780 F.2d 267, *; 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 25812, **;
121 L.R.R.M. 2121; 104 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P11,941
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LOCAL 560 of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, SALVATORE
PROVENZANO, President, JOSEPH SHERIDAN, Vice-President, JOSEPHINE PROVENZANO
SEPTEMBRE, Sec-Treasurer, J. W. DILDINE, Recording Secretary, THOMAS REYNOLDS,
SR., Trustee, STANLEY JARONKO, Trustee, TRUCKING EMPLOYEES OF NORTH JERSEY
WELFARE FUND, INC., SALVATORE PROVENZANO, Employee Trustee, THOMAS REYNOLDS,
SR., Employee Trustee, LOCAL 560 OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES SEVERANCE PAY PLAN,
SALVATORE PROVENZANO, Trustee and Administrator, JOSEPHINE P. SEPTEMBRE, Trustee
and Administrator, ANTHONY PROVENZANO, individually, NUNZIO PROVENZANO,
individually, STEPHEN ANDRETTA, individually, THOMAS ANDRETTA, individually,
GABRIEL BRIGUGLIO, individually, Salvatore Provenzano, Joseph Sheridan, Jay
Dildine, Josephine Provenzano, Thomas Reynolds, Michael Sciarra and Stanley
Jaronko, Appellants LOCAL 560 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, SALVATORE PROVENZANO,
President, JOSEPH SHERIDAN, Vice-President, JOSEPHINE PROVENZANO SEPTEMBRE,
Sec-Treasurer, J.W. DILDINE, Recording Secretary, THOMAS REYNOLDS, SR., Trustee,
STANLEY JARONKO, Trustee, TRUCKING EMPLOYEES OF NORTH JERSEY WELFARE FUND, INC.,
SALVATORE PROVENZANO, Employee Trustee, THOMAS REYNOLDS, SR., Employee Trustee,
LOCAL 560 OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES SEVERANCE PAY PLAN, SALVATORE PROVENZANO,
Trustee and Administrator, JOSEPHINE P. SEPTEMBRE, Trustee and Administrator,
ANTHONY PROVENZANO, individually, NUNZIO PROVENZANO, individually, STEPHEN
ANDRETTA, individually, THOMAS ANDRETTA, individually, GABRIEL BRIGUGLIO,
individually, LOCAL UNION NO. 560, Appellants
Nos. 84-5333, 84-5334
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
780 F.2d 267; 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 25812; 121 L.R.R.M. 2121; 104 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
P11,941; 19 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 944
February 12, 1985, Argued
December 26, 1985, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [**1]
Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc Denied January 23, 1986. Amended February 3,
1986.
PRIOR HISTORY:
On Appeal from the District Court for the District of New Jersey, D.C. Civil No.
82-0689.
CORE TERMS: membership, extortion, appointment, Hobbs Act, RICO
Act, predicate, appointed, business agent, murder, salary, pattern of
racketeering activity, aided, abetted, labor organization, predicate act,
convicted, payoff, extorted, peace, election, intimidation, preponderance,
incarceration, pension, aiding and abetting, racketeering, climate, reputed,
interstate commerce, leadership
COUNSEL: Harvey Weissbard, Esq.
(Argued), Weissbard & Wiewiorka, West Orange, New Jersey, Attorney for
Appellants.
Edward A. Cohen, Esq. (Argued) Schneider, Cohen & Solomon, Jersey City, New
Jersey, Attorney for Appellant Local Union No. 560.
W.H. Dumont, Esq. (Argued), United States Attorney, Ralph A. Jacobs, Esq.,
Chief, Appeals Division, Thomas L. Weisenbeck, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney,
Leopold Laufer, Esq., Special Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice Claudia J.
Flynn, Esq., Victor Ashrafi, Esq., Faith S. Hochberg, Esq., Assistant U.S.
Attorneys, Newark, New Jersey, Attorneys for Appellee.
JUDGES: Garth and Becker, Circuit
Judges, and Rosenn, Senior Circuit Judge.
OPINIONBY: GARTH
OPINION: [*269]
OPINION OF THE COURT
GARTH, CIRCUIT JUDGE:
This appeal culminates a lengthy and complex civil action brought pursuant to
[*270] the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations ("RICO") Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961, et seq., by the United States against several [**2]
defendants who allegedly acquired an interest in, and effectively dominated,
Local 560 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("Local 560").
The district court, concluding that Local 560 was a "captive labor
organization," enjoined certain defendants from any future contacts with
Local 560, and removed the current members of the Local 560 Executive Board,
replacing the Executive Board with a temporary trusteeship until free elections
could be held. The district court's opinion appears at 581
F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984). The district court stayed its injunction pending
appeal to this Court. We now affirm.
I.
On March 9, 1982, the government filed its civil complaint naming as defendants
twelve individuals, Local 560, and Local 560's Welfare Fund and Severance Pay
Plan. The government alleged that five of the named defendants: Anthony
Provenzano, Nunzio Provenzano, Steven Andretta, Thomas Andretta and Gabriel
Briguglio, were members of an ongoing criminal confederation -- the Provenzano
Group n1 -- which, through acts of extortion and murder, effectively acquired an
interest in, and control of, Local 560, an enterprise within the meaning of
RICO, in violation [**3] of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(b). n2 The government also charged these defendants, as the
Provenzano Group, with unlawfully participating, directly and indirectly, in the
conduct of Local 560's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity in
violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) n3 and with conspiring to violate the above two provisions
of RICO (§§ 1962(b) and (c)) in contravention of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d). n4
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n1 Although not named as defendants by the government, the district court held
that other past and present members of the Provenzano Group included Harold
Konigsberg, Armand Faugno, Frederick Furino, Salvatore Sinno, Ralph Picardo, and
Andrew Reynolds. App. at 62.
n2 18
U.S.C. § 1962(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity
or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
[**4]
n3 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt.
n4 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions
of subsections (a), (b) or (c) of this section.
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Finally, the government charged the remaining seven individual defendants:
Salvatore Provenzano, Joseph Sheridan, Josephine Provenzano, J.W. Dildine,
Thomas Reynolds, Michael Sciarra, and Stanley Jaronko, who, at the time the suit
was brought, constituted the Executive Board of Local 560, with aiding and
abetting the Provenzano Group in violating 18
U.S.C. § 1962(b) and (d). n5
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n5 18
U.S.C. § 2 provides: "Whoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission,
is punishable as a principal."
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[**5]
As stated above, the government avers that the Provenzano Group, aided and
abetted by past and present members of the Executive Board of Local 560,
violated 18
U.S.C. § 1962(b) by acquiring an interest in and control of Local 560
through a pattern of racketeering activity. The Provenzano Group's racketeering
activity, the government argues, consisted of various acts of murder and
extortion, the extortion element consisting of:
the wrongful use of actual and threatened force, violence and fear of physical
and economic injury in order to create within Local 560 a climate of
intimidation which induced the members thereof to consent to the surrender of
certain valuable property in the form of their union [*271]
rights as guaranteed by the provisions of Sections 157 and 411 of Title 29 of
the United States Code [the Taft-Hartley Act, 29
U.S.C. § 157 and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA),
29
U.S.C. § 411].
App. at 174A. Specifically, paragraph 12(a) of the Complaint alleged that The
Provenzano Group extorted the membership's rights to vote, speak, and assemble
freely [**6] by systematic acts of
intimidation, including, as the district court summarized:
(1) the June 1961 murder of Anthony Castellitto; (2) the August 1961 appointment
of Salvatore Provenzano to the position of Trustee formerly occupied by
Castellitto; (3) the September 1961 appointment of Salvatore Briguglio -- the
alleged murderer of Castellitto -- to the position of Business Agent; (4) the
February 1963 appointment of Nunzio Provenzano to the position of Business Agent
following his January 1963 conviction for extortion; (5) the May 1963 murder of
Walter Glockner; (6) the 1964 appointment of Robert A. Luizzi to the position of
Business Agent in spite of a record of criminal convictions; (7) the May 1967
appointment of Luizzi to the position of Trustee; (8) the February 1969
appointment of Salvatore Briguglio to position of Business Agent following
completion of a term of imprisonment for extortion; (10) the 1970 appointment of
Nunzio Provenzano to the position of Business Agent; (11) the 1971 appointment
of Thomas Reynolds, Sr. to the position of Business Agent in spite of a record
of criminal activity; (12) the 1972 appointment of Nunzio Provenzano to the
position of Fund Trustee; [**7] (13) the 1972
appointment of Salvatore Briguglio to the position of Fund Trustee; (14) the
allowance of frequent visitations by Armand Faugno and Thomas Andretta to the
offices of Local 560; (15) the January 1963 appointment of Nunzio Provenzano to
the position of Secretary-Treasurer; (16) the 1973 appointment of Reynolds to
the position of Fund Trustee; (17) the 1974 resumption of duties as Business
Agent by Salvatore Briguglio following completion of a term of imprisonment for
counterfeiting; (18) the 1974 appointment of Luizzi to the position of Fund
Trustee; (19) the November 1975 appointments of Anthony and Nunzio Provenzano to
the positions of Secretary-Treasurer and President, respectively, in spite of a
record of convictions for extortion; (20) the February 1977 appointment of
Reynolds to the position of Trustee; (21) the July 1978 appointment of Josephine
Provenzano to the position of Secretary-Treasurer following Anthony Provenzano's
conviction for the Castellitto murder; (22) the July 1981 appointment of
Salvatore Provenzano to the position of President following Nunzio Provenzano's
forced resignation as a condition of bail on a labor racketeering conviction;
(23) the Executive [**8] Board's failure to
recover monies wrongfully converted by Anthony Provenzano; (24) the retention of
Marvin Zalk as Fund Administrator in spite of payments accepted by him from an
insurance company representative during the 1950's; (25) the retention of Ralph
Torraco as the Fund's independent certified public accountant in spite of his
federal indictment for systematically overbilling the Fund; (26) the extortion
of contributions to the defense funds of the Provenzanos and Michael Sciarra
from union members; (27) the 1981 appointment of Luizzi to the position of
Business Agent; and (28) associations by some of the defendants with Frank
"Funzi" Tieri and Matteo Alfredo Ianniello, reputed to be organized
crime members.
App. at 10-12.
In addition to committing acts of murder and extortion for the purpose of
dominating Local 560, the individual members of the Provenzano Group, according
to the government's complaint, allegedly committed several other illegal acts in
its participation in the conduct of the affairs of the Local 560 enterprise in
violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c). The predicate illegal acts [*272]
which comprised the Provenzano Group's [**9]
"pattern of racketeering activity" under § 1962(c) as alleged in the
government's Complaint were summarized by the district court as follows:
(1) the extortion of $17,000 from Walter Dorn and his company (Dorn Transport,
Inc. of Rensselaer, New York), in return for "labor peace"; (2) the
wrongful conversion by defendant Anthony Provenzano, aided and abetted by
successive defendant members of the Local 560 Executive Board of approximately
$223,785 in Local 560 funds "by means of false and fraudulent pretenses,
representations, and promises, and pursuant to a scheme and artifice to defraud.
. .;" (3) the wrongful receipt by Provenzano Group members of payments,
loans and other things of value from certain employers (Interocean Services,
Inc. and Di-Jub Leasing, Inc.) in exchange for "labor peace"; (4) the
unlawful receipt by defendant Anthony Provenzano, aided and abetted by Salvatore
Briguglio, of certain fees, kickbacks, gifts or things of value in the form of
certain Florida real estate because of, and with intent to be influenced with
respect to, his actions and decisions relating to the Benefit Fund; and (5) the
wrongful receipt by defendant Nunzio Provenzano, together [**10]
with Irving Cotler and others, as associates of the Provenzano Group, of
"labor peace" payments by certain employers, specifically Pacific
Intermountain Express Company, Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc., T.I.M.E. -- DC, Inc.
and Helms Express.
App. at 13.
In its demand for relief, the government sought only injunctive and equitable
remedies. The government asked that the district court (1) enjoin Anthony
Provenzano, Nunzio Provenzano, Stephen Andretta, Thomas Andretta, and Gabriel
Briguglio (the members of the Provenzano Group) from having any dealings,
directly or indirectly, with any officer or employee of the Local 560 enterprise
or any other labor organization or employee benefit plan; (2) enjoin Salvatore
Provenzano, Joseph Sheridan, Josephine Provenzano, J.W. Dildine, Thomas
Reynolds, Sr., Michael Sciarra, and Stanley Jaronko (the members of the
Executive Board) from acting in any official capacity for or on behalf of Local
560 or its funds; (3) appoint one or more trustees to discharge all duties and
responsibilities of the Executive Board of Local 560 until such time as free
elections can be held; and (4) after the membership participation in a free
election, permanently [**11] enjoin all
individual defendants from having any future dealings of any nature whatsoever,
directly or indirectly, with any officer, agent, representative, or employee of
Local 560 or any other labor organization.
Before trial, the government entered into consent orders with defendants Anthony
Provenzano, Nunzio Provenzano, and Thomas Andretta. The consent orders bar these
three defendants from, among other things, (1) associating with any enterprise
(within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 1961) which seeks to dominate, control, or otherwise influence the
affairs of any labor organization or any employee benefit plan and (2) acting as
an officer, organizer, administrator, or representative for any labor
organization or any employee benefit plan. In exchange, the government agreed to
"not pursue any further civil claims against the defendants based upon the
transactions which are specifically enumerated in the Verified Complaint . . .
." App. at 164A. Accordingly, pursuant to these consent orders, Anthony
Provenzano, Nunzio Provenzano, and Thomas Andretta were removed as defendants
prior to trial.
On November 1, 1982, prior to trial, the district court denied [**12]
Local 560's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss paragraph 12(a) of the government's
complaint for failure to state a cause of action. United
States v. Local 560, 550 F. Supp. 511 (D.N.J. 1982). Paragraph 12(a),
as previously noted, charged the Provenzano Group and the Executive Board with
extorting members' rights to vote, speak, and assemble. The district court held
that the extortion of intangible rights guaranteed to union members by the
LMRDA's Bill of Rights, 29
U.S.C. § 411, [*273] constituted a
violation of the Hobbs Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1951, and thus, would properly serve as a predicate act under
RICO. The district court also rejected Local 560's argument that the LMRDA
remedies are the exclusive remedies available in combatting the extortion of
member's rights under that statute.
On January 25, 1983, the bench trial of this cause commenced. The trial lasted
until May 17, 1983, comprising 51 days of testimony. On March 16, 1984, the
district court entered its final order, granting the government's requested
injunctive relief in all respects. At the same time, the district court withheld
the appointment of a trustee [**13] because it
stayed its order pending appeal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62. All of the
defendants except alleged Provenzano Group members Stephen Andretta and Gabriel
Briguglio filed timely notices of appeal.
II.
The district court's analysis of the defendants' RICO Act violations in the
instant case differed from the analysis on which the government's Complaint was
based. The government's complaint referred to Local 560 as the
"enterprise" for both its section 1962(b) and (c) counts. Thus, the
government alleged in its complaint that the individual associates of the
Provenzano Group violated 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) by participating in the conduct of the affairs of the Local
560 enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Although the
district court made findings consonant with this theory, it also held that the
individual members of the Provenzano Group violated 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) by unlawfully participating in the conduct of the affairs
of the Provenzano Group (not Local 560), which the district court held
was the "enterprise" for purposes of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c).
In addition, although the [**14] government
initially alleged separate and distinct predicate criminal offenses under
sections 1962(b) and 1962(c), the district court held that there were several
predicate offenses committed by the Provenzano Group members which served as the
underlying predicate acts for both the section 1962(b) and section 1962(c)
counts. Specifically, the district court, while attributing other predicate acts
to either 1962(b) or 1962(c), see, e.g., n.6, infra, held that
the following crimes, among others, constituted predicate acts under both
of the above subsections of the RICO Act:
(1) Dorn: Between approximately January 1, 1952 and June 1, 1959,
Anthony Provenzano (leader of the Provenzano Group), while an official of Local
560, extorted payoffs from Walter Dorn and his company, Dorn Transport, Inc., in
exchange for "labor peace." Anthony Provenzano was subsequently
convicted on one count of Hobbs Act extortion under 18
U.S.C. § 1957 for his part in the Dorn labor peace payoffs. App. at 24, 69.
(2) Castellitto: In 1961, Anthony Provenzano recruited Harold
Konigsberg and Salvatore Briguglio to kill Anthony Castellitto, who was a
popular member [**15] of Local 560 and who
posed a threat to Anthony Provenzano's control of the union. On June 6, 1961,
Konigsberg, Briguglio, Salvatore Sinno, and others, committed the murder.
Salvatore Briguglio was killed while under indictment for the Castellitto
murder, and on June 21, 1978, Anthony Provenzano was sentenced to life
imprisonment for his part in the murder of Castellitto. App. at 24-25, 30,
70-71.
(3) Braun: Between November 30, 1961 and December 12, 1961, Nunzio
Provenzano and Salvatore Briguglio attempted to extort labor peace payments (the
Braun Payoff Demand case) from the Braun Company in violation of New York Penal
Law § 560 and § 1294 (Conspiracy and attempted grand larceny). Nunzio
Provenzano and Salvatore Briguglio were convicted and incarcerated for
approximately 2-1/2 years in New York. App. at 25-26, 29, 69.
(4) Seatrain: Between December of 1969 and June of 1977, Anthony
Provenzano, Stephen Andretta, Thomas Andretta, [*274]
and Gabriel Briguglio unlawfully received "labor peace" payoffs from
Interocean Services, Inc. and Di-Jub Leasing Inc. (Seatrain Labor Peace Payoffs)
in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 186(b). Anthony Provenzano and [**16]
Thomas Andretta each received 20 years imprisonment for their part in the
Seatrain payoffs, and Stephen Andretta and Gabriel Briguglio received 10 and 7
years imprisonment, respectively. App. at 22-23, 25, 28, 77.
(5) Romano: Between 1974 and 1977, Anthony Provenzano, aided and
abetted by Salvatore Briguglio and Stephen Andretta, received kickbacks in
connection with loans made by the union's Passaic and Bergen Funds to Thomas and
Frank Romano in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1954. App. at 77-82.
(6) City-Man: Between January of 1971 and July of 1980, Nunzio
Provenzano, Irving Cotler, and other individuals unlawfully received labor peace
payoffs (the City-Man payoffs) from Pacific Intermountain Express Company, Mason
and Dixon Lines, Inc. T.I.M.E. - DC, Inc., and Helms Express in violation of 28
U.S.C. § 186(b). On May 5, 1981, Nunzio Provenzano was convicted on RICO
charges stemming from these City-Man labor peace payoffs and was sentenced to 10
years imprisonment. App. at 26, 82-83.
Although the district court concluded that the crimes recounted above
constituted predicate acts for purposes of both sections 1962(b) [**17]
and 1962(c), the district court also held that the Provenzano Group's extortion
of the LMRDA rights of union members -- which was the only predicate act aided
and abetted by the Local 560 Executive Board defendants -- was a predicate act
only for purposes of section 1962(b). n6
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n6 Since the Provenzano Group, aided and abetted by the Executive Board,
extorted LMRDA rights of Local 560's membership for the purpose of
"acquiring an interest in and control of" the Local 560 enterprise,
the extortion of membership rights was properly designated as a section 1962(b)
act.
The district court held, as well, that certain crimes committed by the
Provenzano Group were predicate acts only for purposes of section 1962(c). For
example, the district court noted that the Middlesex County Loansharking
Transaction committed in March of 1967 by Thomas Andretta and Armand Faugno in
violation of New Jersey law and the Skil Tool Theft committed in 1968 by Thomas
Andretta and Frederick Salvatore Furino in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 659, were racketeering activities relevant only to section 1962(c)
of the RICO Act. App. at 76.
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[**18]
The district court held that the extortion of the membership's democratic rights
in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1951, was accomplished by fostering a general climate of
intimidation within Local 560. The district court stated that the failure to
develop any political opposition to the leadership of Local 560 during the past
20 years demonstrated this climate of intimidation. The district court
identified several discrete actions taken by the Provenzano Group and the
Executive Board of Local 560 which helped nurture this climate of intimidation,
and which resulted in numerous instances of extortion.
The actions taken by the Provenzano Group and the Executive Board, as found by
the district court, included (1) the repeated appointments of convicted
criminals and persons reputed to be involved in criminal activity to positions
of trust and responsibility within Local 560; (2) the expenditure of Local 560
assets in the form of increased salary and pension benefits to Anthony
Provenzano, who has committed three criminal offenses while a member of Local
560's Executive Board; (3) permitting the presence of convicted criminals and
reputed criminals [**19] in the offices of
Local 560; and (4) the failure of the Executive Board to counter perceptions on
the part of Local 560's membership that it was unwise for the members to voice
dissatisfaction with Executive Board policy.
III.
We address first the issue which concerns both the Provenzano Group defendants
and the Executive Board defendants: namely, whether the district court properly
[*275] found a violation of section 1962(b)
of the RICO Act. The district court held that the Provenzano Group members,
aided and abetted by the Executive Board, acquired an interest in and control of
Local 560 through a pattern of racketeering activity. See 18
U.S.C. § 1962(b) n.2 supra.
Central to the district court's section 1962(b) analysis is its finding that the
Provenzano Group and the Executive Board extorted the membership's LMRDA rights
to democratic participation in their union's affairs. LMRDA rights apply to
every member of a labor organization. These rights include the right to nominate
Union leaders; to vote in union elections; to meet and assemble freely with
other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions at union
meetings. 29
U.S.C. § 41 [**20] (a)(1) & (2)
provides:
(a)(1) Equal rights. -- Every member of a labor organization shall have equal
rights and privileges within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote
in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership
meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business
of such meetings, to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the
business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such
organization's constitution and bylaws.
(2) Freedom of speech and assembly. -- Every member of any labor organizations
shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to
express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the
labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor
organization or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the
organization's established and reasonable rules, pertaining to the conduct of
meetings: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to impair
the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to
the responsibility of every member toward the organization [**21]
as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with
its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.
Indeed, it is upon these predicate acts of extortion that the district court
based its finding of liability.
A.
(1)
As a threshold matter, there are certain evidentiary questions which this court
must resolve that bear upon the extortion of LMRDA rights. At trial, the
government, in attempting to prove that the Provenzano Group and the Executive
Board of Local 560 extorted the LMRDA rights of union members, submitted various
proofs to establish that many union members were fearful of exercising their
statutory right to participate in the affairs of Local 560. As part of these
proofs, the government sought to admit into evidence numerous newspaper and
magazine articles, n7 spanning a twenty-year period, which reported the criminal
activities of Provenzano Group members. The government argued that these
articles were relevant and admissible, not to demonstrate the truth of the
statements in the articles, but to demonstrate the perceived reputation of
Provenzano Group members in the community.
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n7 These articles were from the New York Daily News, the Hudson
Dispatch, Life Magazine, the Newark Evening News, the New York
Post, the New York Times, The Bergen Record, the Newark Star
Ledger, the Wall Street Journal, and Time Magazine.
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[**22]
The government further maintained that it was proper for the district court to
infer that these articles were read by Local 560's membership and that the
reputation of the Provenzano Group members intimidated the membership into
surrendering their LMRDA rights. The district court, adopting the government's
position, admitted the newspaper and magazine articles into evidence, n8 holding
that "it may be a fair inference [*276]
that the members kept abreast of certain events and that having read these
articles they feared violence or economic retaliation if they exercised their
LMRDA rights." App. at 1400.
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n8 The district court did not admit into evidence all of the articles submitted
by the government. The district court, for example, disallowed articles that did
not contain specific references to Local 560 or Provenzano Group members, and
also excluded articles from Philadelphia papers on the basis that there was an
insufficient number of Local 560 members who lived within the general
circulation area of those papers.
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[**23]
The defendants argue that the district court improperly admitted these newspaper
accounts into evidence for reputational purposes. Specifically, the defendants
maintain that the government did not establish a sufficient foundation to allow
in this evidence: namely, that the government did not introduce evidence, along
with these articles, to indicate that members of Local 560 actually read the
articles in question, and as a result of reading the articles, had developed a
fear of the leadership of Local 560.
The district court, in admitting the evidence, relied principally on Webb
v. Fuller Brush Co., 378 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1967). In Webb, the
plaintiffs brought a products liability tort suit for injuries sustained from
using a facial hormone cream sold to the plaintiffs by the defendant. At trial,
the plaintiffs sought to introduce articles discussing the dangers of certain
hormones. The trial court disallowed the evidence. This Court reversed, holding
that, since the defendant had a duty to warn of the dangers of the face cream if
it knew or should have known that the product could be injurious, the
articles were admissible for the purpose of proving whether [**24]
the defendant should have alerted the plaintiffs to possible hazards. Although,
in Webb, this court did not discuss the foundation necessary for the
introduction of the articles, presumably, the plaintiffs there demonstrated that
the articles were in a publication that the defendant, at the very least, should
have been reading. n9
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n9 The government also argues that United
States v. Blane, 375 F.2d 249 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 835, 19 L. Ed. 2d 96, 88 S. Ct. 41 (1967) supports the district court's
decision to admit the articles into evidence. However, we note that in Blane,
the newspaper articles were not submitted into evidence, and were used only to
cross-examine reputational witnesses.
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In the instant case, unlike in Webb, in order for the articles to be
admitted into evidence it must have been demonstrated, not that the members of
Local 560 should have read the articles in question, but that members
of Local 560 actually read these articles. [**25]
The government at trial, however, did not develop this necessary foundation.
Indeed, only one Local 560 member testified that he had ever read anything in
the papers about the Provenzano Group and Local 560. August Muller, a Local 560
member who had been assaulted by Executive Board member Stanley Jaronko, stated
that "in the papers it said that there was an argument involved the prior
night, and the man [Glockner] was dead the next morning. . . I don't want
anything to happen to me. . . ." App. at 7668. We hold that this isolated
reference to a single newspaper article afforded an insufficient foundation for
the admission into evidence of several articles covering a period of twenty
years.
(2)
Another evidentiary question involving the extortion of membership rights
concerned the testimony of Raymond Wren. Wren, a Special Agent of the Department
of Labor, testified at trial as to the reputation for violence and economic
retribution of several former and current members of the Executive Board of
Local 560. Wren based his testimony on interviews he had with 15 former and
current members of Local 560. The defendants argue that the district court
abused its discretion in admitting [**26]
Wren's testimony because Wren did not base his testimony on a random sample of
the Local 560 members, but rather interviewed only members whom he knew to be
opponents of the Provenzano Group and the current Executive Board of Local 560.
The government, on the other hand, argues that the validity of Wren's
"sample" goes only to the weight of his testimony, and not to its
admissibility.
[*277] We recognize that, in modern, complex
litigation, investigative and research surveys may be properly admitted into
evidence for a variety of purposes. Indeed, in United
States v. 88 Cases, etc., 187 F.2d 967 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
342
U.S. 861, 96 L. Ed. 648, 72 S. Ct. 88 (1951), this Court held that a
scientific survey of 3539 individuals was admissible as evidence. We concluded
that the survey was not hearsay because it was used, not to prove the
truthfulness of the numerous responses, but rather to prove the reaction of the
general public. We further held that "the technical adequacy of the surveys
was a matter of the weight to be attached to them." Id
at 974.
Here, however, we have a different situation. Contrasted with the random [**27]
sampling of individuals in 88 cases, in this case, no attempt was made
to establish a scientific basis for the selection of individuals interviewed.
Indeed, Wren, himself, admitted that his "survey" did not comport with
accepted survey techniques. App. at 663.
In the instant case, Wren's testimony was introduced to prove the reputation of
past and present members of the Executive Board as perceived by the membership
of Local 560. However, as we have noted, Wren did not engage in a scientific,
random survey of Local 560's membership. Instead, as Wren conceded at trial, he
approached only those past and present members of Local 560 whom he knew to be
hostile to the leadership of Local 560. n10 Such an approach, by its very
nature, is suspect because of its biased and selective character. Wren's
one-sided sampling did no more than represent the opinion of a few, known
opponents of the Local 560 membership. Although the membership in general may
have subscribed to the same opinions as those expressed by Wren's 15
interviewees, Wren's survey technique was not designed to, nor did it, record
the impressions of the membership at large. See Pittsburgh
Press Club v. United States, 579 F.2d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 1978) [**28]
("A proper universe must be examined and a representative sample
must be chosen" for a survey to be trustworthy.) (emphasis in original).
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n10 Wren obtained these names of members or former members of Local 560 mainly
from the Department of Labor personnel who had been involved in the
investigation of the Local 560 1982 election, and in supervising the 1965
election. All the individuals selected for interviews by Wren had been political
opponents of the Provenzano Ticket in the 1960's.
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While, in normal course, a research survey conducted in accordance with accepted
standards of sampling may be admitted into evidence to be then tested for its
weight, where a survey is offered that has met no such standards and, indeed,
where that survey is conceded to have been deliberately partisan in its limited
sampling, the prejudicial effect of such a flawed survey substantially outweighs
any probative value it may have. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. In such an
instance, admissibility must be denied and weight cannot [**29]
be attributed to testimony of this nature. Because Wren's testimony was
predicated on such a flawed survey, we conclude that the district court abused
its discretion in admitting Wren's testimony into evidence. n11
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n11 The government relies on language which appears in United
States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132, 1140 (7th Cir. 1972) for the
proposition that "systematic inquiry by a person coming from outside will
often be a better source of knowledge than the casual opportunities of a
neighbor or a friend." (quoting III Wigmore, Evidence § 692 at 22
(Chadbourn rev. 1970). However, the text in Wigmore, although not quoted in Lewin,
continues: "the only reason for distrust exists when the inquirer. . .
seeks evidence of one purport only." In the instant case, Wren sought
evidence of only one purport.
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Thus far, we have held that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting into evidence: (1) the newspaper and magazine articles and (2) Wren's
testimony. Both of these evidentiary submissions [**30]
were offered to prove that the rank and file of Local 560 was fearful of their
union leadership. The government's contention is that, by establishing a climate
of fear within Local 560, the Provenzano Group and the Executive Board of Local
560 were able to [*278] extort the
membership's LMRDA rights in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1951.
(3)
The question remains, however, whether the admission of this evidence by the
district court was fatal to the government's charges, or whether the district
court, in erring, committed error which was harmless. As this court held in DeLaval
Turbine, Inc. v. West India Industries, Inc., 502 F.2d 259, 263-64 (3d Cir.
1974), "it is well settled that in a non-jury case, an appellate court
will not reverse on the basis of an erroneous admission of evidence unless (1)
there is insufficient evidence other than the challenged evidence to support the
district court's conclusion, or (2) the district court is induced by the
challenged evidence to make an essential finding that it would not have made
otherwise." Accordingly, in the instant case, we must determine whether
there exists sufficient evidence [**31] in the
record (apart from the newspaper and magazine articles and Wren's testimony) to
support the district court's conclusion that the rights of Local 560's rank and
file were extorted.
It was on the basis of several sources that the district court concluded that
the Provenzano Group and the Executive Board extorted the LMRDA rights of a
substantial segment of Local 560's membership. Of these sources, one of the most
prominent was the testimony of Professor Clyde Summers.
Professor Summers, who has specialized in labor law since 1943, testified as an
expert witness for the government. According to Professor Summers, a significant
proportion of Local 560's rank and file were induced by fear of the Provenzano
Group to surrender their membership rights. Summers' conclusion that the
membership did not feel free to criticize openly the policies and practices of
the Local 560 leadership (and, thus, were fearful of exercising their union
democratic rights) was based primarily on the observation that, throughout the
history of Local 560, incidents which should have raised criticism of Local
560's leadership among its membership, did not. Among the incidents which
Summers' believed should [**32] have spurred
membership reaction were: the murder of Walter Glockner the morning after his
public display of opposition at a union meeting; the many convictions of union
officials on union-related offenses; the failure of the Executive Board to take
any action when an official was indicted; the appointment and reappointment of
persons who had been convicted of union related offenses; the payment of salary
increases to Anthony Provenzano; the appointment of Anthony's daughter,
Josephine Provenzano, to the office of Secretary-Treasurer of the union
following Anthony's incarceration; and the proposal to pay Anthony Provenzano a
one-half salary pension despite his conviction for the murder of Anthony
Castellitto. As Professor Summers testified, "It is beyond belief that
10,000 members would sit by and watch these things done and never utter a
peep," unless a substantial number of the membership were fearful for their
lives or their jobs. App. at 1608.
The district court accepted Summers' testimony as convincing, and we agree.
There seems to be no other plausible explanation for the silence of Local 560's
membership in the face of repeated outrageous events. The district court,
placing [**33] an emphasis on Summers'
testimony, found that the silence was due to the repressive atmosphere of Local
560, an atmosphere created and maintained by the Provenzano Group and the
Executive Board. We cannot characterize such a finding as clearly erroneous.
In addition to the testimony of Professor Summers, the district court, in
determining that the membership's rights had been extorted, also relied on the
testimony of August Muller. Muller, an employee of Maislin Brothers Trucking
Company and a member of Local 560, testified at trial that, at a general
membership meeting in 1983, he heard Salvatore Provenzano state that Maislin
would soon be out of business because the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
would insist that Maislin repay [*279]
certain monies which Teamster employees had loaned the company. After hearing
Salvatore Provenzano's warning, Muller testified that Local 560 Business Agent
Stanley Jaronko went to the Maislin terminal to hold a meeting and speak to the
drivers. At this meeting, Muller challenged Jaronko about the statements
Salvatore Provenzano had made earlier at the general membership's meeting. The
exchange between Muller and Jaronko became increasingly [**34]
heated, and Jaronko ultimately struck Muller, sending him into a wall. It was
after this altercation that Muller recalled the shooting death of Walter
Glockner, which occurred the morning after Glockner had voiced opposition to
Local 560's leadership at a general meeting.
At trial, Muller was called to testify about the incident. The district court
observed that: "Throughout his direct and cross-examination, Muller's
demeanor evinced the precise attributes of a man in the grip of extreme fear
or even sheer terror because of what he was being compelled to say
publicly." App. at 89 (emphasis added). Professor Summers' testimony
indicated that Muller's feelings and fears were shared by a large percentage of
Muller's compatriots. App. at 1608. As the district court noted, Muller's
testimony dramatically illustrated the climate of fear within Local 560 and
served to support and reinforce Professor Summers' conclusion that the
membership's LMRDA rights to democratic participation in Local 560 were extorted
through intimidation and fear.
Accordingly, we believe that the district court was not clearly erroneous in
finding that the Provenzano Group and the Executive Board had extorted [**35]
the LMRDA rights of a substantial number of Local 560 members. This finding,
predicated on Professor Summers' and Muller's testimony, does not depend on the
evidence erroneously admitted, namely the newspaper articles and Wren's survey.
Hence, under the DeLaval,
supra, standard, even though the district court may have erred in
admitting these two categories of evidence, that error was harmless and the
district court's finding, based on evidence independent of the challenged
evidence, must be sustained. See also Anderson
v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518
(1985).
B.
The district court not only found by a preponderance of the evidence n12 that
the [*280] Provenzano Group and the Executive
Board extorted the membership's LMRDA rights, but also concluded that such
extortions constituted predicate acts for purposes of section 1962(b) of the
RICO Act, 18
U.S.C. 1962(b). n13 United
States v. Local 560, 550 F. Supp. 511 (D.N.J. 1982). Section 1962(b)
makes it unlawful for any person to maintain an interest in, or control of, any
enterprise through a pattern of "racketeering [**36]
activity." Section 1961(1) of the RICO Act, in relevant part, defines
"racketeering activity" as "any act which is indictable under . .
. section 1951 [of title 18: the Hobbs Act] (relating to interference with
commerce, robbery, or extortion). . . ." Thus, in the instant case, the
question is whether the extortion of the membership's LMRDA rights constitutes a
Hobbs Act violation so as to satisfy the predicate act requirement of section
1962(b) of the RICO Act.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n12 We agree with the district court that the appropriate burden of proof for
the government in a civil action under the RICO Act (where remedies are sought
pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1964) is the "preponderance of the evidence" standard
and not, as the defendants contend, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" or
"clear and convincing evidence" standard. App. at 124-27. In holding
that "preponderance" was the proper standard, the district court
utilized the three-part balancing test articulated in Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
The Kramer Court, in determining whether a particular standard of proof
in a particular proceeding satisfies due process, evaluated three factors: (1)
the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created
by the state's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing government interest
supporting use of the challenged procedure. In the instant case, the district
court chose the "preponderance" standard in the instant case because
(1) the defendants faced neither the prospect of criminal sanction nor the
imposition of significant liberty deprivations and (2) the nature of the relief
sought was equitable and remedial in nature, not punitive. In adopting the
"preponderance" standard, the district court joined the majority of
courts which have addressed this issue. See e.g., United
States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420
U.S. 925, 43 L. Ed. 2d 395, 95 S. Ct. 1121 (1975); Farmers
Bank of Delaware v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del.
1978); Heinold
Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
Subsequent to the filing of the district court's opinion, the Supreme Court
decided two cases which bear directly on this issue and which add further
support for adopting the "preponderance" standard in civil actions
brought under the RICO Act. In Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 74 L. Ed. 2d 548, 103 S. Ct. 683
(1983), the Supreme Court held that the normal civil standard of proof
applies in civil fraud actions brought under section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b). The language in Huddleston mandates the
"preponderance" standard in all but a few civil cases. The Huddleston
Court, in surveying this area of the law, stated:
Thus, we have required proof by clear and convincing evidence where particularly
important individual interests or rights are at stake. See, e.g., Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982)
(proceeding to terminate parental rights); Addington v. Texas, supra
(involuntary commitment proceeding); Woodby
v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 17 L. Ed. 2d 362, 87 S. Ct. 483(1966) (285-286)
(deportation). By contrast, imposition of even severe civil sanctions that do
not implicate such interests has been permitted after proof by a preponderance
of the evidence. See, e.g., United
States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 48-49, 58 L. Ed. 494, 34 S. Ct. 213 (1914)
(proof by a preponderance of the evidence suffices in civil suits involving
proof of acts that expose a party to a criminal prosecution). Thus, in
interpreting a statutory provision in Steadman v. SEC, supra, we upheld
use of the preponderance standard in SEC administrative proceedings concerning
alleged violations of the antifraud provisions. The sanctions imposed in the
proceedings included an order permanently barring an individual from practicing
his profession. And in SEC
v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. at 355, we held that a
preponderance of the evidence suffices to establish fraud under § 17(a) of the
1933 Act.
Id.
at 389-90.
Even more on point is the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima
v. Imrex Co., Inc. 473 U.S. 479, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed 2d 346 (1985),
where the Court held that proof of racketeering-type activity was not required
to establish a RICO predicate act. Although the Court in Sedima did not
reach the burden of proof issue, it nevertheless held:
We are not at all convinced that the predicate acts must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt in a proceeding under § 1964(C). In a number of settings,
conduct that can be punished as criminal only upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt will support civil sanctions under a preponderance standard. There is no
indication that Congress sought to depart from this general principle here. That
the offending conduct is described by reference to criminal statutes does not
mean that its occurrence must be established by criminal standards or that the
consequences of a finding of liability in a private civil action are identical
to the consequences of a criminal conviction.
105
S. Ct. at 3282-83 (citations omitted).
Reviewing the Supreme Court opinions in Santosky, Huddleston, and Sedima,
we are satisfied that the preponderance standard applies in civil RICO
litigation. While we recognize that the defendants in such actions have
significant interests at stake (i.e., financial, occupational, and
reputational), these interests are not sufficiently compelling to trigger a more
stringent burden of proof. [**37]
n13 The defendants argue that the Attorney General's jurisdiction under RICO in
the instant case is pre-empted by sections 481-483 of the LMRDA, 29
U.S.C. §§ 481-483. They maintain that, since the district court
inferentially found that Local 560's elections since 1968 have been illegal, the
Attorney General could not pursue a RICO claim because the LMRDA, 29
U.S.C. §§ 481-483, provides the exclusive remedy by which an election can
be set aside.
This argument has little merit. Contrary to the defendants' contention, the
government initiated this suit, not to invalidate any particular election, but
to eliminate entirely the union's racketeering element. The RICO Act and
sections 481 through 483 of the LMRDA were designed to combat entirely different
offenses, and as such, the LMRDA cannot be pre-emptive. Moreover, we note that
RICO was enacted in 1970, eleven years after the LMRDA, and was intended, in
part, to supplement the protections already afforded union members.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Hobbs Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1951, n14 prohibits the [**38]
obstruction or interference with [*281]
commerce by use of threats or extortion. This court has held that the primary
elements of a Hobbs Act violation are that (1) that the defendants induce their
victims to part with property; (2) that the defendants do so through the use of
fear; and (3) that, in so doing, the defendants adversely affect interstate
commerce. n15 United
States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 59 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405
U.S. 936, 30 L. Ed. 2d 812, 92 S. Ct. 949 (1972).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n14 18
U.S.C. § 1951(a) provides:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in
violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than twenty years, or both.
n15 In United
States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 424 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444
U.S. 1043, 62 L. Ed. 2d 728, 100 S. Ct. 728 (1980), this Court held that, to
satisfy the "affect on interstate commerce" requirement, all that need
be shown is "proof of a reasonably probable effect on commerce, however
minimal, as [a] result of the extortion." The defendants argue that there
was no evidence that the extortion of union members' intangible property rights
(LMRDA rights) had any affect on interstate commerce. We disagree.
Put simply, the actions of Local 560 affected interstate commerce because Local
560 entered into collective bargaining agreements with businesses directly
engaged in interstate commerce. Thus, when membership rights to democratic
participation in that union were extorted, the actions of Local 560 were
affected, which, in turn, resulted in affecting interstate commerce through
businesses involved in interstate commerce. Accordingly, the district court was
not clearly erroneous in finding that the extortion of membership rights
affected, in some minimal way, interstate commerce.
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[**39]
(1)
The defendants initially argue that the membership's LMRDA rights are intangible
property rights, and as such, cannot be the basis for a claim of extortion under
the Hobbs Act. Defendants maintain that only the extortion of tangible property
(i.e. physical items or possessions) can be cognizable as a Hobbs Act violation.
However, the language of the Hobbs Act makes no such distinction between
tangible and intangible property. Section 1951(b)(2) broadly defines
"extortion" as "the obtaining of property from another, with his
consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force. . . ."
Moreover, other circuits which have considered this question are unanimous in
extending the Hobbs Act to protect intangible, as well as tangible, property. See
United
States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 916, 101 S. Ct. 1359, 67 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1981) (right to solicit
business accounts); United
States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440
U.S. 910, 59 L. Ed. 2d 459, 99 S. Ct. 1221 (1979) (right to make business
decisions free from outside pressure wrongfully [**40]
imposed); United
States v. Nadaline, 471 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 951, 36 L. Ed. 2d 414, 93 S. Ct. 1924 (1973) (right to solicit business
accounts); United
States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397
U.S. 1021, 25 L. Ed. 2d 530, 90 S. Ct. 1258 (1970) (right to solicit
business accounts).
Moreover, at least one court has expressly addressed the question of whether
rights incident to union membership are protectible property interests. In Dusing
v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County), modified
on other grounds and aff'd, 263
A.D. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941), the court held that such rights are
"as real and as needful of equitable protection, surely, as money or
chattels."
The right to membership in a union is empty if the corresponding right to an
election guaranteed with equal solemnity in the fundamental law of the union is
denied. If a member has a "property right" in his position on the
roster, I think he has an equally enforceable property right in the election of
men who will represent him in dealing [**41]
with his economic security and collective bargaining where that right exists by
virtue of express contract in the language of a union constitution.
29
N.Y.S.2d at 884. This holding is significant because the Hobbs Act's
definition of extortion was closely modelled on that in the New York statute and
Congress intended that extortion as used in the Hobbs Act reflect the common
understanding of the states. See United
States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 406 n.16, 35 L. Ed. 2d 379, 93 S. Ct. 1007
(1973). Thus, we conclude [*282] that the
membership's intangible property right to democratic participation in the
affairs of their union is properly considered extortable "property"
for purposes of the Hobbs Act. n16
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n16 This Court's decision in United
States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1022, 75 L. Ed. 2d 494, 103 S. Ct. 1272 (1983), does not dictate
otherwise. In Boffa, this court held that the RICO predicate act of
mail fraud, 18
U.S.C. § 1341, may encompass a scheme to deprive union members of the right
to the "honest and faithful" services of union officials as provided
in section 501 of the LMRDA, 29
U.S.C. § 501, but may not encompass a scheme to deprive employees
of rights created by section 7 of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 157. In Boffa, we rejected the argument that a violation
of union rights under section 7 of the NLRA may be characterized as a RICO
predicate act because of the "remedial nature of the [NLRA] and the primacy
of the National Labor Relations Board in resolving unfair labor practice
disputes." 688
F.2d at 927.
However, Boffa's conclusion with regard to section 7 of the NLRA is inapposite
here since the NLRB does not have primary jurisdiction over the
democratic rights created by section 411 of the LMRDA -- the rights at issue in
the present case. Under section 412 of the LMRDA, 29
U.S.C. § 412, union members have a direct cause of action against the union
and its officers for infringement of their section 411 rights.
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[**42]
(2)
The defendants argue, alternatively, that section 530 n17 of the LMRDA, 29
U.S.C. § 530, is the exclusive criminal sanction for violating a union
member's rights, and that, therefore, the district court erred in concluding
that the extortion of membership LMRDA rights could also constitute a Hobbs Act
violation. The defendants maintain that the government may not apply the Hobbs
Act in the present RICO context because Section 530 of the LMRDA, which was
enacted subsequent to the Hobbs Act and which punishes the same proscribed
behavior as the Hobbs Act, preempts the Hobbs Act in this case. See
generally Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 41 L. Ed. 2d 290, 94 S. Ct. 2474 (1974) (in
certain instances a specific statute governs over a more general one). n18 The
government counters that section 530 does not limit the applicability of the
Hobbs Act to the facts of the present case because section 530 and the Hobbs Act
were designed to prohibit different types of conduct. We are satisfied that,
because the underlying purpose and design of section 530 is different from that
of the Hobbs Act, section 530 does not supercede the use of the Hobbs [**43]
Act in the instant case. While the Hobbs Act, as evidenced by its explicit and
unambiguous language, was designed to combat extortion, section 530 of the LMRDA
makes no mention of "extortion" and rather appears to focus on
prohibiting physical assaults on members in connection with a union's internal
affairs are in the exercise of their statutory rights. In this regard, we note
that Senator Morse, in opposing the passage of section 530, stated:
Generally speaking, the effect of these provisions is to make assault and
battery a Federal crime, but only when it occurs in a union. I have already
referred above to the inappropriateness of provisions of this type for the
enforcement of the rights of union members.
105 Cong. Rec. 16,389 (1959). The limited reach of section 530 is also
demonstrated [*283] by the language of the
LMRDA which states that the Act was enacted as "further and
supplementary legislation that will afford necessary protection of the
rights and interests of employees and the public generally." 29
U.S.C. § 401(b) (emphasis added).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n17 Section 530 of the LMRDA provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person through the use of force or violence, to
restrain, coerce, or intimidate, or attempt to restrain, coerce, or intimidate
any member of a labor organization for the purpose of interfering with or
preventing the exercise of any right to which he is entitled under the
provisions of this chapter. Any person who willfully violates this section shall
be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
29
U.S.C. § 530. [**44]
n18 If the defendants' argument were to succeed, the government would have
failed to prove that the Executive Board violated § 1962(b) because, the
defendants allege, § 530, the preemptive section, is not a predicate act under
RICO. See 18
U.S.C. § 1961(1). In such a case, of course, the Executive Board could not
have aided and abetted the Provenzano Group in a violation of the RICO Act.
As the text reveals, we decline to accept this argument. Rather, we hold that in
the present context, the Hobbs Act is not displaced by § 530, and hence, the
Hobbs Act violations found by the district court satisfy the predicate act
requirement of § 1962(b).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Section 530, in relevant part, prohibits "the use of force or violence, or
threat of the use of force or violence, to restrain, coerce, or intimidate. . .
any member of a labor organization for the purpose of interfering with or
preventing the exercise of any right to which he is entitled under the
provisions of this chapter. . . ." 29
U.S.C. § 530. Although this language of section 530 is broad, [**45]
and conceivably could cover extortionate conduct, we observe that those cases
which have construed section 530 have all involved some form of assault and
battery. See United
States v. Williams, 624 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1980) (defendant hired
individual to assault union member); United
States v. Kelley, 545 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 933, 51 L. Ed. 2d 777, 97 S. Ct. 1555 (1977) (defendant fired three
shots at truck carrying three union members); United
States v. Bertucci, 333 F.2d 292 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 839, 13 L. Ed. 2d 45, 85 S. Ct. 75 (1964) (fight involving union
members); United
States v. Roganovich, 318 F.2d 167 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 911, 11 L. Ed. 2d 150, 84 S. Ct. 206 (1963) (fight involving union
members).
In contrast, cases brought under the Hobbs Act frequently involve schemes to
extort through the creation of indirect fear. See, e.g., United
States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1194 (7th Cir. 1980) (extortion found
although victim "happy" to make payments and relations between victim
and [**46] extorters was "cordial"),
cert. denied, 450
U.S. 965, 101 S. Ct. 1481, 67 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1981); United
States v. Sander, 615 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.) (Hobbs Act covers fear of
economic loss and "subtle extortions"; government need not show that
fear was direct consequence of threat or that victim personally feared
extorter), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 835, 66 L. Ed. 2d 41, 101 S. Ct. 108 (1980).
Here, of course, the extortion of rights which the government's complaint
charged was achieved, not so much by direct physical assault (as is proscribed
by section 530), but by more sophisticated and indirect physical and economic
threats. It was intimidation and fear, as found by the district court, that
caused the members of Local 560 to surrender their LMRDA democratic rights. The
Hobbs Act, much more so than section 530, is designed to combat extortion,
whether such extortion involves LMRDA rights or more tangible property.
C.
In the preceding sections of Part III of this opinion, where we discussed the
Hobbs Act as a predicate act under § 1962(b), we held that the district court
did not err when it concluded that both the Provenzano Group [**47]
and the Executive Board had extorted the rights of Local 560's members and that
the acts of extortion came within section 1962(b) of RICO. In so concluding, the
district court held that the Executive Board had aided and abetted the
extortionate acts. Specifically, the district court held that the Executive
Board defendants aided in extorting member's rights by (1) making certain
appointments and reappointments to union offices; (2) failing to remove certain
appointees from office; (3) spending union assets for Anthony Provenzano; (4)
permitting access to local 560's offices by known or reputed criminals; and (5)
being recklessly indifferent to the above-mentioned systematic misconduct of
fellow incumbent officers. App. at 96-97, 148-150. These actions by the
Executive Board defendants -- particularly the appointment of known criminals to
union office and the expenditure of union assets for Anthony Provenzano -- aided
and abetted the Provenzano Group in establishing the climate of fear and
intimidation found to exist within Local 560 by the district court. These
actions, in turn, coerced a substantial portion of the membership into
relinquishing their LMRDA rights. The district court [**48]
concluded that, because of the offenses committed by the Executive Board, the
members of [*284] that board had to be
removed from office to "prevent and restrain" future violations of
section 1962 of the RICO Act.
The defendants argue that the district court misapplied the law of aiding and
abetting to the actions of the Executive Board. The defendants maintain that,
while the Executive Board may have violated certain fiduciary standards, the
Board's actions did not constitute criminal aiding and abetting.
However, the district court did, in fact, rely on the appropriate test for
establishing liability under the aiding and abetting statute, 18
U.S.C. § 2. In United
States v. Dixon, 658 F.2d 181, 189 n.17 (3d Cir. 1981), this Court held
that:
In order to convict a defendant of aiding and abetting the commission of a
crime, the Government must prove two essential elements: (1) that the
substantive crime has been committed; and (2) that the defendant charged with
aiding and abetting that crime knew of the commission of the substantive offense
and acted with the intent to facilitate it.
We conclude, as did the district court, [**49]
app. at 140, that, although the present case is civil in character, the criminal
standard for aiding and abetting applies. Applying the Dixon two-part
test, the district court examined the surrounding circumstances and found not
only that the substantive crimes had been committed, but that the Executive
Board defendants knew of their commission and demonstrated the requisite intent.
The defendants, citing the district court's discussion of the elevated duty of
care owed to union members by their officers, argue that the district court
found liability based on the Executive Board's violation of fiduciary
responsibility rather than on the Executive Board's criminal intent. We do not,
however, agree with the defendants' reading of the district court's opinion. The
district court addressed the ethical duty that union officers owe membership for
the purpose of examining the extortion of LMRDA rights in the correct light. As
the district court noted, "the knowledge and volitional act requirements of
Dixon's second element have different meanings in various contexts." App.
at 140. Thus, the district court simply recognized that, if an individual fails
to act when he has an affirmative [**50] duty
to do so, negative inferences concerning his intent can be drawn from this
inaction. Moreover, it has long been settled that it is permissible to infer
from circumstantial evidence the existence of intent. United
States v. Burrell, 496 F.2d 609, 610 (3d Cir. 1974).
The defendants further argue that the district court was clearly erroneous in
finding that the Executive Board's (1) repeated appointments; (2) failure to
remove appointees from office; (3) expenditure of union assets for Anthony
Provenzano; and (4) allowance of access to Local 560 offices by known or reputed
criminals, aided the Provenzano Group in extorting the membership's rights. We
disagree. Our reading of the record discloses ample evidence supporting the
district court's subsidiary findings as well as its ultimate finding of aiding
and abetting. Indeed, in our view, the evidence of Local 560's history of
appointments of individuals with criminal convictions to positions of
responsibility within the union, not to mention the expenditure of union funds
for the personal benefit of Anthony Provenzano, more than adequately support the
district court's finding.
(1)
With regard to the repeated [**51]
appointments to union office by the Executive Board of known or reputed
criminals, the following chronology by the district court is instructive:
(a) During September of 1961, Anthony Provenzano and other members of the Local
560 Executive Board (which then included Salvatore Provenzano) appointed
Salvatore Briguglio to the position of Business Agent -- notwithstanding the
fact that Anthony Provenzano then knew that Salvatore Briguglio had murdered
Anthony Castellitto, and notwithstanding the fact that rumors to that effect
were circulating among the membership at that time.
[*285] (b) On or about February 1, 1963,
Anthony Provenzano and the other Executive Board members (including Salvatore
Provenzano) appointed Nunzio Provenzano to the position of Business Agent --
notwithstanding the fact that three days earlier, on January 29, 1963, Nunzio
Provenzano had been convicted (together with Salvatore Briguglio) of an offense
involving a payoff demand.
(c) In 1964, Anthony Provenzano and the other Executive Board members (including
Salvatore Provenzano) appointed Robert A. Luizzi to the position of Business
Agent -- notwithstanding the fact that Luizzi had been convicted [**52]
in 1945 of a felonious assault and battery and in 1949 of felonious breaking and
entry, and had been arrested on four separate occasions thereafter in Hudson
County of Disorderly Person, Aggravated Assault, Deadly Weapon and Aiding and
Abetting a Robbery.
(d) On or about May 15, 1967, Salvatore Provenzano and the other Executive Board
Members appointed Robert A. Luizzi to the position of Trustee -- notwithstanding
his criminal record as outlined in (c) above.
(e) On or about April 25, 1969, Salvatore Provenzano and J.W. Dildine and the
other members of the Local 560 Executive Board appointed Salvatore Briguglio to
the position of Business Agent -- notwithstanding the fact that Salvatore
Briguglio had just completed the term of imprisonment for his 1963 conviction in
New York State.
(f) On or about April 25, 1969, Salvatore Provenzano, J.W. Dildine and the other
Executive Board members appointed Nunzio Provenzano to the position of
"clerk" at the uniquely high salary of some $18,000 per year --
notwithstanding the fact that Nunzio Provenzano had just completed the term of
imprisonment for his 1963 conviction in New York State, and was forbidden by the
terms of his parole from [**53] being an
officer in the union.
(g) In 1970, Salvatore Provenzano, J.W. Dildine and the other Executive Board
members appointed Thomas Reynolds, Sr. to the position of Business Agent --
notwithstanding the fact that Thomas Reynolds, Sr. had pled guilty in 1948 to
misdemeanor assault (having been charged with felonious assault), had been
convicted in 1958 of felony robbery and had been arrested on five separate
occasions for rape (1948), grand larceny (1952), rape (1961), armed robbery
(1961), and as a material witness (and, in the minds of some, suspect) in the
murder of Walter Glockner (1963).
(i) In 1970, Salvatore Provenzano, J.W. Dildine and other members of the Local
560 Executive Board appointed Nunzio Provenzano to the position of Trustee of
the Trucking Employees of Passaic and Bergen Counties Pension and Welfare Funds
-- notwithstanding the fact of his previous conviction and incarceration in New
York State.
(j) In 1972, Salvatore Provenzano, J.W. Dildine and the other Executive Board
members appointed Salvatore Briguglio to the position of Trustee of the Trucking
Employees of Passiac and Bergen Counties Pension and Welfare Funds --
notwithstanding the fact of his previous [**54]
conviction and incarceration in New York State, and notwithstanding the fact
that pervasive rumors had linked him to the "disappearance" of Anthony
Castellitto.
(k) On or about January 25, 1973, Salvatore Provenzano, J.W. Dildine and the
other Executive Board members appointed Nunzio Provenzano to the position of
Secretary-Treasurer -- notwithstanding his prior conviction and incarceration.
(l) On or about September 12, 1975, Salvatore Provenano [sic], J.W. Dildine and
the other members of the Executive Board appointed Thomas Reynolds, Sr. to the
position of Trustee of the Trucking Employees of Passaic and Bergen Counties
Pension and Welfare Funds -- notwithstanding his criminal record and rumored
involvement in the Glockner murder.
(m) In February 1974, Salvatore Provenzano, Nunzio Provenzano, J.W. Dildine and
the other members of the Local 560 [*286]
Executive Board reappointed Salvatore Briguglio to the position of Business
Agent -- notwithstanding the fact that Salvatore Briguglio had just completed a
term of imprisonment on a federal counterfeiting conviction.
(n) On or about March 12, 1974, Salvatore Provenzano, Nunzio Provenzano, J.W.
Dildine and the other members [**55] of the
Local 560 Executive Board appointed Robert A. Luizzi to the position of Trustee
of the Trucking Employees of Passaic and Bergen Counties Welfare and Pension
Fund -- notwithstanding his criminal record as outlined above.
(o) On or about November 24, 1975, Salvatore Provenzano, J.W. Dildine
and the other Executive Board Members appointed Anthony Provenzano and Nunzio
Provenzano to the positions of Secretary-Treasurer and President, respectively
-- notwithstanding the fact that Anthony Provenzano had been convicted of labor
racketeering and Nunzio Provenzano had been convicted of a felony involving a
payoff demand.
(p) On or about February 9, 1977, Anthony Provenzano, Salvatore Provenzano,
Nunzio Provenzano, J.W. Dildine and the other members of the Executive Board
appointed Thomas Reynolds, Sr. to the position of Trustee of Local 560 --
notwithstanding his criminal record and his rumored involvement in the Glockner
murder.
(q) In 1981, Nunzio Provenzano, Salvatore Provenzano, Joseph Sheridan, Josephine
Provenzano, J.W. Dildine, Thomas Reynolds, Sr., Stanley Jaronko and Michael
Sciarra, as members of the Executive Board of Local 560, appointed Robert A.
Luizzi to the [**56] position of Business
Agent -- notwithstanding the fact that Luizzi had a criminal record involving
crimes of violence, and notwithstanding the fact that Luizzi had been identified
in sworn testimony as having solicited labor peace payoffs or bribes from Helms
Express, a trucking company then under contract with Local 560.
App. at 89-93.
Despite this lurid history, the defendants maintain that none of the
appointments "violated any law." The fact, however, that these
appointments were in technical compliance with the federal law concerning union
officer eligibility n19, does not mean that the appointments did not serve to
intimidate the rank and file, and thus extort LMRDA rights in violation of the
Hobbs Act. n20 Indeed, the district court found that the history of Provenzano
Group appointments to union office did cause a substantial portion of Local
560's membership to surrender their right to democratic participation in the
affairs of the union. Since the district court's findings - both subsidiary and
ultimate - are well supported by the record, we decline to disturb them. n21 See
Anderson
v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518
(1985). [**57]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n19 At the time these appointments were made, 29
U.S.C. § 504 barred individuals convicted of certain felonies from holding
union office for a five year period. Section 504 of the LMRDA was amended in
1984 to, in part, extend the disability from five years to thirteen years.
n20 The defendants' argument that the Executive Board cannot be held culpable
for the appointments so long as the appointments were in compliance with 29
U.S.C. § 504, is misguided. Indeed, it was Congress' intent that the LMRDA
should in no way limit the responsibilities which union officers have under
other federal laws. 29
U.S.C. § 523(a) provides, in relevant part, that "nothing in the
[LMRDA] shall reduce or limit the responsibilities of any labor organization or
any officer. . . ."
n21 We also find unpersuasive the defendants' contention that the Executive
Board members were not aware of the criminal backgrounds of Luizzi or Reynolds
at the time of their appointments. Both individuals had fairly extensive
criminal histories and, in light of the entire record, the district court's
finding that the Executive Board was aware of the criminal background of both
individuals cannot be regarded as clearly erroneous.
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[**58]
(2)
The district court also held that the Executive Board's expenditure of Local 560
assets (in the form of accrued salary and pension payments) for the benefit of
Anthony [*287] Provenzano, who had three
times committed offenses while in office, helped (aided and abetted) in
extorting the membership's LMRDA rights. With regard to the payment of accrued
salary, the record indicates that on December 20, 1962, approximately one month
after Anthony Provenzano had been indicted in the Eastern Freightways case,
defendant Michael Sciarra made a successful motion at a membership meeting to
increase Anthony Provenzano's yearly salary from $20,800 to $45,800. One week
earlier Provenzano had won re-election as Local 560 President and had previously
been appointed an International vice-president under Jimmy Hoffa, who was then
President of the Teamsters International union. Sciarra stated that he made the
motion because Provenzano needed the money for his legal expenses. Within two
months, on February 14, 1963, Stephen Andretta made a second motion to increase
Provenzano's salary. This time, Provenzano's annual salary was increased from
$45,800 to $95,000. Andretta stated that he made [**59]
the motion because he felt that Provenzano should be paid as much as Hoffa, who
was then making $100,000 a year.
On March 13, 1963, Anthony Provenzano told the membership that he was "not
taking a penny of the increases offered me by the membership" and would not
do anything to "impoverish" the union. In mid-1966, Anthony Provenzano
was