35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 561, *
Copyright (c) 1998 American Criminal Law Review
American Criminal Law Review
Spring, 1998
35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 561
LENGTH: 29315 words
ARTICLE:
Employment-Related Crimes
David B. Darden and Robyn J. Greenberg and
Susannah C. Merritt
SUMMARY:
... This Article surveys the criminal penalties currently available to
protect workers in the areas of occupational safety and employment practices.
... A. Occupational Safety and Health Act ... Criminal prosecutions
have been initiated either when an employer's willful violation of a standard,
rule, order or regulation causes the death of an employee, or when an employer
makes a false representation regarding OSH Act compliance. ... Employer's
Willful Violation of Standard Causes Death ... Criminal violations occur when
(i) an employer's; (ii) willful violation of; (iii) a specific standard, rule,
order or regulation; (iv) causes the death of an employee. ... In 1992, the
Supreme Court held that state regulation of occupational safety and health
issues already regulated by a federal standard was preempted by the OSH Act. ...
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") regulations governing the
working conditions of employees are themselves preempted by regulations or
standards affecting occupational safety and health enacted by other federal
agencies. ... The Clinton Administration has proclaimed that it "will not
tolerate a lax attitude toward worker safety and health" through its "New OSHA"
initiative. ... C. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act ... The Mine
Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA") has a more vigorous criminal
enforcement program than does OSHA, though the number of criminal referrals from
the MSHA under FMSHA has fluctuated during the 1990s. ...
TEXT:
[*562] I. INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys the criminal
penalties currently available to protect workers in the areas of occupational
safety and employment practices. Section II discusses worker safety through the
Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSH Act"), 1 state criminal law, and the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act ("FMSHA"). 2 Section III analyzes the criminal law
covering employment practices in the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). 3 Section IV covers the Labor Management
Relations Act ("LMRA"), which prohibits payments and loans by employers to
employees or labor organizations. 4 Finally, Section V reviews § 501(c) of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), which prevents
appropriations of union funds for non-union purposes. 5
II. WORKER SAFETY
This
Section discusses the criminal laws relevant to aspects of worker safety. Part A
analyzes the OSH Act, 6 including the offense of willful
violation of a standard leading to the death of an employee, false
representation, penalties, and enforcement. Part B discusses state criminal law
and its effectiveness in deterring violations of the OSH Act. Additionally, Part
B examines current efforts in reforming occupational safety and health. Part C
discusses the FMSHA, 7 including offenses and current reform
efforts under the law.
A. Occupational Safety and Health Act
Due to the trend of increasing employee deaths and injuries in the late
1960s, 8 [*563] Congress enacted
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) 9 in an attempt to ensure worker safety.
10 The OSH Act includes a general duty
clause requiring employers to furnish their employees with a working environment
free from recognized hazards. 11 Violation of the general duty clause
may lead to criminal sanctions in addition to the civil sanctions already
required by the OSH Act. 12 The statute also requires employers
to comply with specific occupational safety and health rules promulgated by the
Secretary of Labor. 13
While the OSH Act provides
for criminal sanctions in three situations, only two have been regularly
enforced. Criminal prosecutions have been initiated either when an employer's
willful violation of a standard, rule, order or regulation causes the death of
an employee, or when an employer makes a false representation regarding OSH Act
compliance. 14 The section of the OSH Act which
contemplates criminal sanctions for any person giving advance notice of an
inspection has not been a source of criminal prosecutions. 15 Finally, employers may be subject to
[*564] both civil fines and criminal sanctions in
separate prosecutions for the same violation. 16
1. Employer's Willful
Violation of Standard Causes Death
a. Elements of the
Offense
Criminal violations occur when (i) an employer's; (ii)
willful violation of; (iii) a specific standard, rule, order or regulation; (iv)
causes the death of an employee. 17
i. Employer
For a party to be an "employer" for OSH Act purposes, an employment
relationship must exist. An "employee" is statutorily defined as "an employee of
an employer who is employed in a business of his employer which affects
commerce." 18
In work places where multiple
employers are involved, the employer who creates a hazard may be liable to
others' employees, such as those of a general contract or a subcontractor. 19 Use of a general contractor or
subcontractor creates an employment relationship; thus, the party controlling
the work or work environment can be liable to the contractor's employees. 20 Subcontractors may also be
[*565] liable to others' employees, including employees of the
general contractor, even if the subcontractors have not created the hazard. 21
In addition, corporate
officers also have been criminally sanctioned under the OSH Act. 22 In the Third, Fifth and Seventh
Circuits, a "mere employee" who is not an officer cannot be liable as an aider
and abettor of the employer's criminal liability. 23 The potential liability of a third
party or of an employee acting in a capacity separate from his or her role as an
employee who aids and abets an employer has not been resolved. 24
ii. Willful
Violation
A willful violation for OSH Act purposes is one involving
voluntary action, done either with an intentional disregard of, or plain
indifference to, the statutory [*566] requirements. 25 Thus, malicious intent is not
necessary to impose liability in the majority of jurisdictions, including the
First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 26 Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and
District of Columbia Circuits. 27
In addition, a good faith
belief in compliance with alternative measures is not sufficient to avoid
liability. 28
iii. Specific
Standard
For a violation of the OSH Act to occur, an employer must
fail to comply with a specific standard, rule, order or regulation. 29 The burden of proof lies with the
[*567] Secretary of Labor. 30 Only a few employers have been cited
for willful violations absent a specific safety standard. 31
iv. Causes Death
Finally, for the employer to be held criminally liable, the violation
must result in the death of an employee. 32
b. Defenses
Defenses available to an employer include preemption, isolated
occurrence, impossibility of compliance, greater hazard, and technical issues.
First, an employer may be able to present a defense of preemption. In
1992, the Supreme Court held that state regulation of occupational safety and
health issues already regulated by a federal standard was preempted by the OSH
Act. 33 States [*568] may,
however, regulate worker safety if a state plan is approved as meeting the
requirements of section 18(c) of the OSH Act by the Secretary of Labor. 34 Thus far, twenty-one states and two
territories have received the Secretary's approval for their plans. 35
Occupational Safety and
Health Administration ("OSHA") regulations governing the working conditions 36 of employees are themselves preempted
by regulations or standards affecting occupational safety and health enacted by
other federal agencies. 37 Although the rationale supporting
such preemption is broadly phrased, 38 individual determinations based upon
preemption tests often turn on specific aspects of the other agency's
regulation. 39
In addition to preemption,
employers may have other defenses available. Employers frequently argue that the
death resulted from an isolated occurrence caused by the inappropriate or
unforeseeable action of a single employee. 40 When [*569] compliance
cannot be achieved, an employer may claim the defense of impossibility. 41 If the hazard of compliance with a
standard is greater than that of noncompliance and there are no alternative
means, an employer may argue "greater hazard." 42 Finally, there may be a technical
defense when delay in prosecution [*570] prejudices the employer. 43 Additionally, several bills pending
in Congress, if enacted, would increase the affirmative defenses available to
employers. 44
2. False
Representations 45
Anyone who knowingly makes a
false statement, representation or certification in any application, record,
report, plan or other document filed or required to be maintained pursuant to
the OSH Act may be criminally prosecuted. 46 Such prosecution, however, is
infrequently pursued. 47
3. Penalties
To enforce the OSH Act's worker safety mandate, Congress provided for
the possibility of both civil and criminal penalties. 48 For a first conviction on a willful
violation causing death to an employee, an employer faces a fine of up to $
10,000, imprisonment for up to six months, or both. 49 For subsequent convictions, the
[*571] employer faces fines of up to $ 20,000, imprisonment for up
to one year, or both. 50 A person convicted of providing
unauthorized advance notice of any inspection conducted under the OSH Act may be
subjected to a fine of up to $ 1,000, imprisonment for up to six months, or
both. 51 Convictions for making false
representations in documentation required under the OSH Act are punished with
fines of up to $ 10,000, imprisonment for up to six months, or both. 52 Recent Democratic attempts to
increase OSHA criminal penalties were defeated along partisan lines. 53
4. Enforcement
The OSH Act has drawn criticism for its limited deterrent effect on
employers, 54 due to the small number of OSH Act
cases prosecuted by the Department of Justice 55 [*572] and because of the
minimal civil fines levied upon employers coupled with the use of monetary
settlements in place of criminal prosecution. 56 Criminal fines are rarely used to
punish employers. 57 To date, only two employers have been
imprisoned, 58 although sentences involving home
confinement and time in halfway [*573] houses are occasionally
imposed. 59 One commentator suggested that the
"knowing endangerment" provisions of the Clean Water Act 60 and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act 61 may be effective supplements to
enforcement of the OSH Act. 62
The Clinton Administration
has proclaimed that it "will not tolerate a lax attitude toward worker safety
and health" 63 through its "New OSHA" initiative. 64 In addition to backing up its focus
on enforcement with a needed increase in funding, 65 OSHA has provided significant
incentives for those participating in the program, including decreased fines 66 and focused inspections. 67 There is some doubt whether the
current enforcement levels will provide effective [*574] deterrence.
68
B. State Criminal
Law
State criminal sanctions against employers, which are not
completely preempted by the OSH Act, can also deter criminal employment
violations. The following two sub-sections discuss the effectiveness of and
practices under state criminal laws.
1. Effectiveness of State
Criminal Law
Although the OSH Act preempts states from regulating
safety in the workplace, the OSH Act does not prohibit states from imposing
certain of their own criminal sanctions against employers. 69 The OSH Act does not preempt the
application of traditional state criminal laws in the context of the workplace.
70 For example, employers whose OSH Act
violations result in death may instead be prosecuted for homicide under state
criminal statutes. 71
[*575] Several
commentators have asserted that state criminal laws may best serve the purposes
of deterrence and punishment for workplace safety and health violations since
they feel that the OSH Act and its state equivalents are currently unable
effectively to deter egregious conduct by employers and because state criminal
law imposes prison sentences along with fines. 72
2. State Criminal
Practice
Only one employer has been convicted of murder for the
workplace death of an employee. 73 The conviction in that case, however,
was reversed because the corporation and the individual defendant were charged
with legally inconsistent offenses. 74 More frequently, prosecutors resort
to state criminal law in order to convict employers who cause the deaths of
their employees by charging employers with the lesser crime of manslaughter. 75
C. Federal Mine Safety
and Health Act
The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977
("FMSHA"), 76 protects mine worker health and
safety through a combination of civil, criminal, and administrative
[*576] enforcement mechanisms. A mine is broadly defined by the
statute to be "an area of land from which minerals are extracted in nonliquid
form or, if in liquid form, are extracted with workers underground," and also
includes all private roads, tailing ponds, retention dams and other facilities
associated with the mine. 77
If a violation of the statute
is found to be willful, then the operator of the mine will be both criminally 78 and civilly liable. 79 If the violation was not willful,
then the operator can be found liable in a civil proceeding without a showing of
fault. 80
The FMSHA imposes civil and
criminal liability on corporate officers, directors, and agents of a corporate
operator who knowingly authorize, order, or carry out a violation, 81 though agents of non-corporate
operators are not subject to any penalties under FMSHA. 82 Criminal liability may also attach to
any person who gives advance notice of any inspection to be conducted under
FMSHA; 83 who knowingly makes any false
statement, representation, or certification in any application, record, report,
plan or other document filed or required to be maintained pursuant to FMSHA; 84 or who distributes, sells, offers for
sale, introduces, or delivers in commerce any noncomplying equipment for use in
a mine, including components and accessories of such equipment, which is
represented as complying with FMSHA or other relevant provisions. 85
The Mine Safety and Health
Administration ("MSHA") has a more vigorous [*577] criminal
enforcement program than does OSHA, 86 though the number of criminal
referrals from the MSHA under FMSHA has fluctuated during the 1990s. 87
III. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
ACT
Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act 88 ("FLSA") in 1938 to eliminate labor
conditions detrimental to the nation's commerce and the general welfare of
workers. 89 By vesting the Secretary of Labor
with broad investigative and enforcement powers, Congress hoped to prevent
employee subrogation and to improve both labor relations and the flow of
commerce. 90
The FLSA prohibits an
employer from: failing to pay minimum wage 91 or overtime compensation to an
employee; 92 failing to keep individual work
records for each employee; 93 discriminating on the basis of sex by
paying different wages for equal work; 94 or using oppressive child labor. 95 The FLSA also makes it
[*578] unlawful for an employer to discharge or to discriminate
against an employee due to the employee's filing of a FLSA complaint or
institution of a FLSA proceeding. 96
Further, the FLSA prohibits
the transport and sale of products manufactured by employees subjected to any of
the unlawful practices described above. 97 The FLSA also includes a "hot goods"
ban, which makes it an offense to purchase goods from an establishment where a
FLSA violation has occurred, unless the purchase was made in good faith and
without knowledge of the business's violations or unless the purchaser is the
ultimate consumer. 98
A cause of action under the
FLSA preempts general federal criminal statutes. 99 Thus, prosecution of employers for
violations covered by the FLSA may proceed only under the FLSA provisions, and
only penalties provided in the statute may be sought. 100 However, state wage statutes are
enforceable if they are not in conflict with the applicable FLSA provisions. 101 The FLSA specifies that its minimum
wage standards are the floor, not the ceiling, and that its provisions do not
excuse an employer who violates a state or federal law which may set a higher
minimum wage or a shorter work week. 102
Part A of this section
reviews the elements of an FLSA offense while Part B addresses penalties under
the FLSA. Part C examines enforcement of this statute.
A. Elements
of the Offense
To constitute an FLSA offense punishable by criminal
sanctions: (1) an employee must show that (2) the employer (3) willfully
violated the Act's [*579] provisions. 103
1. Employee
The FLSA defines an employee as any individual "employed by an
employer." 104 In order to determine if the
employee is covered by the FLSA, the court must look first to the activities of
the employee, as opposed to the business of the employer. 105 The Supreme Court has frequently
found an employer-employee relationship under the FLSA where one may not
necessarily have existed at common law. 106 To "employ" in the context of the
FLSA means "to suffer or permit to work." 107
The FLSA has special
overtime provisions to address the unique employment conditions of domestic
servants, hospital workers, fire fighters, police officers, and transportation
workers. 108 To encourage the employment of
certain individuals [*580] traditionally denied opportunities to
work, the FLSA also provides for the issuance of special certificates
authorizing work at lower wages. These individuals may include learners and
apprentices, students, and handicapped workers. 109 Since independent contractors are
not considered employees for FLSA purposes, it is important to note the factors
which distinguish them from employees. In determining whether a worker is an
"employee" as opposed to an independent contractor, courts look to the amount of
control and supervision exercised by the employer over the work of the
individual concerned. 110 If that control is extensive, the
worker will be considered an employee. 111 There is no bright line rule for
determining whether an individual is an independent contractor or employee under
the FLSA; instead, a case-by-case determination is necessary. 112
The FLSA further provides
that "any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or
professional capacity" is exempt from the overtime [*581] provisions
of the FLSA. 113 The Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor has promulgated regulations and interpretations to use in
determining whether an employee fits into one of these exemptions. 114
2. Employer
The FLSA defines an employer as "any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee...." 115 The Supreme Court has characterized
the FLSA's statutory definition of "employer" as the "broadest ... that has ever
been included in any one act." 116 An employer can be an individual,
partnership, association, corporation, business trust, legal representative, or
any organized group of persons. 117 In addition to the corporation
itself, a corporate officer with operational control is considered an employer
and can be held jointly and severally liable under the FLSA for unpaid wages. 118 Such corporate officers are liable
in their individual rather than their representative capacities. 119
The FLSA provisions apply to
both individual employers and to employers constituting an "enterprise." 120 The statute covers individual
employers in "industries engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce." 121 Liability applies to individual
business entities if they constitute an "enterprise" where related activities
are performed through a unified operation or where there exists common control
for a common business purpose. 122 A significant amount of litigation
has been devoted to determining which businesses constitute enterprises
[*582] within the meaning of the statute. 123
The definition of employer
excludes any person acting as an officer or agent of a labor organization and
the labor organization itself, except when it acts in the capacity of an
employer. 124 The situation of the labor
organization is unique in that criminal, but not civil, remedies may be sought
against it: § 216(a) provides for criminal penalties for willful violations by
"any person," 125 while § 216(b) allows for the
maintenance of a civil action for monetary damages against "any employer." 126 The FLSA, therefore, does not
provide for private actions by employees against a labor union. 127 The Act provides for enforcement
against labor organizations by either injunctive proceedings instituted by the
Secretary of Labor under § 217 or by criminal prosecutions for willful
violations under § 216(a). 128
3. Willful
Violation
In order to be subject to criminal sanctions under the
FLSA, an employer must be shown to have willfully violated its provisions. 129 A violation of the FLSA is willful
if the employer either knew of the illegality of its conduct or showed reckless
disregard for such illegality. 130 Thus, a violation is "willful" if
the [*583] employer knew of the FLSA requirements 131 and took affirmative steps to
conceal the violation. 132 However, where an employer can show
that it has made an effort to find out how the FLSA applies to its business, it
is less likely to be found to have willfully violated the statute. 133 If an employer's violation resulted
from good faith reliance on a ruling, interpretation, or enforcement policy,
then the employer may not be guilty of a criminal violation. 134
B. Penalties
The criminal penalties for violations of the FLSA are outlined in §
216(a): 135 "Any person who willfully violates
any of the provisions of section 215 [of the FLSA] shall upon conviction thereof
be subject to a fine of not more than $ 10,000, or to imprisonment for not more
than six months, or both." 136
C. Enforcement
The Secretary of Labor may utilize several different methods to evaluate
an employer's performance under the FLSA. A special Wage and Hour Division was
created in the Labor Department to allow the Administrator and the Secretary to
make periodic investigations and reports in order to keep the law up to date and
to detect violations. 137 The Division may compel the
attendance of witnesses at [*584] hearings 138 or the production of records during
an investigation. 139 It may also require an employer to
keep records of its employees and to make those records available to the
Administrator. 140 Moreover, the Division is empowered
to determine the applicability of exemptions from certain provisions of the
FLSA. 141 The Secretary may also sue to
restrain violations and, to a limited extent, to recover unpaid benefits on
behalf of employees. 142
An employer has no privilege
against production of its records and, therefore, has no right against
self-incrimination in this context. 143 The Administrator has the authority
to investigate by obtaining access to records without a prehearing on whether an
employer is subject to the FLSA. 144 Moreover, an employee bringing a
wage suit is entitled to inspect the employer's wage and hour records pertaining
solely to that employee. 145 The FLSA also provides for a variety
of civil proceedings to enforce compliance with its requirements. 146
IV. PAYMENT OR LOANS BY
EMPLOYER TO EMPLOYEES OR LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
In 1984, Congress amended §
302 of the Taft-Hartley Act 147 ("the LMRA") in [*585]
order to provide labor unions and their members greater protection from corrupt
union and management officials by elevating the offense of bribery or payoff of
employees, labor representatives, or organizations from a misdemeanor to a
felony. 148 The amendments provide that such
payments or loans by employers are criminal 149 only if made willfully and, in
certain circumstances, 150 with the intent to benefit the
employer or other persons. 151 Under the LMRA, it is illegal for
any employer in an industry affecting commerce 152 to pay anything of value to
representatives of its employees or to union officials. 153 The LMRA also prohibits
[*586] employees and union representatives from accepting such
payments. 154 The statute prohibits all such
payments but enumerates nine exceptions. 155
A. Elements of the
Offense
To constitute an offense punishable by criminal sanctions
under the LMRA: (1) an employer must (2) willfully pay or lend (3) money or
another thing of value (4) to any representative of its employees (5) or an
employee or representative of employees must willfully request or receive such
thing of value. 156
1. Employer
The LMRA's definition of an "employer" includes any person acting as an
agent of an employer. 157 The statute specifically excludes
federal or state governments or their subdivisions, the Federal Reserve Bank,
employers subject to the Railway Labor Act, and labor organizations from the
definition of "employer." 158 Private companies who perform
municipal functions are also excluded. 159 Prohibited payments made by an
employer via a non-employer private corporation, [*587] however, are
sufficient to constitute a violation of the statute. 160
2. Willfulness
Willfulness is required for a court to find a criminal violation of the
LMRA. 161 Most circuits which have ruled on
the definition of willfulness in the context of § 302(d) have held that a
finding of general intent that the defendant knowingly committed the act in
question is sufficient to satisfy this element of the offense. 162 The Seventh Circuit, however, has
held that a finding of willfulness requires proof of specific intent; the
defendant must know he or she is violating a law. 163 Mutuality of guilt is not necessary
for a conviction under LMRA. 164
3. Money or Thing of
Value
The terms "money" and "thing of value" are to be construed as
distinct terms. 165 "Thing of value" includes benefits
flowing from the use of monetary payments. 166 Courts have interpreted what
constitutes a thing of value broadly. 167
[*588] 4.
Representative of an Employee
The LMRA broadly defines the term
"employees" to include almost everyone within the common meaning of the term. 168 Certain employees are not covered,
however, including: managers, 169 full-time faculty members of private
universities, 170 supervisors, 171 confidential employees, 172 agricultural workers, 173 domestic workers, 174 employees covered by the Railway
Labor Act, 175 and independent contractors. 176 "Representative of employees"
includes any person authorized by employees to act for them in dealings with
their employer and is not limited to a bargaining representative. 177
[*589] 5.
Requests or Receives
Section 302(b) makes it unlawful for any
person to request, demand, receive, accept, or agree to receive or accept, any
payment, loan, or delivery of any money or other thing of value prohibited by §
302(a). 178 Violations under this section
include requesting unearned pension benefits, 179 accepting kickbacks or other
payoffs, 180 and receiving payments as a labor
consultant while employed as a union official. 181 Each receipt of a thing of value can
constitute a separate offense. 182
B. Exceptions
Section 302(c) contains nine exceptions to the provisions of LMRA. 183 The first three exceptions 184 describe payments that do not have
the potential for corrupting the labor movement. 185 The first exception involves
payments to an employee who acts openly as a representative of the employer in
labor relations and compensation to an employee for services rendered. 186 The second exception involves
payments [*590] made in satisfaction of a judgment of any court, a
decision or award of an arbitrator or impartial chairperson, or payments for the
settlement of claims or disputes. 187 The third exception includes
payments for the purchase of a product at the prevailing market price in the
regular course of business, 188 where the buyer and seller satisfy
the employer-employee relationship covered by the statute. 189
The last six exceptions 190 describe payments that are believed
to have the potential to corrupt the labor movement unless LMRA's protective
requirements are met. 191 Section 302(c)(4) exempts money
deducted from the wages of an employee to pay membership dues to a labor
organization, but only if the employee has given written approval. 192 The next four exceptions, found in §
302(c)(5)-(8), exempt money or other things of value paid to a trust fund
established by a representative of employees for the sole and exclusive benefit
of the employees and their families and dependents, including trusts for the
purposes of vacation, severance or holiday benefits, scholarships, child care
and housing funds, and legal service funds, under certain conditions. 193 Employers and employees must be
equally represented among the trustees who administer such trusts. 194
[*591] The four
exemptions found in § 302(c)(5)-(8) together with the exemption in § 302(c)(9),
which covers funds paid to a labor-management committee established for the
purposes of the Labor Management Cooperation Act of 1978, 195 define payments from management
representatives to labor representatives that are legal so long as the LMRA's
technical requirements are met. 196 Violations of § 302(c)(4)-(9) are
subject to the enforcement provisions in § 302(d)(1), which require both
willfulness and the intent to wrongfully benefit another person or to personally
benefit oneself. 197 Other violations of LMRA require
only willfulness in order for the defendant to be subject to criminal penalties.
198
C. Penalties
Violation of any part of LMRA is a felony punishable by a fine of not
more than $ 15,000; imprisonment for not more than five years; or both, if the
money or thing of value involved in the crime is worth more than one thousand
dollars. 199 If the value of the money or other
thing involved is less than one thousand dollars, the violation is a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of $ 10,000; imprisonment of one year; or both. 200
In addition, federal courts
have jurisdiction to restrain violations of LMRA by eliminating any features in
the structure or operation of a trust that would cause it to fail to qualify for
a § 302(c)(5) exception. 201 However, federal courts do not
[*592] have the power to issue injunctions against a trust fund or
its trustees to force it to comply with the standards delineated in the LMRA. 202
V. PROTECTING UNION FUNDS
UNDER THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT
In 1959,
Congress enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 203 ("LMDRA") in response to
investigations which revealed corrupt and unethical management of some labor
unions. 204 Section 501(c) of the LMRDA
penalizes appropriations of union funds for non-union purposes by creating a new
statutory crime whose scope extends beyond the common-law offense of larceny and
the old statutory crime of embezzlement 205 to include nearly every kind of
taking. 206
This provision prohibits an
officer or an employee of a union from embezzling, stealing, abstracting or
converting the assets of the union to his own use, or to the use of another. 207 The provision also subjects officers
or employees to criminal sanctions for passively accepting unauthorized funds.
208 Actual or good faith belief in union
benefit or authorization, as well as accident and mistake are available defenses
to fraudulent intent.
A. Elements of the Offense
A
violation of § 501(c) of the LMRDA occurs where: (1) an officer or employee of a
union (2) engages in the appropriation of union assets for his own or another's
purpose (3) with fraudulent intent. Depending on the circuit, demonstrating the
lack of a benefit to the union or the lack of union authorization may also be
[*593] necessary. 209
1. Officer or
Employee
Section 501(c) of the LMRDA applies to those who are
officers of, or who are employed by, a labor organization. Courts have
interpreted the terms "officer" and "employed by" broadly to assure the
protection of union funds. Any elected officer of a union, no matter how
ceremonial the post, is subject to the LMRDA. 210 An individual who has designated
duties as representative of the union, albeit not elected by union members, is
also an officer for purposes of prosecution under § 501(c). 211 In addition to conventional
employees on the union payroll, those hired by a union as independent
contractors may also be "employed by" the union within the meaning of the
statute. 212 Courts have also refused to limit
the statute to those who have a fiduciary relationship within the union. 213
2. Appropriation of
Union Assets for One's Own or Another's Purpose
Under § 501(c), an
appropriation occurs when a union employee deprives the union of funds which
belong solely to the union. 214 Four means of appropriation are
prohibited by the statute; embezzling, stealing, unlawfully and willfully
abstracting, and unlawfully and willfully converting. 215 Indirect and direct methods of
accomplishing such takings are treated equally by courts and prohibited under
the statute. 216
Courts have given a broad
interpretation to the definition of "union assets" to [*594] include
almost all property associated with a union. 217 However, moneys which a union
employee earns in a private capacity are not classified as union assets. 218 The prosecution must also prove that
the union employee took union assets for his own use or the use of another,
rather than a union purpose. Circumstantial evidence may be used to draw an
inference that money was expended for a non-union purpose. 219 At trial, the evidence will be
viewed by the court in the light most favorable to the government. 220
3. Fraudulent
Intent
Courts generally require a showing that the union employee
acted with fraudulent intent. 221 The defendant must have acted
willfully, with the knowledge he was acting unlawfully, and not by mistake. 222 Since the concept of intent reflects
a subjective state of mind that can not be established solely upon objective
proof, the prosecution must demonstrate, on the basis of all available evidence,
that the union employee acted knowing his conduct was wrong under the
circumstances. 223
[*595] 4.
Lack of Benefit to Union or Lack of Union Authorization
Although
there are some differences in how the circuit courts treat the elements of union
benefit and lack of union authorization in determining fraudulent intent under §
501(c), there seems to be a trend toward treating these elements as parts of a
whole picture rather than as distinct essential elements to the offense.
While the First and Fourth Circuits favor the union authorization
approach, 224 the Second Circuit places equal
weight on both union authorization and benefit. 225 The Sixth Circuit has placed a lower
burden of proof on the government, requiring only a showing that the defendant
did not in good faith believe the expenditure would legitimately benefit the
union. 226
Where expenditures are
unauthorized, courts generally have held that the prosecution need only prove a
lack of proper union authorization. 227 The Third, Seventh, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits have offered an alternative view: a lack of union authorization
and a lack of a good faith belief in union benefit bear upon fraudulent intent,
but are not distinct elements of a LMRDA offense. 228
B. Defenses
Although it is unclear whether union benefit, union authorization, or
good faith belief in union authorization or benefit are elements of the LMRDA
offense, these theories may serve as successful defenses for defendants seeking
to negate the fraudulent intent requirement at the crux of the offense. 229 Theories of mistake or accident can
also serve as defenses. 230
[*596] C.
Penalties
Violation of LMRDA is a felony punishable by a fine of
not more than $ 10,000, or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.
231 Separate violations of the LMRDA
constitute separate offenses, unless the violations constitute a single course
of conduct. 232
FOOTNOTES:
n1 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
n2 30
U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
n3 Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended in
various sections of 29 U.S.C.).
n4 Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 302, 29
U.S.C. § 186 (1994 & Supp. I 1995). See generally Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1994) (providing all provisions of this Act).
n5