. at 5. The individual results were as follows: Frederick Devine
received 4,265 of 7,553 votes (56.6%) for President; William Reardon
received 4,159 of 7,143 votes (58.2%) for First Vice President; William
Hanley received 4,299 of 7,190 votes (59.8%) for Second Vice President;
Robert Cavaugh received 4,301 of 6,927 votes (68.3%) for
Secretary/Treasurer; Raymond O'Kane received 4,077 of 7,115 votes
(57.3%) for Chairman of the Trustees.
Id. at 38.
n162
Id. at 15.
n163
Id. at 16. Devine reported contributing $ 10,000 and Reardon, Hanley
and Cavanaugh each contributed $ 5,000.
n164
Id.
n165
Id. at 18.
n166
Id.
n167
Id. at 20.
n168
Id. at 52.
n169
Id. at 38.
n170
See Jacobs & Santore,
supra note 1, (describing how the mob
faction won the first free election in IBT Local 560). The classic study
on the apathy of union members is SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, MARTIN A. TROW
& JAMES S. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY: THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION (Free Press 1956).
n171
Sixth Interim Report of the Investigations and Review Officer at 24,
United States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL 704811 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994)
(No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)) (Mar. 4, 1997) [hereinafter Sixth Interim
Report].
n172
Ninth Interim Report of the Investigations and Review Officer at 31,
United States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL 704811 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994)
(No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)) (Mar. 4, 1997) [hereinafter Ninth Interim
Report].
n173
Sixth Interim Report,
supra note 172, at 23-24.
n174
Ninth Interim Report,
supra note 173, at 32.
n175
Sixth Interim Report,
supra note 172, at 25.
n176
Id. at 25-26.
n177
Eighth Interim Report of the Investigations and Review Officer at 13-14,
United States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL 704811 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994)
(No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)) (Nov. 28, 1997) [hereinafter Eighth Interim
Report].
n178
Id. at. 17.
n179
Id. at 22.
n180
Ninth Interim Report,
supra note 173, at 31.
n181
Id. at 27.
n182
Id. at 28-29.
n183
Sixth Interim Report,
supra note 172, at 15-23.
n184
Fifth Interim Report,
supra note 131, at 2.
n185
Id.
n186
Id. at
3.
n187
Id at 3-4.
n188
Id at 25.
n189
Id at 5.
n190
Id at 26-30.
n191
Id at 26.
n192
Id at 31.
n193
Devine v. McCarron, No. 96 Civ. (CSH) 5093, 1997 WL 379708, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1997)
n194
Id. at *7.
n195
Devine v. McCarron, No. 96 Civ. (CSH) 5093, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16816,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1997).
n196
Sixth Interim Report,
supra note 172, at 12-13. The union had
paid Devine's son, Michael, $ 90,000 a year and provided him a new car.
n197
Id. at 13. Cohen was subsequently indicted for stealing more than $
150,000 from the District Council by overbilling for reimbursable
expenses and inflating expenses of a lobbyist who worked for him.
Impediments to Union Democracy Part II: Right to Vote in the Carpenter's
Union? Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Employer-Employee Relations of the
House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 105th Cong. at § IV, P E
(June 25, 1998) [hereinafter
Impediments to Union Democracy Part II]
(prepared statement of Douglas J. McCarron, General President, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America). Cohen pleaded guilty
to falsifying records. National Legal and Policy Center,
New York
Union Attorney Loses License, 2 UNION CORRUPTION UPDATE 13, June 21,
1999,
at
http://www.nlpc.org/olap/UCU/02_13.htm.
n198
Selwyn Raab,
Former Chief of Carpenters' Union Convicted of Stealing
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998, at B3.
n199
Ninth Interim Report,
supra note 173, at 2.
n200
Eighth Interim Report,
supra note 178, at 2-4.
n201
Impediments to Union Democracy Part II, supra note 197, at § I
(prepared statement of Douglas J. McCarron).
n202
Id. at 22.
n203
Id. at 4.
n204
Local Unions v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 1997 WL 630179 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 9, 1997).
n205
United States v. Dist. Council, 972 F. Supp. 756, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
The consent decree requires prior court approval only for changes
proposed by the IRO. The Restructuring Plan was proposed by the UBC.
n206 "The
national plan calls for regional and district council officers to be
elected by the delegates to the council. The International has come to
believe that such a voting system should be implemented at the District
Council." Ninth Interim Report,
supra note 173, at 12.
n207
Impediments to Union Democracy Part II, supra note 197, at § III
(prepared statement of Douglas J. McCarron).
n208
Id.
n209
Id. at 5-6.
n210 On
June 25, 1998, the Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations of the
Committee on Education and the Workforce of the United States Congress
held a hearing called "Impediments to Union Democracy Part II: Right to
Vote in the Carpenters' Union?" at which Carpenter Union members
described their objections to the UBC Trusteeship.
See Impediments to
Union Democracy Part II app. F,
supra note 197, at 101,
available at
http://edworkforce.house.gov/hearings/105th/eer/ud62598/lebo.htm
(statement of William S. Lebo) ("I believe the New York City District
Councils [sic] take over had less to do with fighting corruption and
more to do with Douglas McCarron's methodical creation of his personal
and publicized goal of restructuring of our union, which is no more than
the building of his own private empire");
see also Impediments to
Union Democracy Part II app. E,
supra note 197, at 93-94,
available at
http://edworkforce.house.gov/hearings/105th/eer/ud62598/luguori.htm
(statement of John F. Liguori) ("The New York District Council, the only
District Council which because of the Consent Degree [sic], had elected
its leaders under the democratic principles of 'one man-one vote' has
met the same fate as its sister Unions . . . These new by-laws shift all
power of governance and self-determination from the Local Unions (and
from the members) and centralize authority in the regional council whose
members are hand picked McCarron appointees.").
n211
Tenth Interim Report of the Investigations and Review Officer at 10-11,
United States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL 704811 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994)
(No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)) (Dec. 3, 1998) [hereinafter Tenth Interim
Report] ("In sum, but for the provision in the proposed by-laws by which
the executive committee is selected by the delegates to the District
Council, the IRO broadly endorses their implementation by the District
Council");
see also Tenth Interim Report at 11 n.8 ("The IRO's
decision regarding the manner by which the executive committee should be
selected should not be construed as a criticism of the delegate voting
method, nor as a prediction that such a system would not, in fact, yield
. . . democratic results").
n212
Id. at 7.
n213 The
District Council of New York City and Vicinity of the UBC By-Laws, § 4
at http://www.local157.com/by_laws.htm.
n214
Id. at § 8.
n215 See
Final Rules for the 2002 Election of the Executive Committee and the
Delegate Body of the District Council of New York City and Vicinity of
the UBC, § IX.B.
at
http://www.nycdistrictcouncil.com/assets/Final%20Rules%20for%20the%202002%20Election.pdf.
n216
Id.
n217
United States v. Dist. Council, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8781, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1999).
n218
Id.
n219
Id. at *18.
n220
See
United States v. Dist. Council, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10527, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1999)
n221
Id. at *13.
n222
United States v. Dist. Council, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8781, at *21.
n223
United States v. District Council, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10527, at
*17.
n224
Id.
n225
Ninth Interim Report,
supra note 173, at 3.
n226
Tenth Interim Report,
supra note 212, at 1 n.1.
n227
United States v. Dist. Council, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8781, at *22
n.4. Conboy also has his critics. For example, "The IRO's tenure under
the consent decree was about to expire at the time the UBC took over our
council, the UBC extended his tenure at the time of the take over at the
cost of sixty-five thousand a month. Ever since, the IRO has been
writing shining reports to the court regarding Mr. McCarron's actions
and it seems every time he writes a report he gets another extension of
his tenure."
Impediments to Union Democracy Part II app. F,
supra note 197, at 101,
available at
http://edworkforce.house.gov/hearings/105th/eer/ud62598/lebo.htm
(statement of William S. Lebo).
Conboy's Sixth Interim Report says that some union members who
complained about the International trusteeship were Devine supporters
with, in some cases, ties to organized crime. Sixth Interim Report,
supra note 172, at 11-12.
n228
Since the trusteeship ended, President McCarron has been tarnished by
his involvement in the "Ullico Scandal." McCarron was a board member of
the union-dominated insurance firm Ullico, which was linked to the now
bankrupt firm, Global Crossing. He, along with other board members,
allegedly cashed in approximately 71,000 Ullico shares at the expense of
union pension funds. Though this scandal doesn't involve any organized
crime connection and may not even involve criminal wrongdoing, it
certainly suggests improper profiteering by top union officials.
See
National Legal and Policy Center,
ULLICO Scandal Grows: Maddaloni,
McCarron, Bahr Sold Shares, 5 UNION CORRUPTION UPDATE 8, Apr. 15,
2002,
at
http://nlpc.org/olap/UCU3/05_08_02.htm.
n229 Tom
Robbins,
Back to the Mob, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 19, 2000, at
31.
n230
Id.
n231
Eighth Interim Report,
supra note 178, at 21.
n232
Fourth Interim Report of the Investigations and Review Officer at 7,
United States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL 704811 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994)
(No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)) (Mar. 15, 1996).
n233
Sixth Interim Report,
supra note 172, at 26-27.
n234
United States v. Dist. Council, 2002 WL 31873460 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24,
2002), 171 L.R.R.M. 3031 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 2002).
n235
Stipulation and Order at 1-5, United States v. Dist. Council, 1994 WL
704811 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994) (No. 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH)) (Dec. 17,
2002). Shop stewards were supposed to be assigned to jobs based on their
place on the out-of-work list when their skills matched those requested
for the job. According to Clarke, this system was corrupted by
manipulation of listed and requested skills. As a remedy, the rules were
changed so that: requests by shop stewards to change their listed skills
would not take effect until 30 days after the request; a District
Council business agent would be assigned to oversee every job with a
shop steward; and a District Council officer responsible for managing
the out-of-work list would review all dispatch requests and flag for
investigation those which meet given requirements for arousing
suspicion.
n236
Id. at 5.
n237
Id. at 5-13. "The Independent Investigator shall have the authority
to investigate allegations of wrongdoing concerning the operation of the
job referral system and/or corruption or violations of federal, state,
or local law by District Council representatives, including without
limitation officers, employees, delegates, business managers, business
agents, and shop stewards (hereinafter, 'District Council
Representatives'), concerning the operation of the job referral system;
to recommend disciplinary charges against District Council
Representatives as well as against officers, employees and members of
the constituent local unions for such wrongdoing or for the failure of
any officer or member to cooperate with the Independent Investigator; to
make referrals to the District Council and/or law enforcement agencies
for further investigation when appropriate; and to report to the Court
and/or the Government as appropriate. The Independent Investigator shall
operate the toll-free 'hotline' telephone service . . . in order to
solicit and receive allegations of wrongdoing or corruption by any
person in connection with the operations of the District Council,
whether or not such allegations relate to the job referral system. The
Independent Investigator shall conduct an assessment of the District
Council's anti-corruption efforts as set forth in paragraph 6(f),
infra."
Id at 6.
n238
Id. at 2.
n239
Herman Benson,
At the House Hearings on Union Democracy, 120
UNION DEMOCRACY REVIEW,
at
http://www.thelaborers.net/aud/AUD_hearings.html.
n240
Dissident carpenters have formed the Carpenters for a Democratic Union
International (CDUI). They demand "one member, one vote" for all union
positions, direct membership votes on contracts, and direct election of
delegates. John Kirkland,
Some Comments on the Carpenters and "The
State of Today's Trade Union Movement", THE LABOR STANDARD,
at
http://www.laborstandard.org/New_Postings/John_Kirkland_comments.htm.
They publish CDUI News.
See http://www.ranknfile.net.
n241 This
is not the only example of union voters returning members of the old
corrupt regime to office. The same thing happened in IBT Local 560.
There too, the trustee ultimately negated the election by having the
president removed.
See Jacobs & Santore,
supra note 1,
142-44.
n242
Robbins,
supra note 230, at 31.
n243
Barbara Ross & Greg B. Smith,
Mob-Extortion Probe Leads To 38
Arrests, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, Sept. 7, 2000, at 6.
n244
National Legal and Policy Center,
Massive New York Probe Nabs 11
Union Bosses, 3 UNION CORRUPTION UPDATE 19, Sept. 11, 2000,
at
http://nlpc.org/olap/UCU2/03_19.htm.
n245
Forde's father, who also served as UBC president of Local 608, was
convicted of bribery in 1990.
n246 NYC
District Council of Carpenters, "Union Elections 2002,"
at
http://www.nycdistrictcouncil.com/unofficial_elections.htm.
n247
Indictment at 4-8, United States v. Parrello, (S.D.N.Y.) (01 Crim. 1120)
(Dec. 5, 2001).
n248
Id. at 53-56.
n249
Jacobs & Santore,
supra note 1, at 152-53.
n250
See Table II in Appendix below.