1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 30511, *; 141 L.R.R.M. 2459

 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Petitioner v. LOCAL 30, UNITED SLATE, TILE AND COMPOSITION ROOFERS, DAMP AND WATERPROOF WORKERS ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO Respondent v. RICHARD SCHOENBERGER, MICHAEL DALY, AND DONNY SHERMAN, Additional Respondents in Contempt

C.A. No. 89-3388

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 30511; 141 L.R.R.M. 2459

 
February 21, 1992, Decided  
February 21, 1992, Filed


 
CASE SUMMARY

 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner National Labor Relations Board asserted that respondents, a union and its representatives, violated a previous court judgment by unlawfully threatening, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act and by threatening to picket a neutral employer with the object of forcing that employer to cease doing business with a non-union company.

 
OVERVIEW: Petitioner National Labor Relations Board alleged that respondents, a union and its representatives, committed multiple violations of previous court judgments and the National Labor Relations Act (Act). The court held that a decree issued against respondent pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act did not preclude petitioner from exercising its authority or the court from having jurisdiction over the case. The court found that petitioner established that respondent union violated §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act as well as a previous court judgment when it picketed a neutral employer because respondent was acting in a manner designed to coerce and enmesh neutrals in its dispute with a non-union company. The court found that respondent representatives were acting as agents of the union when they unlawfully threatened, restrained, and coerced employee members from engaging in protected intra-union activity. The court found that on other occasions respondent representative was not acting as an agent for the union and petitioner's evidence was insufficient to support its claim. The court found respondents in contempt of orders and fined them.

 
OUTCOME: The court found respondents, a union and its representatives, to be in contempt of court by such actions as picketing a neutral employer and unlawfully restraining employees from engaging in protected union activity. The court fined respondents.

CORE TERMS: gate, contempt, picketing, picket, landfill, nomination, threatening, fine, business agent, picketers, notice, reserved, coercing, suppliers, steward, truck, slate, restraining, entrance, decree, conversation, driver, front, fuckin, picket line, contractor, intraunion, candidate, unlawfully, engaging

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OPINIONBY:  [*1]  FOR THE COURT; P. DOUGLAS SISK

OPINION: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
 
PRESENT: P. Douglas Sisk, Special Master
 
I. INTRODUCTION

(a) Background:

This petition presents at least the sixth time in which allegations about the conduct of Respondent, Local 30-30B, United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and Waterproof Workers Association, AFL-CIO (hereafter, "Local 30-30B" or the "Union"), have come before this Court. Local 30-30B has a pervasive history of violating various sections of the National Labor Relations Act and the provision of the law. n1 In April, 1978 the Court entered a judgment enforcing the National Labor Relations Board's (hereafter, "the Board" or "NLRB") findings of § 8(b)(1)(A) violations against Local 30-30B. Thereafter, a series of consent contempt adjudications, followed with increasing sanctions against the Union and its officers. [Judgments entered April 11, 1978 (C.A. No. 78-1260) (Hunter, Weis, and Garth, J.J.), February 20, 1980 (C.A. No. 79-2649) (Weis and Garth, J.J.), July 13, 1984 (C.A. No. 84-3107) (Hunter, Weis, and Garth, J.J.), February 26, 1987 (C.A. No. 87-3042) (Stapleton, Mansmann, and Garth, J.J.), and August 10, 1987 (C.A.  [*2]  No. 86-3324) (Hunter, Weis, and Garth J.J.) (Gov't, Ex. 1-5)]. The within petition for adjudication of contempt is the latest of such filings.

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n1 See, e.g., U.S. v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile, etc., 686 F.Supp. 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1988); U.S. . Local 30, United Slate, 871 F.2d 401, 407 (3d Cir. 1989) (Gov't Ex. 6). The District Court found a continuing, pervasive corrupt influence in the leadership and operations of the Union, a finding which was unchallenged on appeal. 871 F.2d at 407-408.
 

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In a somewhat related matter, in December 1987, civil proceedings pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (hereafter, "RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, were initiated in the district court against Local 30-30B and thirteen individual defendants. Trial, in the Eastern District, was held before the Chief Judge Louis C. Bechtle resulting in the imposition of a decreeship. United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile, etc., 686 F.Supp. 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1988). [*3]  The decreeship prohibits the named defendants, including respondents in this matter Daly and Schoenberger, from holding an officer position with Local 30-30B and from being employed in the roofing industry within the geographical area of Local 30-30B without a Court granted exception; furthermore, it requires that Local 30-30B's financial affairs be audited and that Local 30-30B establish a grievance/arbitration provision. The decreeship further called for the court-appointment of a Court Liaison Officer to enforce the provisions of the decree. Id., 686 F.Supp. at 1171-1174.

Respondents filed an initial objection to these contempt proceedings asserting that the decreeship precluded the Board from exercising its authority under the National Labor Relations Act, and precludes this Court from having jurisdiction to hear the within contempt adjudication. I rejected respondents' objection. While it is clear that some conduct enjoined prospectively in the civil RICO case may be conduct which is also violative of the National Labor Relations Act (Act), the existence vel non of the decree cannot preclude the operation of national labor law nor can it overcome [*4]  this Court's inherent power to vindicate its own judgments. Respondents assert that the only remedy for violative conduct is under the terms of the decree and the District Court's contempt powers, and that some respondents have already been punished for conduct at issue here. As broad reaching as the decree may be, it is not coextensive with the National Labor Relations Act. Neither can the decree supplant this Court's earlier judgments in this case, nor can it be used to vindicate a contempt of this Court's judgments. Moreover, much of the conduct complained of here is essentially post-decree. If an aggrieved party alleged such conduct to be violative of the decree, the District Court could find the Union in contempt, or not. The Board was not a party and the Judgments of this Court in earlier phases of this case were not evidence in the RICO case resulting in the decree. Respondents cannot interpose the decree as a shield to these proceedings. I note that throughout the present contempt proceedings the Liaison Officer has not offered any objections to this Court's jurisdiction.

(b) Present Case:

On or about June 5, 1989, the Board filed a contempt adjudication petition [*5]  against Local 30-30B, Richard Schoenberger, Michael Daly, and Donny Sherman. The Board asserted that Local 30-30B and the other respondents should be held in contempt for failing to comply with the judgment entered by the Court on April 11, 1978 and for failing to comply with civil contempt adjudications entered on February 20, 1980, July 13, 1984, February 26, 1987, and August 10, 1987. Thereafter, respondents, with the exception of Richard Schoenberger, filed their answers in which they admitted certain allegations, denied others and raised affirmative defenses. On September 8, 1989, the Court appointed me as Special Master to conduct a hearing and to make recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law to the Court with respect to the allegations in the Board's petition.

On January 12, 1990, I granted the Board's motion to amend its contempt petition. The amended petition named Local 30-30B business agent Phil Cimini as an additional respondent and included allegations of unlawful picketing at the Pottstown Landfill, and unlawful threats to picket the Biehn Construction Company. A motion to dismiss the petition, filed by Local 30-30B and joined by respondents Daly and [*6]  Sherman, was denied on February 27, 1990.

The Board's original and amended contempt petition presented eight issues, which for the sake of clarity, I have separated into four sections.

1. (a) Whether Local 30-30B, on July 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 1989, at the Pottstown Landfill, violated the Court's April 11, 1978 judgment and February 20, 1980, July 13, 1984, and August 10, 1987 contempt adjudications by unlawfully restraining and coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.

(b) Whether Local 30-30B violated the Court's February 26, 1987 judgment by picketing at the Pottstown Landfill on July 13, 14, 18, 19, and 20, 1989, with an object of enmeshing neutral employers in Local 30-30B's primary labor dispute with Gundle Lining Construction Company.

2. (a) Whether Local 30-30B and Local 30-30B business agent Richard Schoenberger and Local 30-30B steward Donny Sherman violated the Court's April 11, 1978, judgment and February 20, 1980, July 13, 1984, and August 10, 1987 contempt adjudications by unlawfully threatening, restraining, and coercing employee-member William McAndrews from engaging in protected intraunion activity.  [*7] 

(b) Whether Local 30-30B and Local 30-30B business agent Richard Schoenberger violated the Court's April 11, 1978 judgment and February 20, 1980, July 13, 1984, and August 10, 1987 contempt adjudications by unlawfully threatening, restraining, and coercing employee-member Patrick Costello from engaging in protected intraunion activity.

3. (a) Whether Local 30-30B and Local 30-30B business agent Michael Daly violated the Court's April 11, 1978 judgment and February 20, 1980, July 13, 1984, and August 10, 1987 contempt adjudications by unlawfully threatening, restraining, and coercing employee-member William McAndrews from engaging in protected intraunion activity.

(b) Whether Local 30-30B and Local 30-30B business agent Michael Daly violated the Court's April 11, 1978 judgment and February 20, 1980, July 13, 1984 and August 10, 1987 contempt adjudications by unlawfully threatening, restraining, and coercing employee-member Charles Slemmer from engaging in protected intraunion activity.

4. Whether Local 30-30B and Local 30-30B business agent Phil Cimini violated the Court's February 26, 1987 judgment by unlawfully threatening to picket neutral employer Biehn Construction Company [*8]  with an object of forcing Biehn to cease doing business with Greg Carlton Roofing.

Extensive pretrial proceedings occurred, and a four day hearing was held from June 18 to June 21, 1990. The last post-trial briefs were filed in November 1990. All of the testimony has been transcribed and the transcript, with the exhibits, accompanies the present report and recommendation. n2

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n2 Resolution of this matter by the Special Master has been delayed, unfortunately, by the press of other Court business including Master's proceedings in labor cases and other appeals.
 

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I respectfully submit that, by clear and convincing evidence, the Board has established that Local 30-30B violated Sections 8(b)(1)(A), 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act, and the underlying judgement of the Court when it engaged in picketing and related conduct at the Pottstown Landfill. The evidence presented clearly establishes that Local 30-30B was acting in a manner designed to coerce and enmesh neutrals in its dispute with Gundle Lining Construction Company. Such an [*9]  intent was evidenced by the form of picketing, the videotaping and photographing of neutrals, the threats to neutrals crossing the picket line, and the failure to abide by the reserved Gate system established by the Landfill. I further submit that the evidence presented at the hearing establishes that Local 30-30B, Local 30-30B business agent Richard Schoenberger, and Local 30-30B steward Donny Sherman violated § 8(b)(1)(A) and the Court's prior orders by unlawfully threatening, restraining and coercing employee members from engaging in protected intraunion activity. I find the evidence presented at the hearing to establish that Local 30-30B and Local 30-30B business agent Michael Daly violated § 8(b)(1)(A) and this Court's judgment by unlawfully threatening, restraining and coercing William McAndrews and Charles Slemmer. However, I find that due to the circumstances under which Daly made the threats to McAndrews, Daly was not acting as an agent of the Union and would not have been understood as acting as an agent. Finally, as to the alleged violation of § 8(b)(4)(B) and the Court's February 26, 1987 judgment involving Biehn construction company, I find the Board's evidence to be  [*10]  insufficient to support such a claim. Furthermore, even if the alleged statement was made, its effect was de minimis.

Based upon a review of the record, and my observation of the witnesses, I make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
 
II. FINDINGS OF FACT - Secondary Picketing at Pottstown Landfill

A. Gundle Lining Construction Company ("Gundle"), a Texas based company, began the installation of landfill liners at the Pottstown Landfill in Pottstown, Pennsylvania. (I,241). n3 Gundle is a person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. Gundle, a non-union employer, did not pay area wages.

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n3 Testimony with regard to specific issues was scattered throughout the four-day proceedings. In particular, scheduling roofer witnesses and others was problematical. A total of thirty witnesses were heard.

Transcript references are as follows: transcript of testimony, June 18, 1990 = (I,   ); transcript of testimony, June 19, 1990 = (II,   ); transcript of testimony, June 20, 1990 (III,   ); transcript of testimony, June 21, 1990 (IV,   ).
 

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B. On Thursday, July 13, 1989, Local 30-30B began picketing the main entrance of the Pottstown Landfill, located at 1475 Sell Road, Pottstown, Pennsylvania, in support of its labor dispute with Gundle. Picketing began at approximately 7:30 a.m. and lasted only until approximately 9:30 a.m. because of poor weather conditions. (I, 40, 48 187, 251, 301; IV, 29). The picketers carried signs which stated "Gundle does not pay area wages. No dispute with any other employer. Roofers Local 30-30B." Picketing resumed on Friday, July 14, 1989, at approximately 7:30 a.m. and continued until about 2:00 p.m.. (I, 48, 68; II, 203). Local 30-30B members returned to the picket line on Tuesday, July 18, 1989, Wednesday, July 19, 1989, and Thursday, July 20, 1989. Picketing on Tuesday and Wednesday began at approximately 7:30 a.m. and lasted until about 2:30 p.m.. (I, 48; IV, 172). On Thursday, July 20, 1989 picketers left at approximately 8:00 a.m., after being served with a temporary restraining order by the local police department and Pottstown Landfill representatives. (I, 48, 102; II, 46).

Throughout the picketing, the number of picketers present at the Landfill varied between ten to fourteen [*12]  people. (I, 49, 68, 81, 95, 102, 251, 301; II, 21, 36; III, 203; IV, 50, 129, 170).

C. On Thursday, July 13, 1989, Pottstown Landfill General Manager Tim Schotsch met with his staff and with Richard Schaefer, Gundle Project Superintendent, and discussed the establishment of a reserved gate system. Schotsch discussed how the system would work, and explained who would be allowed to use which gate. (I, 182, 253). In the evening of Thursday, July 13, 1989, Pottstown posted two 4'x 8' signs at two of its three gates. (6/18/90 62, 181). The signs indicated that a reserved gate system had been established. Gundle and its suppliers were told to use the reserved gate. (I, 180, 181, 253). Gate 1 was designated as the Gundle Gate, while Gate 3, which was the Gate at the main entrance of the Landfill, was to be used by all other individuals having business with the Landfill. The remaining Gate was located by the Landfill's Office building and was used solely for administrative purposes. The sign at Gate 1 specifically stated:
 
"This entrance is reserved exclusively for Gundle Lining Construction (sic) Corporation and Their Employees and Suppliers. Landfill Employees and Suppliers, customers [*13]  and persons engaging in Business with the Landfill shall not use this entrance and Must Use The Main Entrance.
 
(I, 64; Government Exhibit 10). The sign at Gate 3 stated:
 
"This entrance reserved exclusively for Pottstown Landfill Employees Customers and suppliers Doing Business with Pottstown Landfill. Gundle Lining Construction Corporation and its Employees and Suppliers shall not use this Entrance and Must only Use Gate 1."
 
(I, 64-65; Government Exhibits 10 and 19). n4 A guard was placed at Gate 1; he was instructed to open and close the Gate for Gundle and its employees and suppliers only. (I, 68).

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n4 The signs, submitted as Government exhibits 10 and 19, were altered at some point to reflect different Gate numbers. There was no explanation of these alterations at trial. However, photographic exhibits and trial testimony are in agreement about the numbers which were on the signs at the time of the picketing.
 

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D. On Friday, July 14, 1989, at approximately 7:30 a.m., Local 30-30B began picketing Gate 3. At [*14]  approximately 8:00 a.m. Pottstown Landfill's attorney, Robert Carlton, told the pickets that a reserved gate system was in effect and that Gundle would be using Gate 1. At that point some of the pickets went over to Gate 1. (I, 69, 185, 222). Local 30-30B continued to picket Gate 3. (I, 70, 185). Local 30-30B's business agent for Montgomery County, John Devenney, did not relocate the Local 30-30B van, which served as a base of operations, from the main gate to the reserved gate. (IV, 50). Throughout the period during which Local 30-30B was picketing Gundle, the majority of picketers remained at Gate 3. The number of picketers at Gate 1 never exceeded 4. (I, 70, 95, 185-185, 281) On one occasion even the administrative office Gate (Gate 4) was picketed by two Local 30-30B members. (IV, 138, 154).

E. The witnesses for the Board testified that there was no contamination of the reserved gate system, while Local 30-30B witnesses argued to the contrary. I credit the witnesses for the Board. n5 (I, 71, 204, 270, 311, 312). There were no reports to Pottstown Landfill officials or Gundle representatives as to any contamination by Gundle employee's or suppliers. (I, 259, 271, 312, 270).  [*15]  On July 13, 1989, prior to the establishment of a reserved gate system, supplies were delivered to Gundle via the main gate. (I, 264, 265). Although, there were allegations by Local 30-30B witnesses that the main gate was polluted when a compressor, allegedly used by Gundle, was towed into the Landfill by a Pottstown truck, the union representatives never found out whether the compressor was actually used by or intended for use by Gundle. (IV, 37; I, 88; (IV, 37, 64). The union took photographs of the compressor as it entered Gate 3 behind a red pick up. At the hearing, John Kellas, a Waste Management Company employee, identified the compressor entering Gate 3 as one used by the Landfill; he also noted that it was being pulled by his pickup. The compressor was described as an Ingersoll-Rand compressor, and the testimony at the hearing was to the effect that such a compressor was used by the Pottstown Landfill to "blow the dust out of the radiators on the bulldozers. " (I, 88-89).

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n5 I specifically do not credit a parade of respondents' witnesses who testified on the fourth day of the proceedings, June 21, 1990. Their testimony, which clearly reflected their loyalty to the Union, was too consistent, even as to minute details and phraseology. This, together with the demeanor, leads me to discredit their testimony.
 

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Union witnesses generally testified to seeing a white Bronco and a white pickup pollute Gate 3. (IV, 33). The union also asserted that Gate 3 was polluted by the entry and exit of an unmarked white Bronco which was driven by Schaefer, the Gundle supervisor at the Landfill. (III, 96, 204; IV, 33, 40, 134, 162, 172, 187). Schaefer testified that all Gundle vehicles have a Gundle sign on the side, and that all of the vehicles used at the landfill were white. (I, 250). Two of the picketers had worked with Schaefer in the past, therefore, they would have been able to identify Schaefer if he entered Gate 3. However, the majority of the picketers had not had any involvement with Schaefer and only reported that the Gate had been polluted as a result of other picketers comments that the driver of the Bronco was employed by Gundle. (II, 200). No report was made to either Gundle or the Pottstown Landfill regarding the alleged pollution.

Schaefer testified that once the reserved gate system was established neither he nor any other Gundle employee entered the landfill through a gate other than Gate 1. (I, 253). He stated that once the picketing began, the Gundle employees carpooled and arrived [*17]  at the landfill in a caravan; the employees were also encouraged to bring their lunch and, if leaving the premises for lunch, to travel in a group, in order to minimize their entry and exit from the landfill. (I, 267, 270). Gundle employees always entered and left the Landfill via Gate 1. (I, 253).

Devenney testified that Gate 3 was polluted due to the daily delivery of supplies to Gundle via that Gate. (IV, 34). He specifically stated that supplies were delivered to Gundle via Gate 3 on July 14, 1989. (IV, 34). Schaefer had no reports of a delivery on that date. Schaefer did testify that on July 19, 1989, Gundle received a load of geotextiles, and a few trailers of bentonite. (I, 260). He knew that the geotextiles had been received and unloaded on the 19th because this was reflected in the company daily progress reports and invoices. (Government Exhibits 8 and 9). No union member testified to seeing the rolls of geotextiles or the bentonite enter Gate 3 on July 19, 1989.

Pottstown Police Chief Swavely testified that while he was at the landfill, he never saw any vehicle marked Gundle enter or leave through Gate 3. (II, 47 - 48).

F. Local 30-30B picketed the entrance to Pottstown's [*18]  offices which were located below the main gate. Pickets Steven and John O'Malley testified that they picketed the administrative Gate. (IV, 138, 154). No supplies were ever brought through that entrance. That area was reserved purely for administrative purposes.

G. If Gundle, its employees or suppliers repeatedly used Gate 3, the neutral gate, then Local 30-30B's failure to respect the reserved gate system could be excused. However, in order for such picketing to be excused, the pollution of the neutral gate must be substantial. Even if the neutral gate is contaminated on one occasion, it is possible for the gate to be rehabilitated. See Local 761, International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961); Local Union No. 76 v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 498 (1984). Furthermore, a de minimis use of the neutral gate by Gundle employees would not necessarily destroy the gate's neutrality.

I find the testimony regarding the preservation of a neutral gate to be more credible than the testimony of the alleged pollution. Therefore, I find that Gate 3 was not polluted. Although the union may have acted in the mistaken [*19]  belief that the neutral gate had been polluted, such a mistake would not excuse its picketing. There is no testimony that at any point during the picketing the union moved a majority of its picketers from the neutral gate to the Gundle Gate. Nor is there any testimony that at any point during the picketing the union reported the alleged pollution to the Pottstown Landfill or to Gundle representatives.

H. On all the days of picketing, Local 30-30B actively blocked the ingress and egress of employees, customers and suppliers of the Pottstown Landfill. Picketers circled in front of the main gate in a tight circle in order to obstruct traffic. Picketers jumped in front of trucks, shouted obscenities and photographed drivers, in an attempt to intimidate them. (I, 34-35, 49-50, 52-53, 59, 73, 77-78, 83, 86, 90-92, 101-102, 187, 189, 191, 197, 273-274, 278, 308, 310; II, 24-25, 27-29, 34, 35-37, 39). In order to prevent the picketers from jumping in front of the trucks, drivers would get as close as possible to the rear bumper of the truck in front of them, and inch their way forward through the picket line. Pottstown Police Chief Earl Swavely testified that as the days past, the tension [*20]  between picketers and drivers attempting to enter the landfill increased. He testified that the picketers walked close together and in tight circles. (Govenment Ex. 12 A-Q).) The picketers apparently walked in a way which would maximize their presence directly in front of the trucks. Chief Swavely, as well as other witnesses, testified that the picketers would repeatedly shout obscenities and would yell out to the drivers: "you'll never F'in' drive again; I know who you are." (II, 28). Picketers would also slap the vehicles as they attempted to enter Gate 3. On several occasions the police had to ask the picketers to back away from the trucks. At one point during the picketing, in order to prevent a physical confrontation, the police were forced to intervene and escort a truck through the picket line and into the landfill. (II, 29, 33, 34, 35).

Although union members testified that they did not shout any obscenities or in any way threaten the drivers attempting to enter the landfill, Chief Swavely was so concerned with the volatility of the situation that on July 18, 1989, he activated a Police Code Blue in the county. (II, 36).

I. Picketing by Local 30-30B caused delays to  [*21]  those having to enter and exit the landfill. (I, 109, 60, 77, 111, 190; II, 24). The delays were reported to have been between one and five minutes. (I, 60, 82, 109, 190; II, 24). Pottstown Manager John Kellas reported that picketers caused 75% to 85% of the traffic entering the landfill to experience delays of five minutes or more. (I, 60, 77, 82, 109, 111). On several occasions the police were forced to direct traffic on an intersecting road due to trucks being delayed in entering the landfill. (I, 82). Pottstown Landfill is a regional landfill whose customers count on the ability of the landfill to quickly process their loads. Due to the picketing by Local 30-30B, the Landfill was unable to process its customers' loads at the normal rate. (I, 171, 172, 202; II, 14).

Delays were also caused when some drivers decided that either they would not or could not drive their trucks through the picket line and into the landfill. Some of these drivers requested that Kellas, a Landfill employee, drive the trucks through the picket line which resulted in further delays. (I, 198, 199, 201, 202).

Business agent John Devenney testified that the police spoke with him about traffic back ups;  [*22]  he also acknowledged that the police had to direct traffic on numerous occasions. (IV, 57, 88). Furthermore, picket Al Graber testified that he and other picketers were warned by the police to: continue moving, not stop in front of trucks, and not interfere with traffic. (III, 212). However, the majority of the union's witnesses asserted that the picketing did not result in any delays and that there were no threats to drivers crossing the picket line. (IV, 112, 142, 156, 175, 207, 233). I credit the Board's witnesses and find that the union actively picketed the Landfill, causing delays to neutrals, and threatened drivers crossing the picket line in an attempt to enmesh them in the union's labor dispute with Gundle.

J. I find that Local 30-30B acted in a manner to induce and coerce neutrals from doing business with Gundle. The testimony supports the Board's contentions regarding (a) the establishment of a valid reserved gate system; (b) Local 30-30B's awareness of the establishment of such a system; (c) the delays caused by Local 30-30B's pickets at the main entrance of the Pottstown Landfill; (d) Local 30-30B's failure to respect the neutral gate system; and (e) Local 30-30B's [*23]  coercion of neutral employees by blocking the main entrance, screaming at those entering the main gate, hitting the trucks which entered the main gate, and taking photograph's and videotaping those entering the main gate.
 
III. FINDINGS OF FACT - THE E.R. CARPENTER JOBSITE

A. During 1989, Biehn Construction company ("Biehn") renovated offices and constructed a new warehouse onto an existing building at the E.R. Carpenter Warehouse in Fogelsville, Pennsylvania. Lawrence DeCicco was Biehn's manager for this construction project. Biehn subcontracted the roofing work to Carlton Roofing, a non-union subcontractor. (II, 76-78).

B. During 1988, Biehn's gross annual revenue was $ 155 million. Biehn performs 50% of its work in Eastern and Central Pennsylvania and 50% in New Jersey. At any given time, Biehn has several construction projects in progress. (II, 75-76).

C. Philip Cimini is a business agent for the union, and he works out of the union's Kutztown, Pennsylvania office. Cimini receives Dodge reports that describe construction that is being bid or contemplated and that list the architect and general contractor for each project. (IV, 3-5). After reviewing the Dodge reports,  [*24]  Cimini calls the general contractors "to see if they will use the union contractors. And if they haven't got any of our union contractors to bid to them, I will give them a list of union contractors that they can call if they want to use them." (IV, 16). During the week of May 22, 1989, Cimini called Biehn to speak with "whoever was in charge of the E.R. Carpenter project." (IV, 6-7). DeCicco was not in, so Cimini left a message. DeCicco returned his call, but this time Cimini was not in.

D. Cimini and DeCicco finally reached each other by phone on Friday, May 26, 1989. DeCicco's testimony as to the conversation was as follows:
 
A Yes, he asked me if I was, in fact, Larry DeCicco. I said, yes, I am. And he asked me if I was the project manager at the ER Carpenter Warehouse? I said that was correct. And he said, who is your roofing contractor? . . . . I said, it's Carlton Roofing. He waited about five seconds. He said they're non-union; they're not one of us; they're not on our list. And I said, so what? And he said, well, I have interests to protect. I'm going to picket Biehn at ER Carpenter Warehouse and I'm going to picket Biehn at every Biehn job site that there is that  [*25]  I can find. You have a lot of job sites, right? I said yes, isn't that common situs picketing? . . . . and isn't that against the law? And he said, well, I'm going to picket ER Carpenter. I'm going to picket Carlton Roofing. That he's allowed to do at the ER Carpenter Warehouse, and he said, what are you going to do about that? And I said, well, I'll take this whole conversation, all this information to my boss.
Q Was that the end of the conversation?
A That was the end of the conversation.
 
(II, 79-80). Cimini testified that the conversation went as follows:
 
A Well I basically asked him if the job at E.R. Carpenter had been let yet and he told me yes, it was let to Carlton Roofing. And I told him at that point that they don't pay -- to my knowledge, they don't pay the area wages or follow the area standards and that I would have to picket them and I really don't want to do that on Biehn's job site because we've always had a good rapport with Biehn. Is there anything that we can do to resolve this?
Q That's what you asked him?
A Yes.
Q All right.
A I asked him if we could have the bids reopened or anything like that to give my roofing contractors a chance to rebid the [*26]  job.
Q And what did he say?
A He said no. That the bid was -- the contract was already signed.
Q And what else occurred in that conversation?
A I said, well I'd like to talk to Bob Biehn to see if I could get this resolved somehow.

. . . . . . . . . . .
He said well you do what you have to do. I said i'll have to picket Carlton Roofing on Biehn's job site and I really don't want to do that because, you know, . . . .
(IV, 9-10). Cimini and DeCicco testified that, to the best of their knowledge, Biehn had not been picketed by the union at the E.R. Carpenter site or any other Biehn site.

E. The testimony on this count of the complaint is sparse, at best. I note that to support DeCicco's testimony his daily diary was introduced at the hearing. The diary was kept in the usual course of business; it included a reference to DeCicco's conversation with Cimini. Both witnesses were equally credible. Taking DeCicco's version as true and considering the daily diary, I find that Cimini uttered a threat to picket Biehn Construction wherever it could be found. I find further that the threat was fleeting and of de minimis effect.
 
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT: THE PRE-ELECTION MISCONDUCT [*27] 
 
A. The Pre-Election Misconduct - Richard Schoenberger and Donny Sherman

1. On December 2, 1987, the union held a membership meeting to nominate candidates for union offices. The election was to be held at the end of December. The current union leadership supported a slate of candidates headed by Tom Crosley. One other slate opposed the Crosley slate. This slate was called the Sullivan slate and was composed of Michael Sullivan running for business manager, Bill McAndrews for president, and Donald Powers for an executive board position. (II, 126-27, 129).

2. At the time of the nomination meeting, Respondents Richard Schoenberger and Michael Daly had just been convicted of criminal RICO charges and were awaiting sentencing. E.g., United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile Etc., 686 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. PA. 1988)(J. Bechtle). Both men were business agents for Local 30-30B, and continued to be paid as business agents until the end of December, 1987. Michael Daly was also the union's Recording Secretary. (Deposition, 1/16/90 at 6-10, 24, Government Ex. 6, Government Ex. 14). Business agents air disputes between members, arbitrate disputes with [*28]  other trades, negotiate contracts, and generally "service the needs in the membership." (II, 122). Respondent Donny Sherman was a Local 30-30B member and a union steward at Gravely Roofing, where he worked. (III, 155-56). Union stewards represent union members at their jobsite and resolve conflicts between the members and the employers. They also enforce the union's contract with the employer and insure "safety on the job for the men." (II, 109, 111, 166; III, 156-58).

3. Patrick John Costello, a union member, attended the December 2nd nomination meeting with Michael Sullivan, Bill McAndrews, and other Sullivan slate supporters. He carried campaign literature (fliers) in his back pocket. When he attempted to pass out the fliers to members at the nomination meeting, somebody behind him said, "stick them back in your pocket or I'll stuff your head in your pocket." Costello turned around and Respondent Schoenberger was standing directly behind him. Costello did not hand out the fliers to members. (II, 154-58).

4. When Bill McAndrews signed in at the nomination meeting, he was approached by Respondent Schoenberger. Schoenberger told McAndrews that he didn't want McAndrews to run.  [*29]  Schoenberger also told McAndrews, "the boss doesn't want you to run," "to back off," and "to back the fuck down." In addition, Schoenberger threatened to take McAndrews' job and stated, "I'm gonna put you in a fuckin' body cast." Later on during the meeting, Schoenberger again came up to McAndrews and told him he "wasn't gonna run." Through impeachment by counsel for the NLRB, it appears that McAndrews also testified in 1987 that Schoenberger told him "now you're going against Stephen." (II, 174-80, 186-87). "Stephen" was Stephen Traits, who had been the union's business manager. At the time of the nomination meeting he was in jail. (II, 133; Deposition, 1/16/90 at 44).

5. Richard Schoenberger did not testify on his own behalf; instead he asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege not to incriminate himself. (IV, 81-87). I advised Schoenberger that, in a civil proceeding, an adverse inference could be drawn from his refusal to testify "in response to probative evidence offered against" him. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 317-18 (1976). See also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-431 (1956) (Fifth Amendment  [*30]  protection against self-incrimination only applies to testimony which may expose witness to criminal charges); Asherman v. Meachum, 932 F.2d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 1991) (court can draw adverse inference from refusal to testify in civil proceeding where immunity from criminal prosecution is provided or where other evidence exists and witness' silence is not sole basis for adverse decision). Given Costello's and McAndrews' testimony and Schoenberger's refusal to testify, I find that Schoenberger did in fact make the above described statements to Costello and McAndrews.

6. Respondent Donny Sherman came over to where McAndrews and Schoenberger were standing, near the sign-in tables, several times before the nomination meeting began, and spoke to McAndrews over Schoenberger's shoulder. McAndrews testified that Sherman told him "he was gonna fuck me up if I ran." Sherman also told McAndrews, "you better change your mother fuckin' mind, boy. I'm gonna hurt you, boy," "You heard what I'm tellin you?" "boy, I'm going to fuck you up. You better back down." (II, 183-84).

7. Donny Sherman denied making threatening statements to McAndrews; he further testified that [*31]  he does not know McAndrews, that he does not curse, that he did not speak with any member for more than 15 seconds at the nominations meeting, and that he did not speak to any member with Schoenberger. (III, 162, 180-81). Before the nominations meeting began, another candidate for union office, Joe Crosley, told Sherman to stand by the entrance and remind the members that they needed to sign in when they first arrived. Sherman did this with James Marchese, who was then the Assistant Regional Director of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). (III, 160-61). I find the testimony of Donny Sherman to be incredible. Sherman's tone was evasive, and his demeanor shifted markedly when he was cross-examined. This shift in demeanor undermined any credence I might have given his direct testimony.

8. I credit McAndrews testimony that Sherman came up several times and spoke over Schoenberger's shoulder to him. Because McAndrews and Schoenberger were standing close to where Sherman was positioned to direct incoming members to the sign in tables, Sherman could have easily stepped over to McAndrews and Schoenberger in order to make the threatening comments to McAndrews. (Government Ex.  [*32]  21).

9. Arthur Mehr, who was then the Regional Vice President for the AAA, also attended the nomination meeting to inform the union membership about what the AAA was and how the election would be conducted. He helped direct the union members to the sign-in tables until about 7:50 p.m.. At that time he went to the front of the meeting hall because he thought the meeting was about to begin. The meeting was delayed until 8:15 p.m. because of parking problems. (III, 109-127).

10. Neither Mehr nor Marchese were situated in a position to hear or observe the threatening comments properly. There were approximately 1000 members present at the meeting, and the noise level was reported to have been high. (III, 125, 126, 152; Government exhibit 21). In referring to the noise level in the Hall, Mehr testified that unless he was directly on top of a conversation he would not have heard it. (III, 131). Mehr was separated by several hundred roofer's from the location where the threats were made. (III, 125). Therefore, it is doubtful that he heard the conversation between Sherman, Schoenberger and McAndrews.

James Marchese testified that he stood next to Sherman from 6:30 in the evening until [*33]  the meeting started at 8:00 p.m.. (III, 141, 153). Marchese was stationed either near the stage area or close to the front door, which would place him approximately three sign-in tables, and hundreds of union members, away from where the threats were made. (III, 126, 152). Considering that Marchese was directing several hundred union members to the proper sign-in tables, it is doubtful that he could have heard the threats made in the large, and noisy, hall. I found Marchese's testimony both incredible and evasive.

11. In addition, the demeanor of both AAA representatives was evasive and their testimony incredible, inaccurate, and inconsistent. n6 Furthermore, I note that it appears that the AAA was hired to supervise the special election, not the nomination meeting at which the threats were made. (III, 119, 132). The AAA representatives were present at the nomination meeting solely for the purpose of introducing themselves and explaining how the election would be conducted. (III, 121).

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n6 I note that at the hearing, counsel for the NLRB elicited from Mr. Marchese that it is the policy of the AAA's regional office not to discuss facts with counsel for either party prior to testifying, in order to insure an unbiased reporting of facts. However, Marchese admitted reviewing facts with the union's counsel immediately prior to his testimony. (6/20/90 at 145-146). On an earlier occasion, the Board had requested to discuss the case with Marchese, he refused citing the AAA's regional policy as the reason why he could not discuss the case with the Board. (6/20/90 at 145-47).

One example of the inconsistencies in the testimony of the AAA's representatives involved the number of people present at the nomination meeting. Mehr testified that there were about 1000 members present at the meeting; Marchese testified that only 200 people attended the meeting. (6/20/90 at 126, 153).
 

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12. Based upon the foregoing, I find that Respondents Schoenberger and Sherman made the threatening statements attributed to them by John Patrick Costello and Bill McAndrews.

B. Michael Daly

1. Sometime during the early morning hours of the day after the nomination meeting, December 3, 1987, Respondent Michael Daly went to the home of Marion and Richard Ennis. He and Richard Ennis started drinking around the kitchen table. Around 5:00 that afternoon Donald Powers, a candidate on the Sullivan slate, came by with campaign literature. Powers sat down, started drinking, and asked Daly about running the union and approaching contractors. Marion Ennis also testified that she and Daly had gone to high school together, and they were talking about old times and getting out photographs. (III, 15-20, 46-47).

Michael Sullivan and Bill McAndrews stopped by the Ennis household the next day, December 4th, around 5:00 or 6:00 in the morning joining a drinking party which had been underway for about 24 hours. They had been on their way to campaign at a coffee shop where roofers "hung out" and had noticed Powers' car at the Ennises. Marion Ennis invited them in. They joined Daly and Powers,  [*35]  who had been drinking through the night from the day before, in the kitchen. McAndrews asked Daly what he thought of them running for office. Daly told McAndrews that he was a bum, and that Daly didn't want McAndrews to run, and if he did run it would be "over my dead body," and "I would kill you first." (II, 188-92, III, 21-23, 48-49, 54-55, Daly Deposition, 1/16/90 at 29 37, 47-48). McAndrews testified on direct and cross that he felt threatened and intimidated by Daly, "with the drink in him," but he discounted any specific threat because of Daly's drunken condition. (II, 191). He agreed with counsel for Daly that roofers watch out for themselves around people who are drunk, but he denied feeling any serious threat. (II, 198).

2. Michael Daly admits that he told McAndrews and Sullivan that they should not run for union office, but he denies that he threatened to kill McAndrews. (Deposition, 1/14/90 at 30-36).

3. In an incident which took place some days later, Daly is alleged to have threatened Charles Slemmer. Testimony shows that approximately one week after the nomination meeting, a phone call to Slemmer was made by Richard Ennis and Michael Daly. (II, 218-220, III,  [*36]  27). Union member Charles Slemmer helped distribute campaign posters supporting the Sullivan slate of candidates. Slemmer testified that Richard Ennis called him sometime after the nomination meeting and told him he was putting Respondent Michael Daly on the phone. Daly has no recollection of Charles Slemmer. He denied calling Slemmer. (Deposition 1/16/90 at 40-44). Slemmer stated that Mike Daly told him, "Cholly I understand you're backin' Mike Sullivan. I says, yeah, that's right. He says, you better watch your fuckin' ass. After counsel for the NLRB questioned Slemmer about his previous testimony in the criminal RICO case, Slemmer remembered that Daly also told him, "you see what happened to fuckin' Matt. You could be next." (II, 220-21). Slemmer explained that Matt Smith had been a union steward at Slemmer's jobsite, Logan Roofing Company, and had publicly supported the Sullivan slate of candidates. One day Slemmer heard union business agent Danny Cannon tell the foreman at Logan Roofing Company, that Matt Smith was "done as a steward." (II, 208-212). On cross-examination, Slemmer testified that at the time business agent Canon came to the job site, Matt Smith had been [*37]  out of work for three to four weeks due to an injury. (II, 235-36).

Slemmer also testified that two mornings after he had received the phone call from Respondent Daly, his car windshield and driver's side window were smashed. (II, 227-28). Daly denies damaging Slemmer's car. (Deposition 1/16/90 at 40-44). Finally, Slemmer received several anonymous phone calls where someone asked him whether he needed a job, called him a "fuckin' ass-hole," and told him "you're fuckin' dead, stay away from Sullivan." (II, 229, 231).

Marion Ennis, who lives in the same neighborhood as Charles Slemmer, and who works in the neighborhood coffee shop where roofers hang out, testified that Slemmer has a general reputation in the neighborhood for lying. (III, 43). She stated that about a week after the nominations Richard Ennis and Michael Daly called Charles Slemmer to yell at him for using the Ennises' son Joey on campaign posters. (III, 26-27).

4. I credit McAndrews' and Slemmer's testimony that Respondent Michael Daly made the above-described statements. I find no factual nexus, however, between Michael Daly and Slemmer's smashed car windows or the subsequent crank phone calls received by Slemmer.
 [*38]   
V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

A. Pottstown Landfill

1. The Board must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the union violated this court's decrees. NLRB v. Local 825, A,B,C,D, Internt'l Union, 659 F.2d 379, 384 (3d Cir. 1981).

2. At all material times herein, the judgment of this court, entered April 11, 1978, and the subsequent contempt judgments, entered February 20, 1980, July 13, 1984 and August 10, 1987, have been in full force and effect. The order tracks the language of Section 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A). The order entered February 26, 1987, tracks the language of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), and prohibits Local 30-30B from threatening, coercing, or restraining any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to force or require any person to cease doing business with any other person.

In this instance, the Board contends that Local 30-30B's picketing at the main gate was intended to induce and encourage employees of neutral employers to avoid using the Pottstown Landfill by impeding ingress and [*39]  egress at the main entrance into the landfill and by threatening and coercing such employees with the object of forcing neutral employers to cease doing business with the Pottstown Landfill.

3. The union respondent is a labor organization as defined under the Act and is subject to the court's jurisdiction. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5). I find that Pottstown Landfill is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and is subject to the court's jurisdiction. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), (6).

4. Alleged Secondary Picketing at Pottstown:

(a) In any secondary boycott case in which a union's picketing is at issue, it is necessary to determine the union's objective in picketing. In order to be successful the Board must show that Local 30-30B encouraged cessation of work by employees or suppliers of Pottstown Landfill with the object of forcing Pottstown to cease doing business with Gundle. NLRB v. Local 825, 659 F.2d at 384. The union's sole objective does not have to be unlawful. Mautz & Oven, Inc. v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and Helpers Union, Local No. 279, 882 F.2d 1117 (7th Cir. 1989). [*40] 

(b) The union must picket with restraint in order not to mislead or coerce neutrals. NLRB v. Service Employees Local 77, 123 LRRM 3213, 3223 (9th Cir. 1986); Local 98, United Assoc. of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and pipe fitting Indus. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 60, 65 (6th Cir. 1974); Ramey Construction Co. v. Local 544, Painters, Decorator, and Paperhangers, 472 F.2d 1127, 1131 (5th Cir. 1973). In NLRB v. Service Employees Local 77, the court set out four standards, which are commonly referred to as the Moore Dry Dock standards, which if met establish a presumption that the picketing had a lawful object. The standards, as applied to this case, are:
 
1. Was picketing limited to times Gundle was on the premises?
2. was Gundle performing normal business at time of picketing?
3. were picketers close to Gundle's situs?
4. did pickets disclose that the dispute was only with Gundle?

Local 30-30B has not met the third Moore Dry Dock standard. Pottstown established a valid reserved gate system. When such a system is established, and a union pickets a neutral gate, the object  [*41]  of the picketing is to encourage neutrals to cease doing business with the primary employer. NLRB v. Local 825, 659 F.2d, at 387.

Pottstown posted signs, which were observed by Pottstown employees and Gundle employees and suppliers. Local 30-30B was informed of the gate system on July 14, 1989 at approximately 8:30 a.m.. Although Local 30-30B asserts that the gate was contaminated, the testimony at the hearing does not support such an assertion. Even if there were any contamination, the union did not verify the alleged contamination prior to picketing the neutral gate. See Iron Workers, Local 433 (Chris Crane Co.), 128 LRRM 1088, 1089-90; Operating Engineers, Local 12 (McDevitt & Street Co.), 286 NLRB 1203, 1203-04 (1987).

5. Coercion of Neutrals:

Local 30-30B pickets coerced and restrained employees and suppliers of the Pottstown Landfill by blocking the ingress and egress from the landfill and threatening neutral employees. By picketing in front of the neutral gate in tight circles, Local 30-30B created delays for Pottstown employees and suppliers. Some trucks turned away. See Shopmen's Local Union No. 455, 243 NLRB 340, 346 (1979) [*42]  (10 pickets stationed in front of and on the sides of a truck, blocking entrance or exit, constitutes restraint and coercion within the meaning of the Act); NLRB v. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 254, 535 F.2d 1335, 1337 (1st Cir. 1976)(walking closely spaced, stepping in front of cars, in front of neutral gate so as to create traffic tie ups, constitutes interference with rights of non-striking employees); General Service Employees Union Local No. 73, 239 NLRB 295, 307-08 (1978). Local 30-30B further intimidated neutral employees and suppliers by videotaping and photographing them. NLRB v. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 254, 535 F.2d at 1337 (1st Cir. 1976)(pretending to videotape and photograph neutrals crossing picket line has no legitimate purpose except to coerce and restrain neutrals and customers).

B. The E.R. Carpenter Jobsite

1. The Board must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the union violated this court's decrees. NLRB v. Local 825, A.B,C,D, Internt'l Union, 659 F.2d 379, 384 (3d Cir. 1981).

2. At all material times herein,  [*43]  the judgment of this court, entered February 26, 1987, has been in full force and effect. Local 30-30B, through its officers and agents, has had notice and actual knowledge of its terms. The judgment tracks the language of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4)(ii)(B), and prohibits Local 30-30B from threatening, coercing, or restraining any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to force or require any person to cease doing business with any other person. In this instance, the Board contends that Local 30-30B is in contempt of the court's judgment because Cimini, a union business agent, threatened to picket Biehn Construction Company if Biehn did not cease doing business with Carlton Roofing, a non-union roofing contractor.

3. I find that Biehn Construction Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and is subject to the court's jurisdiction. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), (6).

4. While a union can advise a neutral employer that it intends to picket a primary employer, any unqualified or ambiguous threats of actions will be construed [*44]  as threats to the neutral employer's relationship with the primary employer. NLRB v. Service Employees Local 77, 123 LRRM at 3226 (1986). The burden is on the union to insure that its notice to the neutral employer is restricted to giving notice of lawful activity on the union's part against the primary employer. If the notice describes an action that is unqualified or ambiguous, it will be construed against the union. Food & Commercial Workers Local 506 (Coors Distributing), 268 NLRB 475, 478 (1983).

Furthermore, when a union threatens a neutral with common situs picketing, the union assumes the burden of assuring the secondary employer that the picketing will conform to the Moore Dry Dock requirements. Local Union No. 418, Sheet Metal Workers, 227 NLRB 300, 312 (1976)(a union may not make a generalized threat to picket, with a presumption that it will conform with established restrictions, rather the union is required to give assurances that its picketing will comply with the restrictions on common situs picketing).

5. Here, at best, Cimini initially told DeCicco that Local 30-30B [*45]  would picket Biehn, a neutral employer, wherever it was doing business. After DeCicco asked whether that was not common situs picketing, Cimini told DeCicco that Local 30-30B would picket E.R. Carpenter, and finally he told DeCicco that Local 30-30B would picket Carlton Roofing, the primary employer. After telling DeCicco that Local 30-30B would picket Carlton Roofing, Cimini asked DeCicco what Biehn was going to do in response.

It could be argued that these statements reveal that Cimini, and thereby Local 30-30B, n7 did not meet the union's burden of restricting "its statement to the giving of notice of prospective lawful activity against the primary." Food & Commercial Workers Local 506 (Coors Distributing), 268 NLRB at 478. When DeCicco questioned the lawfulness of Cimini's first statement, Cimini indicated that Local 30-30B would picket Carlton Roofing and not Biehn. Then, Cimini asked DeCicco what Biehn would do in response to Local 30-30B picketing Carlton Roofing at the E.R. Carpenter job site.

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n7 Cimini's statements are easily attributed to the union because they involved "a matter within the scope of [his employment], made during the existence of the [employment] relationship." Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D); United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, and Plastic Workers of America, Local 878 (Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company), 255 NLRB 251, 251 n.1 (1981).
 

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6. I have carefully reviewed the testimony of Lawrence DeCicco (II, 74-105) and Phillip Cimini (IV, 3-24) as well as my notes taken at trial. I found both witnesses credible and I view their testimony as distinguishable only in two respects: the presence of the contemporaneous notes taken in the normal course of business by Mr. DeCicco; and, the discrepancy about whether Mr. Cimini stated that he would picket the general contractor, Biehn Construction. The diary entry reflecting that DeCicco stated that he would picket Biehn Construction wherever it was, adds a scintilla of support to the Board's charge. But I find that the testimony adduced does not satisfy the clear and convincing standard. Taking DeCicco's testimony at face value, immediately upon uttering the phrases which would violate § 8(b)(4)(B), Cimini was reminded of the problem of common situs picketing. He, then, stated that the union would picket Carlton, the non-union roofer, an appropriate target for picketing, at the E.R. Carpenter job site. Neither witness testified of any further conversations remotely containing threats of unlawful picketing, and neither testified of any actual picketing at a Biehn site [*47]  or Carlton Roofing site. Crediting DeCicco's testimony at face value, I find that Cimini uttered forbidden words, but that at the prompting of DeCicco about common situs picketing, he immediately shifted ground and focussed on a proper target. This, together with the lack of any follow-up threats or actions on the part of Cimini and the Union, suggests that this was at most a fleeting, technical violation of the orders and the Act, and I find that it does not meet the clear and convincing test.

C. THE PRE-ELECTION MISCONDUCT

1. Jurisdiction

(a) The union respondent is a labor organization as defined under the Act and is subject to the court's jurisdiction. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).

(b) At all material times herein, the judgment of this court, entered April 11, 1978, and the subsequent judgments of civil contempt entered February 20, 1980, July 13, 1984, February 26, 1987, and August 10, 1987, have been in full force and effect. Local 30-30B, through its officers and agents, has had notice and actual knowledge of the terms of the April 11, 1978 order. The order tracks the language of § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A),  [*48]  and directs the union and its officers, agents and representatives to cease and desist from restraining and coercing employees within the geographical area the union purports to represent by threatening employees with, among other things, physical assaults. The order further provides that the union cannot threaten employees with physical injury for the purpose of coercing or restraining employees in the exercise of their statutory rights. The last paragraph of the order also prohibits the union from "in any other manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act."

The Board contends that Local 30-30B and individual respondents Schoenberger, Sherman and Daly, are in contempt of the Court's April 11, 1978 judgment and subsequent contempt orders because the individual respondents verbally threatened three union members in a way that tended to coerce those members in exercising their rights to engage in intraunion activities protected by Section 7 of the Act. The Board asserts that the individual respondents were agents of Local 30-30B, and that Local 30-30B is therefore legally responsible for their conduct.

2. Whether Respondents [*49]  Schoenberger, Sherman and Daly were agents off the union?

(a) Respondents Schoenberger and Daly had notice of this Court's April 11, 1978 judgment, and the subsequent contempt orders, as business agents of the union. Both Schoenberger and Daly were mentioned by name in the last contempt order entered August 10, 1987, and Schoenberger signed that contempt order. The contempt orders require all business agents to signify in writing, under oath, that they have read and understood the April 11, 1978 judgment and the three subsequent contempt orders. Respondent Sherman testified on direct examination that he had received copies of some unspecified court orders and NLRB orders. He further testified that he understood those orders to provide that he was "not to bother any other contractors or any other scabs or things like that," and not to address his relationship with fellow union members. (6/20/91 at 158). I conclude that all three individual respondents had notice of this court's April 11, 1978 judgment and the subsequent contempt orders.

(b) All three individual respondents were agents of the union respondent at the December 2, 1987 nomination meeting. 29 U.S.C. § 152 [*50]  (13) provides:
 
In determining whether any person is acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed was [sic] actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.
 
This court recognizes a broad standard for determining whether a principal-agent relationship exists under the Act. NLRB v. L. & J. Equipment Co., Inc., 745 F.2d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 1984); Zeiglers Refuse Collectors, Inc. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 1000, 1006 (3d Cir. 1981). The presence of actual or apparent authority can establish a principal-agent relationship. Actual authority can be either expressed by the principal's statements to the agent or implied from the principal's conduct towards the agent. Apparent authority depends upon how a third person views the principal's conduct. It arises from the third person's belief, resulting from his or her reasonable interpretation of the principal's conduct, that the principal consents to the agent's actions. L. & J. Equipment Co., Inc., 745 F.2d at 232-33.

In this instance,  [*51]  the relevant third person perspective is that of the union membership. Therefore, one question is whether the union used the individual respondents as conduits to relay information to the members or whether the union placed the respondents in a position where the members could reasonably believe they spoke on behalf of the union. Our Way, Inc., 238 NLRB 209, 213 (1978). Both Schoenberger and Daly were employed as business agents of the union. Daly was acting as the union's recording secretary at the nomination meeting. Although Schoenberger was not assigned any official role during the nomination meeting, he claimed to speak for "the boss," i.e., Stephen Traits, Jr., the convicted Business Manager.

Respondent Sherman was an employee and union steward at Gravely Roofing Company. On the night of the nomination meeting he was assigned the task of directing union members to the appropriate sign-in tables. As a union steward he was the union's conduit for members to air their grievances to the employer. He was the union's representative for the members on the jobsite. See Western Renaissance Corporation, 267 NLRB 1030, 1040 (1983) [*52]  (union steward, who was elected official of union and was instructed by business agent to distribute pro-dues increase literature, was acting within general scope of authority conferred upon her when she confiscated anti-dues increase literature distributed by dissident union member); East Texas Motor Freight, 262 NLRB 868, 871-72 (1982) (if union steward participated in assault against dissident union member, then basis could exist for holding union responsible for assault).

Based upon the foregoing, I conclude that Respondents Schoenberger, Daly and Sherman were acting as agents of the union at the nomination meeting. n8

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n8 The Board sought to introduce several out of court statements made by other union business agents who were not named as individual respondents. See Transcript, II, 97-106, 113-17, 120-21, 125-26, 138-41; Government Exhibit 6: 16T-1. These statements were not pleaded in the Board's petition for an adjudication of contempt as conduct violating this Court's April 11, 1978 judgment. The Board claimed that the statements provided a context for the alleged pre-election misconduct, and revealed that the current union officials and stewards participated in the same illegal conduct as the convicted officials. Most of the statements were offered by the Board for the truth of matters discussed therein.

One of the statements comes from an unsworn transcript of a taped conversation held by former business manager Stephen Traits, Jr. with Stephen Traits, III, and Robert Hammond. During the conversation, Stephen Traits, Jr. tells the other two that he will take "Donny Sherman and a couple of other black guys out there tomorrow & I'm gonna scare em good," and "I'll take Donny Sherman and them out there and I'll humiliate the shit out of the guy." This transcript was recorded on October 15, 1985, more than two years before the alleged pre-election misconduct. To the extent the Board sought to use this statement as background information establishing that the union had used Respondent Sherman in the past to threaten others, I find the statement to be more prejudicial than probative. Even assuming that Stephen Traits, Jr. did use Respondent Sherman to threaten others, the statement does not prove or disprove that Respondent Sherman threatened McAndrews on December 2, 1987, or that he threatened anyone else on any other date. The Board asks me to infer that because Stephen Traits wanted to use Sherman to threaten others, that Sherman actually did threaten others and that he threatened McAndrews on December 2, 1987. Such an inference is speculative. I find that regardless of whether or not the statement is inadmissible as hearsay, it is inadmissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 402, 403.

Other statements sought to be admitted were overheard by witness Charles Slemmer at his jobsite. Slemmer was working within 15 to 20 feet of business agent Danny Cannon when he came to talk to the foreman at Slemmer's jobsite. Business agent Cannon told the foreman that "If Sullivan wins the election we're going to lose everything we ever fought for," and that union member Matt Smith was "done as a steward." Matt Smith and Charles Slemmer had campaigned together for the Sullivan slate.

These statements are admissible because they were made by a union business agent in the presence of a witness who testified at the hearing. United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, Local 878 ( Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, 255 NLRB 251, 251 n.1 (1981)). In addition, the statements made by Cannon are only admissible to explain what Charles Slemmer thought Respondent Michael Daly meant when he told Slemmer, "you see what happened to fuckin' Matt. You could be next." They were not offered for the truth of the matters discussed and were not considered for the truth of the matters discussed.

Candidate Michael Sullivan testified that after he informed Acting Business Manager Mike Mangini of his intent to run for union office he was fired as an apprenticeship instructor, and that Mangini told him that he didn't think Sullivan could win and that "the new guy they get in there -- gets in there isn't gonna like you too much." Sullivan also testified that after the election he received only three job referrals, two of which were for one day each, and the last of which was rained out. As was stated above, neither the statement made by Mike Mangini nor the actions taken by unnamed union officials were pleaded in the Board's petition for an adjudication of contempt. The relevance of these matters to the specific threatening statements pleaded in the petition is unclear. These matters do not tend to prove or disprove that the threatening statements pleaded in the petition were made by the individual respondents. I therefore find that these matters are irrelevant and inadmissible. Federal Rule of Evidence 402.
 

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C. Respondent Daly was not acting as an agent of the union when he spoke to McAndrews around the Ennises kitchen table. The circumstances surrounding his statements to McAndrews indicate that he was acting as a union member who had been drinking for over 24 hours in an old friend's and union member's home after he had been convicted, and that he was speaking out of his concern for the future of the union. He was not acting as a business agent or a recording secretary. Unlike Schoenberger, he did not threaten McAndrews with loss of employment. In addition, McAndrews' stated fear stemmed from his experience that drunk roofers were dangerous. He was afraid of Daly becoming violent at that time and not of what Daly could do in his capacity as a union business agent or recording secretary.

Based upon the circumstances surrounding Daly's statements to McAndrews at the Ennis household, I conclude that Daly was not acting as an agent of the union at the time he made those comments.

D. However, I do conclude that Daly was acting as an agent of the union when he spoke with Charles Slemmer over the telephone, because Daly implied he could do something as a union official if Slemmer continued [*54]  to support the Sullivan slate, by stating, "you see what happened to fuckin' Matt. You could be next." At that time Daly was on the union payroll as a business agent. n9

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n9 Argument at trial suggested that Daly and others were not "agents" because they had been convicted, and it was well known that the were lame ducks. Daly acted as the recording secretary at the December 2, nomination meeting (Deposition, 7-9). He never tendered his resignation as an officer. (Id.) The only action tantamount to a resignation of his office was his tendering of his union card in the last week of December and the new officers taking their positions shortly before Christmas (Deposition, 7-8). Daly was cloaked with sufficient authority in this period to show he was an agent of the Union.
 

 

- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -3. Whether the individual respondents' statements to Costello, McAndrews and Slemmer violated this Court's April 11, 1978, order because they restrained employees in exercising rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act.

(a) Although this Court's [*55]  April 11, 1978 order was not issued in a proceeding involving intraunion coercion, it required Local 30-30B to cease and desist from "in any other manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.". The Supreme Court has held that a party can be held in contempt for violating an injunction that requires the party not to violate a statutory provision, so long as the statutory provision, or the law interpreting the statutory provision provides adequate notice of the forbidden conduct. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192 (1949); American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1147 n.5 (3d Cir. 1986). Any ambiguity in the law should be resolved in favor of the party charged with contempt. United States on behalf of the I.R.S. v. Norton, 717 F.2d 767, 774 (3d Cir. 1983).

The law is clear that Section 7 does apply to union members engaging in intraunion political activities. See Heavy and Highway Construction Workers' Local Union No. 158, 280 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 123 L.R.R.M. 1042 (1986) [*56]  (refusal of union to refer eight employees because of their intraunion political activities violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2)); Flagstaff Brewing Corp., 1960 C.C.H. N.L.R.B. P 9108 at 14,106 (Act protects union members' rights to express dissatisfaction over stewardship of elected union officers without fear of Union causing employer to discharge); Highway, City and Freight Drivers,, 250 NLRB 1127, 1130 (1980) (union president violated Section 8(b)(1)(a) of the Act by threatening to cause the discharge of two employees, threatening to refuse to refer the employees, and threatening to refuse to represent the employees, because the employees opposed a dues increase); United Steelworkers of America Local 1397, 240 NLRB 848 (1979) (vice-president who was acting president, and grievance committee member of union, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, by threatening to have dissident member of union fired and by threatening to refuse to represent member in any of dissident's future grievances). Accordingly, the April 11, 1978, enforcement order and subsequent contempt orders provided notice [*57]  that any restraints on employees engaged in activity protected by Section 7 would be forbidden, regardless of whether the protected employees are union members or not.

(b) The test for whether the individual respondents' statements violated this Court's order and Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act is whether those statements tended to restrain or coerce employees in the rights guaranteed them in the Act. The test is not whether the individual respondents intended to coerce employees, or whether the employees were in fact intimidated or coerced. Highway, City and Freight Drivers,, 250 NLRB at 1130 (1980); United Steelworkers of America Local 1397, 240 NLRB 848, 849 (1979).

(c) At the nomination meeting respondent Schoenberger told Patrick John Costello to "stick [those campaign fliers] back in your pocket or I'll stuff your head in your pocket." The very nature of this statement tended to restrain Costello in exercising his right to support a candidate for union office and thereby violated this Court's April 11, 1978 judgment.

(d) At the same nomination meeting, respondent Schoenberger also told Bill McAndrews not to  [*58]  run for union president. Schoenberger threatened to physically harm McAndrews and to take away McAndrews' job. These statements tended to restrain McAndrews in exercising his right to run for union office and thereby violated this Court's April 11, 1978 judgment.

(e) While Schoenberger was threatening McAndrews, respondent Sherman also approached McAndrews and threatened to physically harm him if he ran for union office. Such statements tended to restrain McAndrews in exercising his right to run for union office and thereby violated this Court's April 11, 1978 judgment.

(f) Because I have concluded that respondent