In furtherance of this conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof, the following overt acts were committed:

1. Between October 4, 1979 and November 7, 1979, the exact date being unknown to the Grand Jury, RAYMOND H. FLYNN and others met and had a discussion concerning a threat made by John Paul Spica to kill RAYMOND H. FLYNN in an effort to take over leadership of Laborers' Local 42 of the Laborers' International Union.

2. Between October 4, 1979 and November 7, 1979, the exact date being unknown to the Grand Jury, in St. Louis, Missouri, RAYMOND H. FLYNN and others obtained and examined a 1977 Cadillac automobile similar to the one then being used by John Paul Spica.

3. On or about November 7, 1979, in St. Louis County, Missouri, RAYMOND H. FLYNN attached an explosive device to a 1977 Cadillac automobile then being used by John Paul Spica.

4. Between August 11, 1981  [**13]  and September 11, 1981 RAYMOND H. FLYNN and others drove in an automobile to the vicinity of Fredericktown, Missouri.

5. On or about October 15, 1981 RAYMOND H. FLYNN and others met and had a conversation on the parking lot of a restaurant in St. Louis, Missouri.

6. On or about October 15, 1981, on the parking lot of a restaurant in St. Louis, Missouri, RAYMOND H. FLYNN delivered to others a quantity of explosives.

It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity * * *.

In reviewing a denial of a motion  [**15]  for judgment of acquittal "we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government." United States v. Springer, 831 F.2d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 938, 108 S. Ct. 1117, 99 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1988) (citations omitted). We also must give the Government "the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may logically be drawn from the evidence." Id. at 783-84 (citations omitted). "A motion for acquittal should be granted only where 'the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, is such that a reasonably minded jury must have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any of the essential elements of the crime charged.'" United States v. White, 562 F.2d 587, 589 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (citations omitted; emphasis in original), quoted in United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 924 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980, 106 S. Ct. 382, 88 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1985).

The Leisure group acted out of a common purpose to dominate local labor unions, profit economically from this domination, and murder opponents of their efforts to the extent necessary. The structure and personnel of the Leisure group was continuous and consistent throughout the entire period of racketeering activity. Paul Leisure directed and coordinated the group, except during the period of recovery from his own bombing injuries, when Anthony Leisure  [**17]  stood in his place. Paul Leisure, Anthony Leisure, David Leisure, John Ramo, Joe Broderick, Fred Prater, and Charles Loewe were members of the Leisure group during the entire period of the racketeering events. Each member participated in nearly all of the criminal acts. Finally, the Leisure group clearly had an ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in the conduct of this pattern of racketeering activity, that is, the sequence of murders and attempted murders. This structure is found in the family and social relationships between the members of the group, and their concerted attempt to gain control of the local unions, which can be viewed in complete isolation from the group's pattern of racketeering activity. Of course, the murders and attempted murders in themselves also shed light on this structure. As the Supreme Court has recognized, "the proof used to establish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. [576,] 583 [(1981)]. Indeed, the evidence in this case seems to fall squarely within an example of a RICO enterprise previously given by this court: "Th[e] distinct structure [of a RICO enterprise] might be demonstrated  [**18]  by proof that . . . it has an organizational pattern or system  [*1052]  of authority beyond what was necessary to perpetrate the predicate crimes. The command system of a Mafia family is an example of this type of structure." United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 665.

In sum, this is not a case of "a sporadic and temporary criminal alliance to commit one of the enumerated RICO crimes." United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d at 1201. We conclude, therefore, that the evidence adequately supported the jury finding that the Leisure group was a RICO enterprise.

to enrich its members financially; to murder leaders and members of rival groups, organizations, and families; to retaliate against leaders and members of rival groups, organizations, and families for acts committed against associates of the enterprise; to avoid, discover and obstruct investigations and prosecutions  [**19]  of associates and activities of the enterprise by law enforcement officials.