1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5565, *

MASON TENDERS DISTRICT COUNCIL WELFARE FUND, et al., Plaintiffs, -against- MACKROYCE CONSTRUCTION CORP. and PETER D'AGOSTINO, Defendants. MACKROYCE CONSTRUCTION CORP. and PETER D'AGOSTINO, Third-Party Plaintiffs, -against- HOUSEWRECKERS UNION LOCAL 95 INSURANCE, PENSION & ANNUITY FUND, Third-Party Defendants.

96 Civ. 4693 (SAS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5565


April 20, 1998, Decided  
April 22, 1998, Filed

CORE TERMS: unpaid, unremitted, checkoffs, summary judgment, fringe benefit, notice, admit, rate charged, calculated, depositions, accrue, prime, liquidated damages, sworn

COUNSEL:  [*1]  For Plaintiffs: Lawrence A. Kravitz, Esq, Gorlick, Kravitz & Listhaus, P.C., New York, NY.
 
For Defendants: Edwin L. Smith, Esq., Smith & Laquercia, P.C., New York, NY.

JUDGES: Shira A. Scheindlin, U.S.D.J.

OPINIONBY: Shira A. Scheindlin

OPINION: OPINION
 
SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, U.S.D.J.

Plaintiffs Mason Tenders District Council Welfare Fund, Pension Fund, Annuity Fund, Asbestos Training Program Fund, Industry Fund, Legal Services Fund, Vacation Fund, New York State Laborers-Employers Cooperation and Education Trust Fund, New York Laborers' Health and Safety Trust Fund, Building Contractors Association Industry Advancement Program, John J. Virga, in his fiduciary capacity as Director, (the "Funds"), and Steve Hammond as Trustees of the Mason Tenders District Council of Greater New York, (the "Union"), (referred to collectively as "Plaintiffs"), bring this action pursuant to section 502(a)(3) and 515 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(3) and 1145, and section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, for unpaid fringe benefit contributions, unremitted union dues checkoffs, and unremitted New York Laborers'  [*2]  Political Action Committed ("NYLPAC") contributions. In addition, Plaintiffs seek to recover interest, statutory damages, and attorneys' fees pursuant to section 502(g)(2) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment which defendants oppose only to the extent of the date on which interest begins to accrue and the amount of attorneys' fees.

BACKGROUND

Defendant Mackroyce Construction Corporation ("Mackroyce") is a for-profit corporation doing business in the City and State of New York as an employer within the meaning of sections 3(5) and 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(5) and 1145, and is an employer in an industry affecting commerce with the meaning of section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Defendant Peter D'Agostino ("D'Agostino") is the president of Mackroyce. D'Agostino executed a collective bargaining agreement for the period June 1, 1993 through May 31, 1996 (the "Agreement") on behalf of Mackroyce and himself with the Union wherein, pursuant to section 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1145, Defendants became obligated to pay and/or submit the required monetary contributions and/or reports to the Funds and to deduct and remit dues checkoffs  [*3]  and NYLPAC contributions from the wages paid to those employees who authorized such deductions.

Plaintiffs served a Notice to Admit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36. See Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, sworn to by Lawrence A. Kravitz, Plaintiffs' Attorney, on January 29, 1998, Exhibit A ("Kravitz Aff."). In response ("Response") (Kravitz Aff., Exhibit B), Mackroyce admitted that it was bound by the Agreement. Response, P 1. D'Agostino similarly admitted that he became a party to the Agreement, id. at P 3, and that he signed the agreement, id. at P 7.

Defendants conceded that they are liable for $ 35,652.36 in unpaid fringe benefit contributions (id. at PP 8-10), $ 3,697.25 in unremitted dues checkoffs (id. at PP 15-17), and $ 184.86 in unremitted NYLPAC contributions (id. at PP 20-22), all for the period February 14, 1995 through June 27, 1995. During a pretrial conference held on December 9, 1997, Plaintiffs agreed that $ 39,534.47 is the principal amount due. n1 See Declaration in Opposition, sworn to by Edwin L. Smith, Defendants' Attorney, on February 27, 1998 ("Smith Decl.").
 
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n1 Plaintiffs originally demanded $ 63,968.13 in unpaid fringe benefit contributions, $ 5,219.75 in unremitted dues checkoffs, and $ 224.97 in unremitted NYLPAC contributions, totalling $ 69,412.85. See Complaint at PP 17, 46 and 55.
 
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DISCUSSION

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party seeking to recover upon a claim is, upon motion, entitled to a grant of summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). Here, Defendants have made Rule 36 admissions which may be used as a basis to grant summary judgment. See Donovan v. Carls Drug Co., Inc., 703 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). Hence, there is no dispute as to either liability or the amount of principal damages, both of which have been admitted by Defendants. n2 The only remaining issues for the Court are interest and attorneys' fees.
 
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n2 Defendants argue that it was not appropriate for Plaintiffs to file an omnibus motion for summary judgment "when the issues had already been stipulated in open court." Smith Decl., P 4. Plaintiffs claim that the motion was both necessary and appropriate as Defendants "have not filed or offered to file a stipulation acknowledging liability." Whether Defendants were asked, and refused to file, such a stipulation is not known.
 
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Section 502(g) of ERISA provides for interest on unpaid contributions at the rate provided under the plan. In this case, the applicable plan provides for interest at the prime rate charged by Citibank plus two percent. Kravitz Aff., P 28. As of the return date of Plaintiffs' motion, the prime rate charged by Citibank was 8.5%. Id. Thus, the rate to be charged, 10.5%, is not in controversy. What is disputed is the date that interest should begin accruing. Defendants argue, without supporting authority, that interest should only be awarded from December 9, 1997, the date Plaintiffs agreed to the amounts owed by Defendants. Smith Decl., P 7. Plaintiffs argue that interest should accrue from the date the amounts originally became due, July 1, 1995. Kravitz Aff., P 28. Plaintiffs are correct in requiring that interest be calculated from the date the payments first became due. See ILGWA Nat'l Retirement Fund v. Distinctive Coate Co., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(5)). See also DeVito v. Hempstead China Shop, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 38 F.3d 651 (2d Cir. 1994) (because interest is available  [*6]  on unpaid or delinquent contributions, the date they are due to the Fund is the applicable commencement date for the accrual of interest).

Interest on $ 35,652.36 in unpaid contributions from July 1, 1995 to April 20, 1998 amounts to $ 10,492. Interest on the $ 3,697.25 in dues checkoffs and $ 184.86 in NYLPAC contributions shall similarly be computed from July 1, 1995 but at a rate of 9%. See Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Pistone, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12270, No. 90-3852, 1992 WL 204377, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1992) (citing N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5001, et seq.) This interest amounts to $ 280. Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to $ 10,772 in interest under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(B) and $ 10,492 in statutory damages under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (g)(2)(C). n3
 
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n3 That subsection provides for statutory damages in an amount equal to the greater of interest on the unpaid contributions or liquidated damages provided for under the plan. Given the absence of a liquidated damages clause in the instant Agreement, these damages amount to the interest calculated on the unpaid fringe benefit contributions only.
 
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This leaves the determination of reasonable attorneys' fees which "lies within the sound discretion of the district judge." DeVito, 831 F. Supp. at 1043. See also NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund v. Salco Trucking Corp., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9321, No. 90-5949, 1995 WL 404863, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1995). Plaintiffs' counsel submit a total fee of $ 29,773.50 and costs of $ 160 for this litigation which consisted of service of a summons and complaint, service of a document demand and a notice to admit, defendants' service of a response to the notice to admit, and several court appearances. No depositions were held and no dispositive motions were made except for this largely uncontested summary judgment motion. The hourly rates used in computing this amount are as follows: $ 200 per hour for the partner in charge; $ 140 per hour for associates; and $ 60 per hour for paralegals. I find these rates to be reasonable. However, upon review of the timesheets relating to these fees, I find that there were duplicative and/or unnecessary time charges. For example, there are numerous entries for correspondence, telephone calls, and intraoffice conferences in which several attorneys participated. In  [*8]  addition, there appears to be repetitive charges for document review. Performing wasteful or superfluous work or spending excessive time on a given task does not generally give rise to compensable fees. Salco Trucking, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9321, 1995 WL 404863 at *4. Overall, the relatively straightforward nature of this lawsuit does not support an award of close to $ 30,000 in attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the amount of attorneys' fees is reduced by $ 9,889.50, or approximately 33%, resulting in a fee and cost award of $ 20,044.

In sum, Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for $ 39,534.47 in unpaid fringe benefit contributions, unremitted dues checkoffs, and unremitted NYLPAC contributions, $ 10,772 in interest, $ 10,492 in statutory damages, and $ 20,044 in attorneys' fees and costs. A separate Judgment in the total amount of $ 80,842.47 is being entered reflecting these amounts.

SO ORDERED:

Shira A. Scheindlin

U.S.D.J.
 
Dated: New York, New York
April 20, 1998