OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT HEARING OFFICER
IN THE MATTER OF |
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DOCKET NO. |
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MARK EAGLE v. WILLIAM BARTLETT LOCAL UNION 334 DETROIT, MICHIGAN |
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98-60TB |
ORDER AND
MEMORANDUM
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This Order and Memorandum addresses Trial Board charges filed by Mark H. Eagle (“Eagle”), a member in good standing of Local 334, against the President of Local 334, William Bartlett (“Bartlett”), on July 8, 1998. Local 334 conducted a Trial Board on August 5, 1998, with the Executive Board members sitting as the Trial Board. The Local 334 Trial Board dismissed Eagle’s charges. Eagle appealed to the LIUNA Appellate Officer. On October 6, 1998, the Appellate Officer reversed the decision of the Trial Board and remanded the matter for a new Trial Board. Eagle v. Bartlett, A.O. 209 (98-041-TB). On October 21, 1998, General President Arthur A. Coia appointed the Independent Hearing Officer (“IHO”) to hear the Trial Board pursuant to Article XII, Section 3 of the LIUNA Uniform Local Union Constitution (“Constitution”). See Letter from General President Coia to IHO (10/21/98).
On January 12, 1999, the IHO appointed William Heiman (“Heiman”), Esquire, a member of the law firm of Vaira and Riley and a member of the Pennsylvania Bar, as a Special Hearing Master to conduct the hearing. On February 12, 1999, Heiman conducted the Trial Board in Detroit, Michigan.
The basis of Eagle’s charges is that he was denied his right of full freedom of speech at a Local 334 membership meeting.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Local 334 held its monthly meeting on the evening of July 2, 1998 (“July 2 meeting”).
2. Eagle attended this meeting. He estimated that 80 members of the Local were in attendance.
3. Eagle testified that, during the New Business portion of the meeting, he rose, turned his back to the Executive Board dias and started to read a one-page statement to the membership in which he asked to inspect documents dealing with the job referral system. See Exhibit (“Ex.”) 1.
4. Eagle testified that soon after he began to read his statement, Bartlett, who was presiding over the meeting, interrupted him and told him that he was “out of order.” Eagle said Bartlett told him he was not allowed to “grandstand,” and if he had a question, to ask it or sit down. Eagle testified that he was not permitted to finish reading his statement and was limited to specifically asking to examine the job referral documents.
5. At the hearing, Eagle presented the stipulated testimony of Lucretia Sturdivant (“Sturdivant”) and Gerald Evans (“Evans”). Both are members in good standing of Local 334. Sturdivant and Evans testified that they were both present at the July 2 meeting, that they observed Eagle attempt to read his statement, and that Bartlett cut him off and directed Eagle to ask a question or take his seat.
6. Bartlett testified that the normal procedure for Local 334 monthly meetings is that during the New Business portion of the meeting, members are permitted to ask specific questions directed to a specific member of the Executive Board, but they are not permitted to make any further statements to the membership.
7. Bartlett testified that the rules stated above are necessary to maintain order because of the volatile nature of many of the Local meetings. He said there had been acts of violence in the past, and he was concerned for the safety of the members. Bartlett estimated that approximately 150 members of the Local attended the July 2 meeting.
8. Bartlett testified that there is a procedure for members of the Local to have their opinions and concerns addressed at the Local’s monthly meetings. He said members are required to write their statements and deliver them to the Executive Board prior to the meeting. The Executive Board reviews the statements submitted. The subjects which the Executive Board considers worthy of discussion are read aloud to the membership at the next regularly scheduled meeting of the Local, under the heading “Communications and Bills.” Any appropriate discussion by the members from the floor follows. Those subjects deemed not worthy of discussion are not heard.
9. An audio tape of the July 2 meeting was made part of the record. See Ex. 3.
10. During the New Business portion of the meeting, a member addressed the membership at the microphone and made a highly emotional, rambling statement, concerning the intricacies of the job referral system, during which she repeatedly and passionately asked how the system worked. During the twelve minutes that the member was speaking, the gavel was banged several times and on several occasions Bartlett appealed for order from the crowd.
11. The record reflects that subsequent to the meeting Eagle was given an opportunity to review the referral document that he requested.
DISCUSSION
The issue presented at this Trial Board is a fundamental one – balancing the right of a union member to exercise his right to freedom of speech at a meeting of the Local and the responsibility of the Local to adopt and enforce reasonable rules governing the conduct at meetings, particularly with respect to maintaining order.
Section 101(a)(2) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. ' 411(a)(2), the Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations, states as follows:
Freedom of speech and assembly
– Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and
assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or
opinions and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views . . .
upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization’s
established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings . . . .
The Constitution, Article III, Section 3(e), lists the Obligation of Members. Section 3(e) states, “[A member is required] [t]o observe proper decorum in attending and participating in meetings and functions of the Organization, in accordance with such reasonable rules established by the organization and generally accepted parliamentary rules of procedure pertaining to the conduct of meetings and functions.”
The Democratic Practices Section of the LIUNA Ethical
Practices Code protects the right of a union member to exercise his or her
right of freedom of speech:
1. …Each member shall have full freedom of speech and the right to
participate in the democratic decisions of the Union.
2. Local Union membership meetings…shall be conducted in an
atmosphere of fairness.
…
4. The Union shall ensure that its operations shall be conducted in a democratic and fair manner. Corruption, discrimination or anti-democratic procedures shall not be permitted under any circumstances.
1.
Additionally, there is a presumption that, in the absence of any special rule to the contrary, Robert’s Rules of Order apply to the conduct of Local meetings. See Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 7.
The case of George v. Local Union No. 639, 825 F. Supp. 328 (D.D.C. 1993), is instructive in this matter. There, George, a member of a Teamsters Local, rose to speak at a membership meeting. He turned his back on the presiding officer and began to address the members. The President warned George that if he did not address his remarks to the Chair, the meeting would be adjourned. George persisted and the President adjourned the meeting. The court noted that Robert’s Rules of Order, Sec. 7 applied. Section 7 provides, “Speakers must address their remarks to the presiding officer, be courteous in their language and deportment….” The court held that the President was acting within his authority in requiring George to address the Chair, stating, “…George did not properly have the floor because of his refusal to address the Chair. A member speaking out of order may be interrupted and the meeting adjourned without a violation of Sec. 101 (a)(2) even if the adjournment was procedurally improper.” George, 825 F. Supp. at 332.
In the instant case, Eagle turned his back on the Chair when he began to read his statement. The IHO finds that Bartlett acted properly in directing Eagle to sit down.
The issue presented, however, is not as simple as resolving whether Eagle violated parliamentary procedure. There is a far more important issue of whether Local 334’s meeting procedure unduly inhibits the free speech rights of members.
Notwithstanding that a member held the floor for a full twelve minutes just prior to when Eagle attempted to read his statement, Bartlett testified that members are not permitted to speak during New Business beyond asking specific questions. This rule, according to him, is to insure that order in the hall will be maintained.
Bartlett noted that members may submit statements to
the Executive Board prior to the meeting.
The Board determines which statements, if any, will be read at the
membership meeting in the Communications and Bills portion of the meeting. General discussion follows.
The Local 334 procedures governing free expression at
union meetings should be examined in light of United Steelworkers of
America v. Sadlowski,
457 U. S. 102 (1982). Justice Marshall,
writing for the majority, examined the legislative history of Title I of the
LMRDA:
This history reveals that
Congress modeled Title 1 after the Bill of Rights, and that the legislators
intended ' 101(a)(2) to restate a
principal First Amendment value—the right to speak one’s mind without fear of
reprisal. However, there is absolutely
no indication that Congress intended the scope of ' 101(a)(2) to be identical to
the scope of the First Amendment.
Rather, Congress’ decision to include a proviso covering “reasonable”
rules refutes that proposition. First
Amendment freedoms may not be infringed absent a compelling governmental
interest. Even then, any government
regulation must be carefully tailored, so that rights are not needlessly
impaired. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54, 102
S.Ct. 1523, 1529, 71 L.Ed.2d 732 (1982).
Union rules, by contrast, are valid under ' 101(a)(2) so long as they are
reasonable; they need not pass the stringent tests applied in the First
Amendment context.
Justice Marshall then set out the following criteria: “To determine whether a union rule is valid under the statute, we first consider whether the rule interferes with an interest protected by the first part of Sec. 101 (a)(2). If it does, we then determine whether the rule is ‘reasonable’ and thus sheltered by the proviso to Sec. 101 (a)(2).” Id. at 111. “The critical question is whether a rule that partially interferes with a protected interest is nevertheless reasonably related to the protection of the organization as an institution.” Id. at 111-12.
Applying the first prong of the test, it is evident that the Local 334 rule which limits members to asking specific questions during the New Business portion of the meeting runs counter to the fundamental right of a member to speak out at a union meeting as stated in the LMRDA. As for the second prong of the test, the IHO finds that suppressing any discussion during the New Business section of the meeting for the purpose of preserving order is too restrictive on the members and is unreasonable.
The presiding officer may place reasonable restrictions on the comments of the members during the New Business portion of the meeting; however, the blanket restriction of limiting members to simply asking a question is an unreasonable restriction on the right of free speech. Moreover, there is evidence that the rule is not uniformly applied; prior to Eagle speaking, a member delivered a twelve minute highly emotional speech.
The procedure of limiting a member to asking a question during the New Business portion of the meeting is an unreasonable restriction on the members’ right of free speech.
The procedure of requiring members to submit their statements to the Executive Board for prior approval is unreasonable. The Executive Board may require members to seek a time slot to make a statement prior to the meeting, so as to maintain a reasonable meeting length. The Executive Board, however, cannot act in an editorial capacity and decide what topics will be heard, and what topics will be rejected. The Executive Board may place reasonable restrictions as to length of time permitted for presentations, but may not place itself in the position of arbitrator of what may be heard.
The procedure of the Executive Board in deciding what topics will be heard during the Communications and Bills portion of the meeting is an unreasonable restriction on the members’ right of free speech.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Although Bartlett properly ordered Eagle to sit down during his presentation during the New Business portion of the meeting, the procedure followed during the New Business portion of the meeting unreasonably restricted Eagle’s right of free speech.
2. The Procedure of restricting a member to simply asking a question during the New Business portion of the meeting is an unreasonable restriction on the members’ right of free speech.
3. The procedure in which the Executive Board requires members to submit all subjects to be discussed to the Executive Board for its approval or rejection prior to the meeting, is an unreasonable restriction of the members’ right of free speech. The Executive Board may reasonably require members to seek time to make a statement as a scheduling matter; however, the Executive Board may not place itself in the position of approving or disapproving any statements.
DECISION
Eagle has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Bartlett improperly prevented him from speaking.
The procedure of limiting a member to asking a question during the New Business portion of the meeting shall be discontinued.
The procedure under the Communications and Bills portion of the meeting, in which the Executive Board has the power to prevent subjects from being raised shall be discontinued. A reasonable procedure for scheduling as discussed above may be implemented.
This decision will become final within 30 days, unless appealed to the LIUNA Appellate Officer within 30 days.
The Appellate Officer is:
W. Neil Eggleston, Appellate Officer
1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 783-0800
(202) 383-6610 (fax)
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s/Peter Vaira
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PETER F. VAIRA |
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INDEPENDENT HEARING OFFICER |
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Date: March 26, 1999 |
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Mark H. Eagle William Bartlett Terrence M. Healy Local 334 |
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