100 Colum. L. Rev. 2157, *

 
Copyright (c) 2000 The Columbia Law Review
Columbia Law Review

December, 2000

100 Colum. L. Rev. 2157

LENGTH: 18396 words

NOTE: AN OFFER THE TEAMSTERS COULDN'T REFUSE: THE 1989 CONSENT DECREE ESTABLISHING FEDERAL OVERSIGHT AND ENDING MECHANISMS

NAME: Andrew B. Dean

SUMMARY:
... "The Teamsters' union is as free of corruption as any great institution. ... 115 At the very least, this leaves a perception that the union leadership brokered a deal that would preserve their interests (i.e., their pensions) at the expense of the Teamsters rank and file (i.e., expensive, potentially unending oversight). ... 140 In the Teamsters Consent Decree, the government did not charge the court with the task of ending oversight, as has been recommended in this Note. ... 160 The Consent Decree with the Teamsters governs the IBT, or the International. ... 200 In addition to intimidating and coercing union members, organized crime subverted democracy and took control of the Teamsters. ...  

HIGHLIGHT: In 1989, members of the Teamsters union and the federal government entered into a consent decree subjecting the union to potentially unending federal oversight. The Consent Decree did not establish any mechanism by which oversight would end, marking the first time that a major union was subjected to such severe oversight. This Note argues that, while the government was right in substantially infringing upon the Teamsters, the government should have developed some mechanism by which oversight would end. In an ideal situation, the most effective way to structure a consent decree or judicial judgment in cases of long-term and significant corruption is to establish oversight that ends only when the court decides that a set of clearly articulated, publicly known, and substantive criteria are met. In this case, and in future cases of oversight, consent decrees and judicial judgments should adopt criteria that include the reduction of corruption and the establishment of democracy-reinforcing principles.

TEXT:
 [*2157]  Introduction
 
"The Teamsters' union is as free of corruption as any great institution." 1 It is ironic that the union's president, James Hoffa, Jr., son of the prominent racketeer and former Teamsters president Jimmy Hoffa, 2 should be the voice declaring the decade-long oversight of the Teamsters a success. It is also curious that this success should be qualified by comparing it to other institutions. 3

For decades, corruption and scandal were the hallmarks of the Teamsters. During the past four decades, the Teamsters leadership, from  [*2158]  Dave Beck to Jackie Presser, 4 has been subject to repeated investigations. 5 One of the most important pieces of legislation aimed at democratizing unions, the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, failed to alter the union's lawless culture. 6 Government attacks on the locals, 7 prosecutions of criminal elements within the union, and even supervision by a government monitor could not identify and eliminate the corruption that had infiltrated every level of the Teamsters. 8 La Cosa Nostra ran the Teamsters. 9

 [*2159]  In the late 1980s, the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, led by Rudolph Giuliani, 10 ushered in a new era for the Teamsters and unions everywhere 11 when it decided to deploy the provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute against the Teamsters - a novel approach to addressing criminal control of an international union. 12 In 1989, under siege by the government and with RICO dangling like the sword of Damocles, the Teamsters leadership signed a consent decree ceding decisionmaking power of many important internal matters to a variety of court-appointed outside monitors. 13 In part, the Consent Decree made an Independent Review Board (IRB) a permanent part of the union's constitution. 14 The IRB, appointed jointly by the United States government and the Teamsters, could promulgate rules necessary to monitor and prosecute corruption within the union, and a federal judge was to review any conflicts in the application and interpretation of the Consent Decree. 15

Since 1989, corruption in the Teamsters has decreased. In 1991, Ron Carey became the first democratically elected Teamsters' president in modern Teamsters history. While the rank and file at first objected to the new rules, Carey cooperated with the IRB's oversight. 16 With the new watchdog, hundreds of highly ranked officials were removed from office, and numerous criminal investigations were launched in order to clean up the union. Today, organized crime is no longer an overt threat, and the Teamsters continue to hold democratic elections for all major offices. 17

However, the Consent Decree is not an unqualified success. One section in particular has recently provoked much controversy - the permanent status of the Independent Review Board. Since 1999, the newly elected president James Hoffa, Jr. has been asking that the federal government cease the decade-long government oversight which to that date  [*2160]  had cost the union about $ 82 million. 18 Because of Hoffa's initial reluctance to endorse a presidential candidate in the 2000 election, it was speculated that he would peg a presidential endorsement of the 1.4 million-member union to the candidate who pledged to end oversight. 19 In August 1999, the current United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Mary Jo White, stated that withdrawal would be premature. 20 Law enforcement officials, while acknowledging that corruption in the union was down, pointed to pockets of corruption in a number of the union's 600 locals. 21

This Note explores whether the federal oversight should end by analyzing two related criteria: (1) the relative success of anti-corruption efforts of the government and union; and (2) the extent to which democracy-reinforcing mechanisms have been installed in the union. Part I outlines the history of the Teamsters leading up to the 1989 Consent Decree and establishment of the IRB. Part II explains the necessity of using severe remedies in instances where unions have a well-developed history of corruption, as the Teamsters do. This section suggests that the federal government should have included a provision for the withdrawal of the government from the internal affairs of the Teamsters. At the very least, the government should have supplied a mechanism by which the external monitoring would transfer to internal monitoring. The ideal mechanism would require the court, not the government, to determine when the oversight should end. Part III proposes that, because the government did not provide for a termination mechanism, the government should decide when to end federal oversight on the basis of two substantive criteria: reducing corruption and institutionalizing democracy-reinforcing principles (based on the RICO statute and Landrum-Griffin Act, respectively). These criteria could also be applied to other unions that have fallen into trusteeships. Finally, this section considers whether the government can successfully apply these criteria.

 [*2161] 

I. Background

A. Infamy: The Notorious Teamsters
 
The reach of corruption into every constituent level of the union helps to explain why the government established permanent oversight of the Teamsters 22 - a move unprecedented in labor law. 23

Nothing better reflects the breadth of Teamsters corruption than its leadership. The modern story of corruption begins in 1952 when Dave Beck became IBT General President. 24 In 1959 Beck was convicted of violating federal income tax laws; he was the first president of the Teamsters to be incarcerated. 25 His successor Jimmy Hoffa was the first IBT president clearly under the thumb of organized crime. 26 Hoffa was convicted of jury tampering in 1964, and in 1975 he disappeared permanently. 27 The next IBT president, Frank Fitzsimmons, was thought to  [*2162]  have mob ties, but was never indicted during his tenure. 28 His successor, Roy Williams, was convicted of trying to bribe a U.S. Senator. 29 Jackie Presser, president from 1983 until the federal oversight began, was known to have mob ties and was implicated in a number of suspect dealings. 30 Through a manipulated election and appointment process, these incumbents were able to ensure handpicked successors or to guarantee the reelection of the IBT Executive Board. 31 Because this electoral process ensured continuous, corrupt leadership, the Teamsters could assert substantial control over select industries in the national economy. 32

The Teamsters corruption ran from the local to the international level of the union. Generally, as organized crime infiltrates a particular local, the criminal activity spreads and the local becomes captured; 33 reform groups are intimidated and suppressed. 34 Ultimately, the influence over a few locals can lead to control of the international. 35 The corrupt international officers, in turn, assert authority over those locals that are not yet controlled by organized crime. 36 This relationship of corruption  [*2163]  between local and international will be referred to as the "reciprocal effect" 37 of union corruption. The reciprocal effect of corruption ensured that organized crime would be able to influence every major decision made by the IBT or local.

Understanding the day-to-day operation of labor racketeering 38 provides some insight into the ability of a few corrupt officials to sink the Teamsters by spreading into every cabin of the union. On the most basic level, racketeers often steal membership dues. 39 The more sophisticated and bold racketeers engage in strike insurance, 40 sweetheart deals, 41 and pension abuse fraud. 42 As the racketeers begin to realize the possibilities in unions, violence becomes necessary to consolidate and coordinate the various activities. 43 The corrupt officers of the Teamsters perfected these activities, making the union ripe for government intervention.

B. Intervention: The 1989 Consent Decree

1. Possible Remedies. - Traditionally, when corruption is identified in a union, a number of remedies are available to both the union and the government. First, remedies are available within the union infrastructure. Ideally, the rank and file can vote the corrupt officials out of office. 44 Furthermore, a union member can inspect the union's books and  [*2164]  records, 45 and the union can then take the necessary disciplinary action, including restitution or discharge of the offending officials. 46 If corruption has taken hold of an entire local union, the Landrum-Griffin Act allows the parent international or national union to establish a trusteeship over the local. 47 This often means replacing the local's officials and overseeing its finances. 48 Finally, unions can establish independent public review boards to serve as a neutral organ in policing corruption. 49 However, these remedies are only effective where union corruption exists in small pockets that can be removed with a few measured cuts while the infrastructure is left intact. In the Teamsters case, the government realized that more systemic reform was necessary.

In handling more extensive corruption that could not be addressed by piecemeal remedies, the government could take advantage of the benefits of institutional reform, and the government had a few options in the Teamsters case. 50 First, before 1970, common law receiverships and the Landrum-Griffin Act allowed the state to establish a trusteeship over a corrupt union. 51 However, because of the inadequacies of the Landrum-Griffin Act in fighting institutional corruption on a grand scale, 52 Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 53 which gave the government broad discretion to reorganize 54 a corrupt union. 55 This discretion included the ability to discharge officials,  [*2165]  to run elections, and to oversee all aspects of union governance. For the first time the government had a mechanism to shape the ideal union - a mechanism later used on the Teamsters. 56

2. The Government's Response to the Teamsters' Corruption. - The government's response to the Teamsters corruption came with much anticipation in June 1988. 57 After successfully using RICO against a number of local unions, the government decided that expanding the statute's application to the international union was an appropriate step in the new war on corrupt unions. The United States Department of Justice filed a RICO suit against the Teamsters seeking to remove IBT executive board members found to have violated RICO, to appoint a trustee to discharge the duties of the executive board, and to hold new elections free of intimidation. 58 The Justice Department alleged that La Cosa Nostra 59 had captured the IBT through control of top international officers. 60 Through the RICO suit, the government sought to eliminate organized crime's "ready access to union funds and jobs and free reign over certain IBT Locals, which La Cosa Nostra figures have used as instrumentalities to extort monies from employers." 61 The government hoped to gain a temporary trusteeship before the litigation began, but District Court Judge David Edelstein decided to hold an evidentiary hearing before granting any relief. 62 Just hours before the trial was to begin, however, the government and the union defendants entered into a consent decree that would define the fate of the union indefinitely. 63

 [*2166] 

C. Permanency: The Consent Decree and the Independent Review Board (IRB)
 
The decree mandated two stages of implementation. First, a court-appointed Independent Administrator was to oversee the efforts of an Investigations Officer and an Election Officer. 64 The Independent Administrator, who shared power equally with the IBT president, was empowered to remove or discipline any officer or member, impose trusteeships over corrupt locals, and veto any IBT decision that appeared to further the interests of organized crime or racketeers. The Investigations Officer was given the broad power to investigate corruption within the union and to bring disciplinary charges against the violators. The Election Officer was given broad authority to conduct a democratic, direct election for IBT positions until the implementation of the secret ballot election in 1991. 65 The Consent Decree permanently changed elections, allowing rank and file secret ballot election of Convention delegates for the first time. 66 This first stage of the Consent Decree was scheduled to end after the 1996 IBT election. 67

In the second stage of the decree, which would begin after December 1991, the IBT Constitution was to be amended to incorporate a three-member Independent Review Board (IRB) to replace the Administrator. 68 The Attorney General and the union were to each select one member of the IRB, and these two appointed members would jointly select a third. 69 The IRB was authorized to hire a sufficient staff of investigators and attorneys to investigate (1) any allegation of corruption, including bribery, embezzlement, extortion, loan sharking, violation of 29 U.S.C. 530 of the Landrum-Griffin Act, Taft-Hartley Criminal violations, or Hobbs Act violations; (2) any allegations of domination or control or influence of any IBT affiliate, member or representative by La Cosa Nostra or any other organized crime entity or group; or (3) any failure to cooperate fully with the Independent Review Board in any investigation. 70

After an investigation, the IRB was to issue a report detailing its "findings, charges, and recommendations concerning the discipline of union officers, members, employees, and representatives and concerning the placing in trusteeship of any IBT subordinate body." 71 The findings of the IRB would be final and binding, and the General Executive Board of the Teamsters was obliged to implement its decisions. 72 The Teamsters  [*2167]  was to pay all the costs and expenses of the IRB and all of its investigations. 73

The Consent Decree allowed the United States to establish a permanent sentinel within the Teamsters infrastructure. While the government gave no indication when or if the oversight would end, it expressed the hope that such a significant infringement upon union autonomy would "take back the Teamsters from the Mafia." 74

II. The Complexities of Unending Remedies

A. The Need for Such an Infringement on the Teamsters
 
Some argue that the Consent Decree infringed too severely on the autonomy of the Teamsters. The Teamsters is the only major union ever to be subject to a potentially permanent governmental watchdog and administrator while other less intrusive remedies might have adequately dealt with the union's corruption. 75 Professor Clyde W. Summers puts the question most pointedly: "If we believe in union democracy, in the right of union members to elect their officers and to decide their union's policies, how can we justify imposing a trusteeship which displaces the officers and deprives members of full control of their union?" 76

In the case of the Teamsters, however, the government was wise to take off its gloves. In retrospect, the government's approach was appropriate in light of (1) prior experiences with trusteeships and the historical entrenchment of Teamsters' corruption through oligarchic control, (2) the subsequent reaction of Teamsters' officials after the Consent Decree, and (3) the need to protect the union and society. Whether the government's actions were excessive will be considered in the next section.

First, it is an accepted practice to use trusteeships in some instances to address breakdowns in internal union governance. 77 However, trusteeships with too weak a mandate, too limited remedial authority, or too little resolve on the part of the government or the trustee, have often failed to rid unions of corruption. 78

 [*2168]  One such failure helped to set the stage for the current oversight. When corruption in Hoffa's Teamsters became extreme in the 1950s, 79 a group of union reformers attempted to place the entire international into receivership. 80 The litigation resulted in a consent decree establishing a court-appointed Board of Monitors 81 until a new convention was held and new elections conducted. 82 While successfully restoring autonomy to some locals, the Board "displayed a passive and tolerant attitude" 83 toward what one Monitor called "trouble spots." 84 Ultimately, the Board of Monitors fell into disuse with the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 85 which preempted suits to overturn elections. Thus, the first attempt at reforming the international Teamsters with a limited remedy failed. 86

Similarly, limited attempts at transforming the Teamsters locals have failed to rid the IBT of corruption. After the prosecution of members of the disreputable Teamsters Local 560, 87 the District Court of New Jersey created a trusteeship over the local in 1987 and granted broad power to  [*2169]  the trustee. After eighteen months, the court 88 extended the receivership because, in the words of the trustee, the local was "still suffering from the effects of more than twenty five years of racketeer domination." 89 Despite the extension, the 1988 election resulted in the defeat of the reform candidates and the election of the relatives of two disqualified candidates. 90 Many saw the outcome of this election as "a referendum on the RICO trusteeship itself." 91 Because the corruption was so clearly entrenched, the trustee could not get the union members to commit to ridding the union of corruption through self-governance. 92

Leading up to the 1989 Consent Decree of the IBT, then, the government had learned that more robust remedies would be needed in order to rid the Teamsters of the effects of decades of corruption. Randy Mastro, former Assistant United States Attorney who led the charge against the Teamsters in 1989, noted:


 
Prior to the enactment of the RICO statute, the federal government's supervision of labor unions principally entailed enforcement of the labor laws, coupled with criminal prosecutions of corrupt individuals. This limited approach to regulation sometimes permitted unions with sordid histories to remain mired in corruption even in the midst of scrutiny by the Labor Department and other regulatory and law enforcement agencies. 93


 
In the absence of robust remedies, the entrenched corruption can simply wait until oversight has ended to continue its illegal activity.

The brand of Teamsters' corruption also makes it clear why limited trusteeships were doomed to fail. On the most general level, the oligarchic tendencies of unions can strengthen the ruling regime. 94 When the  [*2170]  regime becomes corrupt, the democratic breakdowns become more pronounced and the corruption more entrenched. Candidates for union office proposing reform are intimidated and sometimes killed. 95 The power of the IBT office is used to maintain that power, and the reciprocal effect 96 of corruption ensures that locals and the international are both captured by corrupt elements.

Second, the events after the signing of the Consent Decree serve as ex post evidence that a robust remedy was needed. The pre-Consent Decree Teamsters regime did not intend to cooperate with the government. "Removals were contested, election rules disputed, and as many of the consent decree's provisions as possible ignored or evaded...." 97 Because the delegates at the 1991 convention rejected the terms of the Consent Decree, the required constitutional reforms were imposed by the court. 98 The corrupt officials attempted to remain in office until the 1991 election, which they were confident that they could win. 99 However, the trustees, the government, and the presiding judge successfully pursued and prosecuted corrupt officials, and the old regime began to crumble.

Finally, the infringement of robust remedies can be justified on the grounds that the union, businesses, and consumers will benefit from honest unions. Clean unions meet more success in collective bargaining than corrupt unions, and they may be more prone to cater to the needs of the  [*2171]  rank and file in the twenty-first century. 100 Corrupt American unions may push employers to seek cheaper labor and fewer headaches overseas. 101 Because of the decreasing number of union members and the sullied reputation of unions, corrupt unions discourage honest workers who would otherwise unionize. Similarly, union corruption exacts a toll on businesses and consumers who often pay higher prices due to the corruption. 102

Thus far, history has treated the Consent Decree well. While the Consent Decree may have been unpopular with some in the labor unions, many commentators have acknowledged that significant oversight was warranted in the case of the Teamsters. 103 In certain limited circumstances - when a union cannot be distinguished from its corruption - substantial infringement of a union's autonomy is necessary in order to serve the interests of the rank and file and the public at large.

B. The Need for a Mechanism to Shut Down Oversight

1. The Need for Outer Limits on a Trusteeship's Broad Mandate. - Trusteeships with broad authority are appropriate in certain circumstances, but there must be a clearly defined outer limit to that authority. 104 A number of factors weigh against the potentially unlimited oversight that is imbued in the Consent Decree's IRB. First, potentially unending oversight tramples the right of union workers to have an autonomous, self-governing union. Historically, workers have fought for the right to represent themselves collectively, and after generations of legal and social struggle, the laws have developed to preserve the independence and self-governance of unions. 105 Congress's passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act most clearly sets forth the general policy that unions "are fully competent  [*2172]  to regulate union affairs," 106 and establishes that there should be only "minimum interference by Government." 107 Only through autonomous rule of the union can memberships' rights be fully defended and articulated, 108 and most agree that democratic self-governance is the bedrock of a successful union. 109 The aggressive oversight involved in a RICO civil injunction can have the unintended effect of undermining the very union members' rights 110 that the trusteeship was established to protect. 111

In order to remain consistent with the fundamental notions of union self-governance, a trusteeship should make its goal clear and transparent. This would alert union members and officials that oversight will end, for instance, when corruption is reduced and democracy-reinforcing principles are introduced - not simply when the government decides to withdraw. 112 In this sense, much like installing oversight in the first place,  [*2173]  devising a mechanism whereby the oversight will end vindicates the notion of union democracy. 113

The second problem with potentially unending oversight involves the representativeness of the officials who agreed to the oversight. Although the government's complaint sought to take the old guard's pensions and bar its corrupt members from the union, 114 the Consent Decree allowed the pensions to be paid. 115 At the very least, this leaves a perception that the union leadership brokered a deal that would preserve their interests (i.e., their pensions) at the expense of the Teamsters rank and file (i.e., expensive, potentially unending oversight). It is also not clear that the interests of the rank and file were taken into account in events leading up to the Consent Decree. 116 Moreover, in a peculiar constitutional maneuver, pursuant to the Consent Decree, the democratically elected delegates at the new convention were "forced to vote to accept changes in their union's fundamental law that the discredited old guard had negotiated, whether the delegates wanted to or not." 117 Thus, the rank and file had reason to question the circumstances surrounding the signing of the Consent Decree. 118

 [*2174]  Third, potentially unending governmental intervention can backfire and undermine a movement to end corruption. Early attacks on Jimmy Hoffa's Teamsters led to "a sense of defiance" amongst the rank and file. 119 Union advocates frequently view trusteeships as a form of union busting. 120 Corrupt officials can use the government's intrusiveness as a potent rallying cry in union elections - shifting the focus from the clean up effort to the government's intrusiveness. 121

Fourth, unlimited oversight gives too much power to politicians and their appointees who may decide when the oversight should end. The prosecution of the Teamsters had political implications throughout. Rudolph Giuliani, then the U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York, wanted to file suit before the Justice Department's Organized Crime and Racketeering Department could do so. 122 There is no indication that the political undercurrent of the Teamsters oversight has disappeared. 123 In deciding to end oversight, one of two undesirable results may occur: political pressure may result in either an inappropriate extension or an inappropriate termination of the oversight. First, because of the failures of limited oversight in the past, a prosecutor has no real incentive to seek termination of the Teamsters oversight. 124 The prosecutor  [*2175]  is not directly accountable to the union because the prosecutor is a political appointee. Moreover, a federal prosecutor in New York is unlikely to be swayed by union members who are dispersed throughout the nation. 125 Prosecutors can more realistically be charged with the duty of eliminating corruption than weighing the union's interest in democracy and autonomy. Realistically, the U.S. Attorney's only real incentive is to do its job in fighting crime, and since there will always be corruption in a union, it becomes difficult for the U.S. Attorney to end oversight without the aid of any guiding principles beyond "fight crime."

Alternatively, the political forces involved could push for oversight to end, possibly prematurely. For instance, there was speculation that the Teamsters endorsement in the 2000 presidential election was going to the candidate who was willing to end oversight. 126 Thus, there is the possibility that a politician could inappropriately put pressure on the U.S. Attorney's Office to expedite the termination of the oversight - a problem as real and as dangerous as ending oversight too early.

These arguments for placing an outer limit on oversight are similar to the arguments cautioning against the use of strict trusteeships in the first place. 127 The more severe the oversight, the more important these arguments become. Ultimately, this Note argues for the prohibition of a certain extreme form of oversight - oversight that is potentially permanent even if the union significantly reduces corruption.

2. Defining a Trusteeship's Outer Limits. - How, then, in a case of significant corruption should a consent decree or judicial judgment be structured in determining when the oversight will end? What content should be given to oversight's outer limit? This analysis begins with a simple proposition that is not opposed by any party in the Teamsters case: Oversight should never be permanent. 128 Even in the most extreme cases, there must be some clearly defined mechanism in place to end oversight, or else the notion of autonomous, democratic unions is lost.

 [*2176]  Generally, the government has a few options in deciding who or what determines when oversight should end: (1) an expiration date determined by the court or located in a consent decree, (2) the government, or (3) the court. Each of these options can have variations. For instance, the government or court can have complete discretion in determining whether oversight should end, or the government or court can be compelled to evaluate the trusteeship based on criteria stated in a consent decree or court ruling. This Note argues that the court should determine when oversight should end based on set criteria.

First, expiration dates on trusteeships are problematic. As already noted, prior trusteeships with definite expiration dates often have to be extended by the court. 129 Oftentimes these trusteeships have been a failure in part because the government and courts have miscalculated the time it would take to reform the union. For example, corrupt union officials may think that they need only survive for a year or two until they can be back to business as usual. 130 Expiration dates on trusteeships simply allow the old regime to drag its feet. Corrupt union officials can make enough concessions to the government and convince the membership that the government is the enemy. Only by stressing the requirement of substantive change as a requirement for the expiration of the trusteeship will the government prevent corrupt union officials from manipulating the trusteeship. 131

Second, the government should not determine whether to end oversight, regardless of whether it is evaluating stated criteria. As already noted, government officials may be overly vigilant in maintaining oversight. 132 Government is in the business of establishing the trusteeship, which might indicate that the government is less likely to end the oversight. Moreover, because of political pressures that may influence the government officials, government cannot neutrally decide when oversight should end. 133 Even if the government used stated criteria to determine whether to end oversight, the government could manipulate the criteria in favor of maintaining the trusteeship past an appropriate termination time. 134

The best option, then, is the court. This Note contends that the most effective way to structure the consent decree or judicial judgment in cases of long-term and significant corruption is to establish oversight that ends only when a  [*2177]  judge decides that a set of clearly articulated, publicly known, and substantive criteria are met. 135 In this ideal situation, a federal judge 136 will evaluate the criteria after hearing oral arguments from both sides and soliciting amicus briefs from interested parties. 137 Thus, the government and union have an opportunity to have any competing views arbitrated. Perhaps once a year, the union would be required to provide an assessment of clean up efforts to the court and would have the option to petition to end the oversight. 138 Through this process, the court could inform the union what further steps need to take place in order for oversight to terminate.

To be sure, the government in a consent decree could manipulate this situation by designing criteria that would be difficult to satisfy in almost any situation. However, the judge signing the consent decree or issuing a decision can protect the interests of the rank and file by ensuring that the criteria are fairly written into the consent decree. At the very least, a court-appointed representative who is not part of the union's hierarchy should negotiate on behalf of the union, thus preventing the type of self-dealing by union leaders that may have occurred in the Teamsters case. 139 If the judge could not ensure that the consent decree is substantively fair, at least the judge can ensure that the rank and file are represented in negotiations leading up to a consent decree.

III. Setting the Criteria for Ending Trusteeships
 
Whenever there is oversight of a union with a history of significant corruption such as the Teamsters, the trusteeship or oversight should end  [*2178]  based on the application of predetermined, substantive criteria. 140 In the Teamsters Consent Decree, the government did not charge the court with the task of ending oversight, as has been recommended in this Note. Because the government did not defer to the courts and did not include in the Consent Decree any criteria regarding when the Teamsters oversight would end, this Note will approach the question from the perspective of what the government's approach should be. The government should adopt criteria based on the twin goals of oversight: reducing the amount of corruption and institutionalizing democracy-reinforcing principles. 141

In evaluating whether any given trusteeship should end, the actual criteria may vary depending upon the circumstances of each union. These two broad criteria are a benchmark - corruption and democratic failures are the two primary reasons oversight is necessary. The following discussion, then, concerns the Teamsters RICO injunction. However, with some modification in application, these same principles can be used in future consent decrees or court judgments in deciding when oversight of a union should end. 142

A. Criterion 1: Reducing Corruption
 
Because the government prosecuted a suit against the Teamsters with the RICO statute, one criterion for the end of governmental oversight  [*2179]  should be a significant reduction in corruption and a low threat of future corruption. This recognizes that every union, like any institution, is prone to some level of corruption. 143 One method for arriving at this anti-corruption criterion is to look at the elements of the RICO statute required to impose a RICO trusteeship in the first place.

The RICO statute makes it unlawful (1) for a person engaging in a "pattern of racketeering activity... to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise," or (2) "for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise... to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." 144 The first provision reaches organized crime outside of the union while the second provision reaches members working within the union. 145 These principal elements of the RICO statute should be taken into account in deciding whether or not to end the oversight. Years after the prosecution of the IBT, former Assistant United States Attorney Randy Mastro outlined a roadmap that could serve as a guide for anyone desiring to use the RICO statute against a union, pointing out the key elements of the RICO statute that need to be proven. 146 These two elements have thus become well known in many legal circles. 147

In determining when the oversight should end, the government should rephrase the question RICO asks. The government should ask: (1) do organized crime and the union leadership still maintain "control over the union through a pattern of racketeering activity, facilitated by union leadership"? and (2) do organized crime and the union leadership "use[ ] their control to conduct the affairs of the union through a pattern of racketeering activity"? 148

In deciding whether organized crime still controls or influences the union enterprise, the government could take into account previous criminal  [*2180]  RICO prosecutions, 149 investigative reports, 150 Fifth Amendment invocations, 151 and expert testimony. 152 The government is equipped to determine to what extent the international and the locals of any given union are controlled by organized crime. 153 One suggestion is for the government to evaluate the level of corruption of all unions every few years. This would provide a benchmark for determining which unions might require oversight and which unions no longer need to be supervised by the government.

However, even if the clean up reduces corruption to a level that would not warrant oversight in the first place, it may still be too early to end the trusteeship. A Teamsters corruption rate similar to other unions that are generally corruption-free would not take into account, for instance, the five decades of corruption that completely permeated the Teamsters union. There would remain the possibility that entrenched, corrupt elements in the union have gone underground, waiting until the trusteeship was lifted. 154

Thus, in order to determine whether the trusteeship should end, the government should take into account the RICO elements, with teeth. The anti-corruption factors to be evaluated should include: (1) a determination of whether RICO predicates 155 are still being prosecuted at an  [*2181]  alarming rate, (2) separate evaluations of RICO predicates in the international and the locals, (3) an evaluation of the extent to which the corruption permeated the union in the first place, and what bearing this might have on future corruption, (4) a determination of whether a trustee is the most effective method of reducing corruption, (5) a determination of whether the union has developed internal mechanisms to investigate current corruption and deter future corruption, and (6) an evaluation of the attitude of union officials and the rank and file toward corruption. Each of these six factors are addressed, in turn, below.

1. RICO Predicates. - Perhaps the most obvious indication of whether oversight should end is the number of RICO predicates committed by members of the union. The Consent Decree gives the Independent Review Board and investigations officers broad authority in prosecuting alleged RICO predicates. 156 Until the first valid IBT election, court-appointed officers had full access to examine books and records, to attend meetings of the General Executive Board, to take and require depositions, to require independent audits, and to oversee every stage of the IBT election. 157 Similarly, the permanent IRB had the authority to hire a staff of investigators at the expense of the union and look into any matters of corruption. Thus, the government is probably able to uncover at least the most flagrant violations.

An increasing number of RICO predicate offenses would indicate that corruption is still a threat. In fact, since the oversight began, over 200 officers have been removed from office. 158 Comparing this rate of violations to the rates in other unions could help the government determine to what extent corruption is a problem in the IBT. 159

 [*2182] 

2. RICO Predicates in the Locals Versus the International. - There is an important distinction between corruption in the Teamsters International and the Teamsters locals. 160 The Consent Decree with the Teamsters governs the IBT, or the International. Having locals that are generally free of corruption does not mean that the IBT is necessarily clean. 161 Moreover, the fact that some locals may still be under the thumb of organized crime does not necessarily mean that oversight of the International is still warranted. 162 While there is always the possibility that a powerful, corrupt local can capture an international, the government can prevent the realization of this scenario by using RICO to prosecute the local 163 or by allowing the international to use the Landrum-Griffin Act to establish a trusteeship. In distinguishing between the level of corruption in the local and the international, then, a clean international should not be subject to oversight merely because of a few corrupt locals. 164

3. History of Corruption. - As already noted, the duration of the corruption should have some bearing on the duration of the oversight. 165 Decades of corruption will not end overnight. 166 The lack of law and democracy in a union is a problem that cannot be overcome by removing a few union officials. How the government should take this into account is unclear; after 10 years of oversight, there is inevitably a significant amount of turnover in the officer ranks.

4. Effectiveness of Trusteeship. - The government should also evaluate the success of the trusteeship. For instance, if the trusteeship has been successful and RICO prosecutions are dwindling, the union rank and file can be turned against the trusteeship. A union candidate can claim that it is time for the trusteeship to end - a claim that will be popular among the rank and file if the perception exists that oversight has achieved its purpose. 167 Instead of allowing union officials to focus on the oversight  [*2183]  for political purposes, it would better serve the union and the government to fight corruption in other ways, such as internal monitoring. 168 This does not mean that the trusteeship should be eliminated as soon as union officials start using it as a political issue. Rather, if the union is showing success in weeding out corruption, and the union officials turn the rank and file's opinion against the trusteeship, then the government or union should consider other effective and less unpopular mechanisms of oversight.

5. Development of Internal Mechanisms. - The government should not terminate the trusteeship without the assurance that the union will continue efforts to prevent future corruption. Many unions have instituted internal mechanisms, such as investigatory boards that have successfully thwarted corruption. 169 If the Teamsters wanted oversight to end, the incentive would be to establish permanent, internal bodies that can investigate possible corruption and racketeering. 170

In fact, the Teamsters recently have established the exact type of plan that should be a prerequisite for oversight to end. First, in June 1999, Hoffa, Jr., hired Edwin Stier, the former federal prosecutor who cleaned up Local 560, to set up an "in-house anti-corruption program." 171 Then, the Teamsters unveiled a plan that includes a Teamsters code of conduct and an internal ethics board to monitor violations. 172  [*2184]  Additionally, the union agreed to conduct a study investigating the level of corruption that exists in the locals and share the results with the Justice Department. 173 The government can examine this plan to ensure that it is not merely a cosmetic change designed to coopt the government into prematurely ending oversight.

6. Attitude Toward Corruption. - Finally, the government should gauge both the union officers' and members' attitudes toward corruption. One indication might be the amount of cooperation the union gives to the IRB in its investigations and the amount of effort it gives to fight corruption in general. 174 The Teamsters' recent efforts to help convict former IBT president Carey's campaign manager for diverting over $ 885,000 in union funds from the Teamsters to Carey's campaign indicate some willingness to continue the clean up process. Finally, the Teamsters hiring of Stier, who headed the clean up of Local 560, and the new anti-corruption plan also indicate hostility toward corruption. 175

Of course, the government needs to determine if the union's changes are merely cosmetic - intended to end oversight without any serious consideration to ending corruption. The government can evaluate an internal board on a probationary basis. If the internal body actually serves a function similar to the IRB and eliminates some level of corruption, that is a factor militating in favor of ending oversight.

B. Criterion 2: Enhancing Democracy-Reinforcing Principles
 
Second, in deciding when oversight should end, the government should evaluate the institutionalization of democracy-reinforcing principles within the IBT. 176 The rationale behind this approach comes from the purposes of the RICO statute and the Landrum-Griffin Act.

Corruption is perpetuated in part by corrupt elements obtaining control over and manipulating the democratic processes in unions. Therefore, mechanisms need to be implemented that help prevent corruption from seeping back into the system. 177 Second, although the government  [*2185]  chose not to use the Landrum-Griffin Act to prosecute the Teamsters, 178 the Consent Decree is replete with Landrum-Griffin principles. 179 Either way, most agree that the purpose of the trusteeship should be to "reestablish an effective and vital democratic process within the union." 180

The question, then, is: What conception of union democracy should be required of the Teamsters before oversight should end? Should the Teamsters have to measure up to an ideal notion of union democracy? Should they be as democratic as similarly situated unions? Or should union democracy be more robust?

A notion of procedural change seems insufficient if not coupled with any real substantive change. For instance, if suspected racketeers are continually voted in by the rank and file, the union offers little democratic legitimacy. 181 Similarly, having only one person run for a given union office, while formally democratic, does little to forward the principle of substantive democracy. Because of the entrenched corruption of the Teamsters, the conception of democracy should include both these procedural mechanisms and substantive changes as discussed below.

1. The Failure of Landrum-Griffin Democracy. - The government's conception of the type of democracy necessary in unions is found most clearly in the Landrum-Griffin Act. The Act's central premise is that freedom of speech and equal rights in a union will lead to full union participation and thus a truly democratic union. 182

Title I of the LMRDA contains the members' Bill of Rights, the purpose of which is to ensure equal rights and freedom of assembly and speech, to regulate dues, to protect a member's right to sue, and to provide safeguards in disciplining members. 183 Title II requires full financial disclosure of the unions and their officials. 184 Title III prevents the abuse  [*2186]  of an international's trusteeship over a local. 185 Title IV ensures fairness in the election process, aiming to end the financial and physical coercion of union members. 186 Title V establishes a fiduciary duty of the union officials to the union's members. These guarantee union members a voice in the discussion of union policies. 187

However, Landrum-Griffin democracy is flawed. First, while the principles of Landrum-Griffin democracy appear to reflect an American conception of democracy, 188 the link between democracy and corruption is problematic. Democratic processes often fail to ensure democratic results. 189 Second, perhaps to a fault, the Landrum-Griffin Act attempted to maintain "minimum interference by Government in the internal affairs of any private organization." 190 Without adequate safeguards, the Landrum-Griffin Act permitted those in power to manipulate the processes to perpetuate their own power. 191 For instance, it eventually became the established rule in the union that "the interpretation of the union's own constitutions was to be entrusted to the incumbent union officers themselves." 192 This allowed the leadership to govern the rules of campaigns, elections, and anti-corruption provisions. Moreover, the Act failed to include a provision mandating a union code of ethics - an omission  [*2187]  that allowed corrupt officials to prosper. 193 At its best, Landrum-Griffin democracy is successful only when a union is already relatively democratic and corruption free. 194 Therefore, it is unsurprising that Landrum-Griffin democracy failed to prevent the spread of corruption in the Teamsters union. 195

The practical democratic measures required to end oversight should be more robust than required in Landrum-Griffin democracy. However, the keystone principles of Landrum Griffin democracy - ensuring fair elections, increasing union responsiveness to the rank and file, and assuring union officials' adherence to ethical conduct 196 - will still be central to any enhanced conception of union democracy.

This Note suggests that the government should determine what vision of union democracy should be encouraged. The union democracy model would have to be realistic and attainable. How close the Teamsters are to such a model should also determine whether oversight should end.

2. Procedural Changes: The Procedural Mechanisms Necessary for Oversight to End. - To start, democracy-reinforcing principles demand the adoption of procedural mechanisms as a prerequisite to the termination of oversight. In order to understand the importance of the Consent Decree in transforming Teamsters elections, one must understand the Teamsters incumbency machine. 197 The membership at the locals elected delegates, who in turn were often elected at the convention. 198 Actually, the Teamsters electoral process differed from that of other unions in only one significant respect: The IBT combined a vote for local officials with the vote for national delegates, instead of holding separate votes. 199 Many of the delegates, then, served on an ex officio basis. These procedures prevented local union members from choosing different local officials and national delegates, and the time lag between the local election and convention often prevented the membership from knowing the national issues that would later emerge. 200 In addition to intimidating and  [*2188]  coercing union members, organized crime subverted democracy and took control of the Teamsters.

Based on this pre-oversight system, it was not difficult for the government to establish a new system that reflected a conception of union democracy that empowered the rank and file. First, the Consent Decree established a number of procedures that are a starting point for fulfilling the procedural democracy requirement. The IBT Constitution was amended to ensure that delegates to the IBT International convention be "chosen by direct rank-and-file secret balloting shortly before the election." 201 Officers would "be elected by direct rank-and-file voting by secret ballot in unionwide, one-member, one-vote elections." 202 An Election Officer, charged with overseeing the elections, was given the authority to supervise the balloting process and distribute any materials about the election to the union membership. 203 These measures were all designed to ensure that the union leadership would reflect the ballot of the union rank and file. 204 The rules governing elections came down through the Election Rules. 205 Moreover, 11 of the 16 vice-presidents would run on a regional rather than on an at-large basis, resulting in a decentralization of power that allows potential challengers to develop a base of political power. 206

Without these safeguards, the leadership heading into the 1991 election "would have been able to steal the election." 207 Procedural safeguards applied by the Election Officer included a mail ballot, 208 slate voting for candidates, 209 and equal access to union publications during elections. 210 In conjunction with these procedures, the Election Rules  [*2189]  gave the Election Officer a strong remedial power, including the power to remove a nominee and to require the IBT to distribute campaign literature at the union's expense. 211

One commentator observes that these procedures have made the Teamsters election process more fair and more democratic than most other unions. 212 In assessing whether oversight should end, the government should ask the following questions: (1) To what extent are these democratic rules embedded in the union's rules? (2) Will the Election Rules survive after oversight? (3) Will there be an effective remedial body to enforce the electoral requirements? 213 If the government wanted to ensure union democracy, it could strengthen the laws that regulate union elections, perhaps by expanding the role of the Department of Labor.

If these rules are adopted by the union membership into the IBT Constitution, the interest of union self-governance will be served. An internal election committee may lack the remedial authority of a governmental official whose authority was broadly interpreted by a district court judge. However, these rules and procedures are more robust than the rules and procedures of similarly situated unions. 214 The model is already in place, and the Teamsters need only (1) establish its own electoral system that grants open access to the union newspaper, (2) police the polling places or establish mail-in voting, or (3) provide for supervision of ballot-counting by the Department of Labor or some other group not part of the incumbency. 215

 [*2190] 

2. Substantive Changes: The Results Necessary for Oversight to End. - As already noted, establishing the Landrum-Griffin conception of procedural democracy did nothing to eradicate organized crime from the Teamsters. 216 By the time Landrum-Griffin was passed, the Teamsters corruption had already become entrenched under Hoffa, Sr. In the forty years after it was passed, organized crime used the Teamsters infrastructure as its base of operations. The failure of the Landrum-Griffin to rid the Teamsters of corruption demonstrates the difficulty of installing democratic processes in the face of the manipulation and influence of incumbency. Unions generally steer towards oligarchy, 217 and if only one candidate runs for IBT General President each election, the democratic principle of accurate ballot counting becomes hollow. The government should not end oversight unless it is clear that the Teamsters has made substantive changes to these historical deficiencies.

The breadth and depth of substantive union democracy can be measured by examining a number of factors: (1) the development of a two-party system, (2) the extent of contested elections, (3) the level of rank-and-file participation, (4) the election of reform-minded candidates, (5) the officials' and members' attitudes toward democracy and reform, and (6) the extent to which the union is voluntarily embracing other democratic principles such as the separation of powers. The government should take these factors into account in determining whether the union's democracy is strong enough to warrant termination of oversight. These six factors are discussed below.

 [*2191]  A robust conception of union democracy includes the development of a two-party system. In a single-party system, the convention system limits the role of the delegates to the futile exercise of ratifying pre-determined choices made by the incumbent leadership. 218 The institutionalization of a second party can forestall the oligarchic tendencies of a union by challenging the incumbency to continue responding to the needs of the rank and file. 219 For instance, a reform party can provide credible opposition to fill a national slate. 220 The influence of the Teamsters' own reform party, TDU, is an example of the positive impact a second party can have on a union. In 1991, many commentators believed that TDU's organizing led to the election of Ron Carey, the first true reform candidate to win a national Teamsters election in fifty years. 221 The active TDU provided Carey with money and local organizing efforts that helped him win the election. 222 TDU also engaged in litigation that increased the substantive rights of members and protected the Landrum-Griffin rights of reform candidates. 223 Simply having a reform party, however, is not sufficient. TDU formed as a response to corruption, and over its twenty-year existence TDU required government support in its anti-corruption efforts. 224 Still, a healthy second party could help neutralize the incumbent advantage. 225

Next, the government should look at the election process. The government should ask: Who is being elected, and how great are their margins of victory? If the Teamsters elect IBT officers who have rumored ties to organized crime, then this may indicate regression and perhaps the oversight should not end. Meanwhile, the election of reform-minded candidates, the fair administration of elections, and a reduction in the number of abuses that occur during the course of elections are signs of  [*2192]  progress. 226 Also important might be the extent to which the rank and file vote in union elections. If voting turnout in union elections is generally low, an increase in turnout at the polls would indicate that the rank and file perceive that their votes count in the electoral process.

The government can also examine to what extent the union has adopted other democratic principles on its own. In its adoption of structural reform, the Teamsters could institute mechanisms that serve the democratic notions of separation of powers and checks and balances. While the legislative functions of the union are performed by the conventions at the national level and the executive functions are performed by elected officers, there is generally no equivalent to an independent judiciary. 227 This gives the executive officers the power to execute and interpret the laws of the union. 228 The Teamsters could establish an intra-union "supreme court" to resolve internal disputes. A judicial body would serve independent of the union hierarchy. This third branch could effectively prevent incumbents from manipulating the rules and possibly from becoming entrenched. 229 The Teamsters' current plan comes close to the notion of a Public Review Board, 230 but it does not seem to have the same authority.

Finally, the government can look to a number of factors that indicate the union's attitude toward democracy. Are the Teamsters enhancing democracy above and beyond the specific provisions of the Landrum-Griffin Act? Is the union giving effect to the principles of Landrum-Griffin democracy? Do members actually attend, speak freely at, and vote at union meetings? Do they express views, arguments, and opinions critical of union leadership and policies? Are members protected against discriminatory discipline? 231 The government should track the frequency of any union violations and the depth of worker participation. Finally, the government  [*2193]  should note the opinions of TDU. If the reform party does not think oversight should end, those views warrant the government's attention. 232

There is one note of caution that should be taken into account when evaluating the substantive criteria. It is unclear to what extent the government should expect the Teamsters to become as democratic as other unions. This Note has argued that, due to the unique and rich history of the Teamsters corruption, the government should expect more out of the Teamsters than is displayed by a federation such as the AFL-CIO. However, the government should not expect too much more. In part, Landrum-Griffin democracy failed the Teamsters because corruption and organized crime had already captured the Teamsters. 233 What would have happened had the Teamsters been clean at the time is unclear. Other large unions like the AFL-CIO and UAW prevented corruption from infiltrating the highest ranks. Moreover, most unions are not highly participatory. It is important to distinguish what non-democratic results stem from the natural oligarchy of unions and which stem from corrupt influence.

C. Can the Government or Courts Effectively Apply These Criteria?
 
Like any multi-factor test, this Note's proposal leaves some areas of uncertainty. For example, to what extent do RICO predicates need to be reduced? Should oversight end if the union devises internal monitoring but repeatedly elects officers with possible links to the old regime? 234 However, if clear, these publicly known criteria would be a tremendous improvement over the current system which allows the government to use complete discretion. Moreover, the government and courts can learn from experiences in other areas of institutional reform where balancing tests have been utilized. 235 With regard to some aspects of the plan, decisionmakers can use hard data, such as devising an acceptable rate of illegal activity. Other areas do not lend themselves to such precise calculations.

Applying these criteria would be difficult. The judge, government officials, or master panel making the decisions would have to make hard choices. The people making these choices should be knowledgeable and apolitical.

 [*2194] 

IV. Conclusion
 
In 1989, after initiating a RICO suit, the government entered into a Consent Decree with the Teamsters that sought to address the corruption that had become indistinguishable from the union itself. The government, appreciating the magnitude of corruption that permeated the union since the 1950s, was right to insist upon a harsh remedy - a federally controlled trusteeship that would essentially run the Teamsters. However, by not providing a mechanism by which oversight would end or revert to internal monitoring, the government jeopardized the very principles of democracy and self-governance that it sought to instill within the union. The government would have better served the interests of the union by including in the Consent Decree a provision that allowed the courts to decide when oversight should end by applying clearly articulated and publicly known criteria. The government did not list any criteria that would be used to determine when oversight would end. This Note proposes two broadly defined substantive criteria that should be adopted and made public by the government. 236 These criteria reflect the purposes of the RICO suit - to eliminate organized crime's control over the IBT and to enhance democracy-reinforcing mechanisms within the union.

Over the past ten years, the federal oversight of the Teamsters has dramatically improved the union. More than ever, the union represents the interests of the rank and file. However, since there may always be doubts about whether the Teamsters are free of corruption, the current oversight is potentially unending. As the legitimacy of the oversight becomes increasingly dubious, an articulation of substantive criteria as a guide for ending oversight might be the torchbearer of union democracy and self-governance for the Teamsters.



FOOTNOTES:


Click here to return to the footnote reference.n1. Steven Greenhouse, Teamsters Push to End Decade of Supervision, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1999, at A1 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Supervision]. The full name of the Teamsters is the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America (IBT or Teamsters). Founded in 1903, the union had 1.4 million members in 1999. See id. For a discussion of the structure of the Teamsters, see infra note 22.



Click here to return to the footnote reference.n2. The elder Hoffa led the union from 1957 to 1967, and he served a sentence for jury tampering while in office. The reason for his disappearance in 1975 continues to engage the attention of conspiracy theorists.



Click here to return to the footnote reference.n3. That it is exculpatory to say that one is as guilty of corruption as the next is a questionable proposition. Still, the younger Hoffa states that his father would approve of his recent efforts at cleaning up the union: "I think he'd be proud of what I'm doing." Alice Ann Love, Hoffa: Union Will Police Itself, Associated Press, July 30, 1999, available in 1999 WL 22028534 [hereinafter Love, Hoffa].



Click here to return to the footnote reference.n4. In order, the Teamsters' presidents leading up to the 1989 oversight were Dave Beck, 1952-57, James Hoffa, Sr., 1957-67, Frank Fitzsimmons, 1967-81, Roy Williams, 1981-83, Jackie Presser, 1983-88, and William McCarthy 1988-92.



Click here to return to the footnote reference.n5. For an in-depth account of the Teamsters corruption, see generally Michael J. Goldberg, Cleaning Labor's House: Institutional Reform Litigation in the Labor Movement, 1989 Duke L.J. 903.



Click here to return to the footnote reference.n6. The Landrum-Griffin Act (formally known as the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, or LMRDA) was a congressional response to corruption in unions, particularly the Teamsters. 29 U.S.C. 401-531 (1994). In the late 1950s, in order to investigate corruption in unions, the Special Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field was formed within the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. In 1957, Subcommittee Chairman Senator John McClellan assembled the largest investigative team in congressional history - known as the McClellan Committee - and investigated labor corruption, including the link between unions and organized crime. The final report documented the close ties between the Teamsters and organized crime. The McClellan Committee's final report stated that "Hoffa, more than any other single individual, must bear the responsibility for specific provisions of the law that is now on the Nation's statute books." S. Rep. No. 86-1139, pt. 3, at 731 (1960); see also Sam Nunn, The Impact of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on Federal Policy, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 17, 27-29 (1986) (discussing the formation and effect of the LMRDA in the context of the history of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations).



Click here to return to the footnote reference.n7. The structure of most large unio