674 F. Supp. 269, *; 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10856, **;
110 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P55,955
E&E Construction Co., et al., Plaintiffs, v. State Of
Illinois, et al., Defendants
No. 87 C 6289
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION
674 F. Supp. 269; 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10856; 110 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) P55,955
November 26, 1987, Decided
CORE TERMS:
laborer, resident, predecessor, immunity, market participant,
injunctive relief, classifications, unemployment, invoke, qualified immunity,
abstention, out-of-state, contractor, injunction, residency, enforcing,
treating, conform, equal protection, Preference Act, fundamental right,
contracting, pre-deprivation, discriminating, collectively, nonresident,
excessive, exceeded, caption, travel
COUNSEL: [**1] Gerard C. Smetana,
David G. Duggan, for Plaintiffs.
Moshe Jacobius, William F. Kane,
William F. McGlynn, Illinois Attorney General's Office, for Defendants.
JUDGES: Milton I. Shadur,
United States District Judge.
OPINIONBY: SHADUR
OPINION: [*270]
Milton I.
Shadur, United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On July 15, 1987 E&E Construction Co. ("E&E") and Easlick
Contracting, Inc. ("Easlick") (collectively, with Midwest Construction Co.
("Midwest"), n1 the "Corporate Plaintiffs"), joined by Brent Pinter, David
Frick, Kenneth Smith, Lawrence McCoy and David Youngstrom (collectively
"Individual Plaintiffs"), sued the State of Illinois Department of Labor
("Department") and three Department officials (collectively "Individual
Defendants"), claiming the Illinois Preference Act (the "Act," Ill. Rev. Stat.
ch. 48, paras. 2201-2207) violates several provisions of the United States
Constitution. Based on an undisputed factual presentation made almost
immediately after suit was filed, this Court issued a temporary restraining
order (the "TRO") preserving the status quo. By agreement among the parties the
TRO has remained in effect while the litigants have engaged in the discovery and
briefing they considered necessary to tender the current motion for decision.
[**2]
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n1 Midwest was added as a party
plaintiff by the First Amended Complaint (the "Complaint") filed September 8.
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At this point defendants have moved to dismiss this action
on myriad grounds, n2 and the matter is fully briefed. n3 For the reasons
provided in this memorandum opinion and order, the motion is granted in part and
denied in part.
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n2 Defendants have not bothered to
identify just which Fed. R. Civ. P. ("Rules") provisions they invoke in their
motion. Most of the grounds advanced are appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) as
asserting plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action upon which relief
may be granted. Under Rule 12(b)(6) this Court must accept as true all
well-pleaded factual allegations, drawing all reasonable inferences in
plaintiffs' favor (Marmon
Group, Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc., 822 F.2d 31, 34 (7th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam)). This opinion's factual statement conforms to that requirement, citing
to allegations of the Complaint in the form "para. --" and to its exhibits as
"Ex. --."
n3 Plaintiffs' responsive memorandum is styled in part a
"Memorandum . . . in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment." That latter
motion, which was procedurally insufficient, has been withdrawn and is not
before the Court.
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Facts
Midwest is the general contractor on a project (the "Project") to dredge
and reconstruct the Lake Michigan lakefront at Winthrop Harbor, Illinois to
provide marina facilities (para. 13). Midwest's contract is with the Illinois
Capital Development Board ("CDB"), a state agency (id.). E&E and
Easlick are subcontractors on the Project (para. 16). All Individual Plaintiffs
have been [*271] employed by E&E (id.) and then Easlick
(para. 18) to work on the Project.
Individual Defendants are officials
of Department, which is responsible for enforcing Act § 3:
Whenever there is a period of excessive unemployment in
Illinois, every person who is charged with the duty, either by law or
contract, of constructing or building any public works project or improvement
for the State of Illinois or any political subdivision, municipal corporation
or other governmental unit thereof shall employ only Illinois
laborers on such project or improvement, and every contract
let by any such person shall contain a provision requiring that such labor be
used: Provided, that other laborers may be used when Illinois
laborers as defined in this Act are not available, or are
incapable of performing the [**4] particular type of work
involved, if so certified by the contractor and approved by the contracting
officer.
In turn Act § 1 defines two critical operative
terms:
(1) "Illinois laborer" refers to any person who
has resided in Illinois for at least 30 days and intends to become or remain
an Illinois resident.
(2) "A period of excessive unemployment" means
any month immediately following 2 consecutive calendar months during which the
level of unemployment in the State of Illinois has exceeded 5% . . .
.
Throughout the relevant period unemployment in Illinois
has exceeded 5% (para. 12), so Department has sought to enforce the Act.
In October 1986 Department informed Midwest that its employee Kenneth
Reed ("Reed") was not an Illinois laborer, directing that he be
terminated. Department provided neither Reed nor Midwest with a hearing to
determine whether Reed qualified as an "Illinois laborer."
Midwest complied with Department's directive and was thereby deprived of Reed's
services (para. 14). In June 1987 the same scenario was repeated with Roger Rose
(para. 17).
All Individual Plaintiffs work for Easlick and E&E on
their respective phases of the Project. By July 10 each had resided
[**5] in Illinois for 30 days and intended to remain here (para.
19). n4 On July 10 Department Labor Conciliator David Hubbs ("Hubbs") (now a
defendant) wrote to Easlick and E&E (para. 21 and Ex. A), with copies and a
forwarding letter to Midwest (para. 22 and Ex. B), saying Department had
determined Individual Plaintiffs were not eligible to work on the Project and
directing that they be "removed from the project at the close of business" that
day. Hubbs' letters (Ex. A) also threatened an injunction against continued work
on the Project if Individual Plaintiffs were not removed.
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n4 Complaint para. 19 also asserts Individual Plaintiffs are "Illinois
laborers as defined in the Preference Act." That, of course, is
a legal conclusion rather than a factual assertion. As this opinion will
develop, that has caused some confusion on defendants' part.
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While Department officials had visited the Project site about a month
earlier and questioned Individual Plaintiffs, none of the latter was given any
hearing before Department ruled they were not "Illinois
laborers" (para. 20). Fearing an injunction that would shut
down the entire Project, Midwest directed Easlick to cease its portion of the
work [**6] as soon as it received Hubbs' letter (para. 23 and Ex.
E). This action, the TRO and the "standstill agreement" continuing the TRO
followed in quick succession.
Prior "Preference Act"
In
1984 the Act was adopted by the Illinois General Assembly promptly after its
predecessor Preference Act n5 had been declared [*272]
unconstitutional by both the Illinois Supreme Court (People ex rel. Bernardi
v. Leary Construction Co., 102 Ill.2d 295, 464 N.E.2d 1019, 80 Ill. Dec. 36
(1984)) (under the Privileges and Immunities Clause) and our Court of
Appeals (W.C.M.
Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984)) (under both the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause). Given the Act's close
similarity to its unconstitutional predecessor, defendants' submissions to this
Court might have been expected to describe the statutory differences and to
explain how the changes made by the General Assembly overcame the prior
constitutional difficulties.
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n5 Under the prior
Preference Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, para. 271):
Every person who is charged with the duty, either by law or
contract, of constructing or building any public works project or improvement
for the State of Illinois or any political subdivision, municipal corporation
or other governmental unit thereof shall employ only Illinois
laborers on such project or improvement, and every contract
let by any such person shall contain a provision requiring that such labor be
used: Provided, that other laborers may be used when Illinois
laborers as defined in this Act are not available, or are
incapable of performing the particular type of work involved, if so certified
by the contractor and approved by the contracting officer.
Persons were deemed "Illinois laborers" if they resided in
Illinois for at least one year before their employment (id. P 269).
Thus the Act differs from its predecessor in just three respects -- (1) by
applying only when statewide employment exceeds 5%, (2) by reducing the
residency requirement from one year to 30 days and (3) by requiring that a
worker intend to become or remain an Illinois resident.
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[**7]
But defendants have inexplicably ignored both
Leary Construction and W.C.M. Window (their memoranda cite
W.C.M. Window only in passing and never even mention Leary
Construction!), instead purporting to argue from first principles on issues
that have already been conclusively decided against them. While a few of
defendants' contentions have at least surface merit, most plainly do not.
Nevertheless this opinion, after describing the constitutional claims raised by
plaintiffs, will address each of defendants' contentions in turn.
Plaintiffs' Challenges to the Act
Plaintiffs attack the
Act as violating the Due Process, Equal Protection, Privileges and Immunities
and Commerce Clauses in a number of ways:
1. Due process challenges include, among others (para. 31):
(a) depriving Corporate Plaintiffs of the right to employ
out-of-state residents;
(b) depriving recent migrants to Illinois of
their right to employment;
(c) basing the presumption of excessive
unemployment on an unrealistically low figure and using statewide rather
than local data to see whether that figure has been exceeded;
(d)
using a 30-day residence requirement rather than more reliable indicia; and
(e) [**8] enforcing the Act without hearings to
determine compliance.
2. Privileges and immunities challenges
comprise (para. 33):
(a) preventing employers from hiring without regard to
citizenship and requiring them to use certain hiring methods;
(b)
preventing new residents from working in Illinois;
(c) preventing
nonresidents from working in Illinois; and
(d) treating Illinois
residents as nonresidents if their families live outside
Illinois.
3. Equal protection challenges involve (para. 35):
(a) infringing the fundamental right to travel;
(b)
discriminating against the class of workers who do not live with their
families;
(c) discriminating against the class of workers who have
previously worked for the same contractor in another state;
(d)
discriminating against the class of workers who have resided in Illinois
less than 30 days; and
(e) using a different criterion for residency
to vote than to work.
4. Commerce Clause challenges are (para.
39):
(a) erecting barriers to entry by out-of-state
laborers; and
(b) requiring new residents to sit
idle for 30 days before working.
Finally,
plaintiffs seek damages against Individual Defendants under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") for [**9] all the asserted
violations.
[*273] Standing
Defendants
repeatedly assert that all Individual Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the
Act because they claim to be Illinois residents and the Act therefore does not
apply to them (D. Mem. 2, 3, 5, 7, 9; D. R. Mem. 2-4). Almost without exception,
n6 defendants' standing argument is nonsensical.
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n6 As
discussed below, the specialized standing requirements of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause do arguably raise problems for Individual Plaintiffs -- but
those problems too are overcome here.
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For any Individual
Plaintiff to have standing, he n7 must satisfy three elements (Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700, 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982)):
1. He must have personally suffered an actual or threatened injury
because of defendants' conduct.
2. His injury must be fairly traceable
to defendants' challenged action.
3. His injury must be redressable by
the court.
Each Individual Plaintiff unquestionably
satisfies each of those requirements, and defendants really do not maintain
otherwise. It is irrelevant for standing purposes that Individual Plaintiffs
assert they satisfy the Act's residency requirements [**10] -- a
legal conclusion. What has caused their injury -- the operative fact that
confers standing -- is that defendants say they do not and want them
fired on that account.
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n7 This is not
chauvinistic usage. Although the principles discussed in the text of course
apply irrespective of gender, all the Individual Plaintiffs here happen to be
male.
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Even apart from defendants' untenable view of the
residency factor, most of the due process and equal protection challenges do not
rest on Individual Plaintiffs' residence anyway. Rather they focus on the lack
of pre-deprivation hearings, infringement of the fundamental right to travel and
classifications among residents.
Finally, the standing argument raised
by defendants does not even apply to the Corporate Plaintiffs. They, after all,
are harmed by defendants' enforcement of the Act whether or not Individual
Plaintiffs are Illinois residents.
All Plaintiffs have standing to bring
this action. This is the first of the arguments defendants should not have made
in good conscience.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants correctly contend the Eleventh Amendment requires dismissal
of Department itself from this action -- even the declaratory [**11]
aspects (Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67, 104
S. Ct. 900 (1984)). n8 Of course, because plaintiffs have also sued
Department officials in their official capacity, seeking injunctive relief
against them (para. 10) for violations of federal constitutional rights, it has
been settled at least since Ex
Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908) that
suit may proceed as to them.
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n8 As Pennhurst
reaffirmed (id. at 100-01), the "jurisdictional bar applies regardless
of the nature of the relief sought." If states are immune from both injunctive
relief and damages in federal court, it necessarily follows that they are immune
from declaratory relief.
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As for plaintiffs' damage
claim (the Fifth Claim, paras. 40-43 and related prayer for relief), it is
specifically limited to Individual Plaintiffs. Where plaintiffs have gone astray
in purely technical terms is in failing to make clear in the case caption that
they are suing Individual Defendants in their personal as well as their official
capacities. There is no reason not to allow the Complaint to be amended to
conform the caption to the operative allegations (see Rule 15(a)).
Privileges and Immunities
Complaint para.
[**12] 33 invokes both the Privileges and Immunities Clause (U.S.
Const. art. IV, § 2) and the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Because W.C.M. Window spoke of [*274] the former
and because the two clauses share a common jurisprudence, this opinion will
employ the slightly different terminology ("and" rather than "or") of Article
IV.
In any event, the two clauses have their own jurisprudence of
standing. As plaintiffs concede, corporations have long been barred from
asserting claims under the Privileges and Immunities Clause (Paul
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177, 181, 19 L. Ed. 357 (1869)).
Accordingly the Complaint's Second Claim may be pursued only by Individual
Plaintiffs.
Defendants urge that because the Privileges and Immunities
Clause does not allow citizens of a state to complain of its own laws (United
Building and Construction Trades Council of Camden County and Vicinity v. Mayor
and Council of the City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 217, 79 L. Ed. 2d 249, 104
S. Ct. 1020 (1984)) and because Individual Plaintiffs say they are Illinois
residents, they cannot assert a claim. Of course this case would be over if
defendants were to accept Individual Plaintiffs as bona fide residents of
Illinois. But it [**13] is defendants who insist Individual
Plaintiffs are citizens of another state and who seek to prevent them from
working here for that reason. That insistence has given rise to the
case and controversy here. In terms of this dispute, at least, the nonresident
label that defendants attach to Individual Plaintiffs should be treated as
implicating the constitutional guaranty.
Defendants have offered no
other basis for arguing Individual Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. To the contrary, it is clear the claim is
more than substantial, given W.C.M. Window and Leary
Construction.
Commerce Clause
Defendants next
assert no Commerce Clause violation has been alleged because the state is acting
as a market participant, rather than as a regulator of the market (White
v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 75
L. Ed. 2d 1, 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983)). Their statement of the legal
distinction is correct, but it does not compel dismissal of the Complaint at
this threshold stage. n9
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n9 Indeed, even were
defendants right in their argument, they would defeat only the Commerce Clause
claim, not the Complaint itself. Leary
Construction, 102 Ill.2d at 300-01, 464 N.E.2d at 1022 pointed out "a
'market participant' determination is irrelevant in a case which is litigated
under the privileges and immunities clause," rendering the state's "reliance on
the 'market participant' analysis in White . . . misplaced." Thus the
Privileges and Immunities claims are unimpeded by "market participant" notions.
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- - - - - - - [**14]
By its terms, the Act applies not only
to state construction projects but to those of all political subdivisions and
other governmental entities. When the Act is applied to such local projects, the
state is acting more as a regulator than as a participant (W.C.M.
Window, 730 F.2d at 495-96).
Complaint para. 13 identifies
Midwest's contract for the Project as having been awarded by CDB -- not of
itself conclusive on this issue. Defendants have submitted the affidavit of CDB
employee Robert Pierce stating the Project is "funded entirely by revenue of the
State of Illinois" (D. Mem. Ex.). But the current Rule 12(b)(6) motion must be
decided on the face of the Complaint. Whether the state is indeed acting as a
market participant is a factual issue, which must await trial or a summary
judgment motion.
Due Process
Department's asserted due
process violation lies in its having determined, without holding any hearings,
that Corporate Plaintiffs cannot employ Individual Plaintiffs (and others). n10
Plaintiffs claim that [*275] infringes the due process rights of
both employers and employees. As Baja
Contractors, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 667, slip op. at 19 (7th
Cir. Sept. 16, [**15] 1987) (quoting Cunningham
v. Adams, 808 F.2d 815, 820 (11th Cir. 1987)) has stated the test:
To establish a due process violation, [plaintiffs] must show:
"(1) a protected property or liberty interest, and (2) that [they were]
deprived of that interest by government action and without due process of
law."
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n10 Plaintiffs also
advance other due process claims:
1. They purport to find such a violation in defendants' mere
efforts to enforce a facially unconstitutional law. But in those terms any law
found unconstitutional for some reason would also violate due process -- a
needless redundancy.
2. They appear to assert substantive (as
contrasted with procedural) due process claims based (a) as to Corporate
Plaintiffs, on their rights to employ out-of-state residents and (b) as to
Individual Plaintiffs, on their rights to seek employment. Plaintiffs offer no
authority to suggest those rights are substantively rooted in the Due Process
Clause. They have not been since the Lochner era.
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- -
Defendants first contend Corporate Plaintiffs have no protected
interest at stake here because they (D. Mem. 4):
do not have any right to employ individuals. That was
determined by the passage of the 13th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.
[**16] That assertion is
patently ludicrous and unworthy of serious comment. n11 Of course Corporate
Plaintiffs have protected interests in conducting their businesses, in their
contracts to build the Project, in their contracts with each other and in their
contracts with their employees (cf. Brock
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 107 S. Ct. 1740, 1746-47, 95 L. Ed.
2d 239 (1987) (contractual right to discharge employee is protected property
interest)).
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n11 P. Mem. 10 n.2 provides a classic instance
of understatement in characterizing defendants' assertion as "at best curious."
Not content with that mild reproof, D. R. Mem. 5 responds: "People, furthermore,
cannot constitute corporate property subject to due process protection." Enough
is enough. Defendants' attack on the Complaint via the prohibition on slavery is
an idea that should never have been conceived, much less committed to paper and
filed in a memorandum of law.
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Next defendants suggest
Individual Plaintiffs have no protected right in their employment. D. Mem. 4
first says Individual Plaintiffs had "no more than a unilateral expectation of
private employment." That isn't true: They had jobs. And of course an employee's
interest in continued employment [**17] -- a contract right -- is
entitled to protection from governmental interference without due process. n12
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n12 Indeed, defendants seem to have forgotten the
fundamental premise that property rights are defined by state law --
and "rights" are jural relationships enforced by courts (Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 92 S. Ct. 2701
(1972)). Under Illinois law (as in most jurisdictions), the kind of
relationship exemplified by the employer-employee situation -- even if not for a
fixed term -- is protected against third-party interference by creating the
familiar tort of interference with advantageous relationships (e.g., Kemper
v. Worcester, 106 Ill.App.3d 121, 435 N.E.2d 827, 62 Ill. Dec. 29 (5th
Dist. 1982)). Although some such interference is legally privileged, whether
that privilege extends to defendants' conduct here begs the ultimate question of
the legitimacy of the state's interest. For the present it is enough to
recognize the clear existence of a property interest in the continuation of the
employment relationship.
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Thus the only issue is not
plaintiffs' entitlement to due process, but rather what process is due. In that
respect, defendants are right in saying not all deprivations [**18]
of property or liberty interests require a pre-deprivation full evidentiary
hearing. But defendants go farther, suggesting plaintiffs have gotten all the
procedural protection they need. Yet the employee's interest in continued
employment is certainly substantial (Cleveland
Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494, 105
S. Ct. 1487 (1985)), and the Supreme Court has consistently held due process
requires some kind of hearing before a discharge (id.
at 542). n13 At this preliminary stage of the litigation, there is no
factual record on which to determine whether Individual Plaintiffs received the
kind of hearing to which they were entitled.
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n13
Loudermill involved a public employee, whereas here we have private
employees (working on a public project) subject to discharge at the government's
behest. Though it would seem the same level of procedural protection is due in
the two instances, neither party has addressed the issue. There is the
possibility (unexplored to this point) that the type of determination made here
(the bona fides of a residency claim) is either more or less susceptible to
error-free determination without a hearing. If so, a different level of
protection could be called for (a different kind of "process" may be "due").
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[*276] Defendants raise a
more substantial difficulty by noting plaintiffs' apparent failure to seek
approval from the contracting officer to employ non-Illinois
laborers because Illinois laborers could not
be obtained. Under the Act, employers are clearly authorized to seek such
approval. And the Complaint has not suggested why that route was not followed,
nor has it asserted a basis for believing that any review triggered by the
refusal of such approval would be deficient in due process terms.
But
even in those terms the Complaint would not succumb. Individual Plaintiffs
challenge Department's conclusion, without the benefit of a hearing, that they
are not Illinois laborers. Nothing in the Act's certification
and approval process provides for a review of that determination. Once again,
without a well-developed factual record it is not appropriate to decide
plaintiffs have been afforded all the process to which they are due. n14
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n14 Defendants also suggest plaintiffs can avail
themselves of other state procedures such as an original writ of certiorari or a
breach of contract action. However, they never explain how those procedures
would provide adequate pre-deprivation hearings.
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Equal [**20] Protection
As already
indicated, Complaint para. 35 asserts the Act violates the Equal Protection
Clause by impinging the fundamental right to travel. Without citing any
authority, defendants assert the right to travel is not infringed because the
Act only prohibits Individual Plaintiffs from taking certain types of employment
once they have traveled to Illinois. But "the right to migrate protects
residents of a State from being disadvantaged, or from being treated
differently, simply because of the timing of their migration, from other
similarly situated residents" (Attorney
General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 106 S. Ct. 2317, 2322, 90
L. Ed. 2d 899 (1986)). Clearly the Act deprives new migrants to Illinois of
a significant opportunity. To withstand scrutiny, then, the Act's restrictions
must be necessary to further a compelling state interest (id.
106 S. Ct. at 2322 n.4).
Complaint para. 35 also says the Act and
Department's enforcement methods create a number of classifications that violate
equal protection:
1. treating workers who have resided in Illinois less than 30 days
differently from those who have resided here longer;
2. treating
workers whose families live in another state differently from
[**21] those whose families live in Illinois; and
3.
treating workers whose prior employment was with an out-of-state contractor
differently from others.
Defendants retort Individual
Plaintiffs are merely objecting to the way the residency requirement was applied
in their individual cases. But as alleged, the distinctions are
class-based and invidious -- and that suffices to save the Complaint from
dismissal.
Maybe the facts will ultimately show Department's policy does
not create the last two alleged classifications. But again the Complaint charges
Department does classify in that way. Were those classifications found to burden
the right to travel, each would be subject to heightened scrutiny. And even if
they do not, the classifications must still withstand "rational basis" scrutiny.
Qualified Immunity
Each Individual Defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity from damages unless her or his actions in
enforcing the Act violated a clearly established right (Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 102 S. Ct. 2727
(1982)). To avoid creating such immunity, "the contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right" [**22] (Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523
(1987)). n15
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n15 Defendants also rely on Benson
v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir. 1986) as requiring that "the
facts of the existing case law must closely correspond to the contested action
before the defendant official is subject to liability under . . .
Harlow." But Benson limited that statement to situations where
officials had to balance individual rights and governmental interests on a
case-by-case basis (id.). No such balancing is called for here, so it
would appear Benson does not apply. Even if it did, however, Leary
Construction and W.C.M. Window surely fit the bill -- absent a
showing that the statutory differences pose at least a plausible distinction in
light of those decisions.
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[*277] Defendants
say their actions violated no clearly established right because, while the Act's
predecessor was declared unconstitutional, the Act itself has not been. Yet
defendants fail to identify even one difference between the Act and its
predecessor that salvages its constitutionality!
Because defendants seem
to have difficulty grasping the issue (their D.R. Mem. 9-10 is really a repeat
of D. Mem. 11-12), it [**23] bears a brief walkthrough. Leary
Construction and W.C.M. Window (both of which, as already pointed
out, defendants choose to ignore) certainly articulated "clearly established"
constitutional rights. To pose a reductio ad absurdum, had the General Assembly
followed those cases by a verbatim reenactment of the predecessor Act,
defendants could not even arguably have raised the shield of qualified immunity.
Although the legislature did not do that, what it did enact was so close to its
predecessor that, absent a far more compelling presentation on the part of
Department than has been advanced to date, the rights defendants violate in
enforcing the Act must also be viewed as "clearly established." As Anderson,
107 S. Ct. at 3039 (citation omitted) stated the test:
This is not to say that an official action is protected by
qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held
unlawful, . . . but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the
unlawfulness must be apparent.
Abstention
As an
overriding argument, defendants invoke Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 85 L. Ed. 971, 61 S. Ct.
643 (1941) to suggest this Court should abstain on the [**24]
constitutional issues to allow state courts to construe the Act.
Pullman abstention is appropriate only when a statute is "obviously
susceptible of a limiting construction" that would save its constitutionality
(Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 237, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186, 104 S.
Ct. 2321 (1984) (quoting Zwickler
v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251, 19 L. Ed. 2d 444, 88 S. Ct. 391 (1967)).
There is no ambiguity in the Act's straightforward provisions (with one
possible -- though nondispositive for current purposes -- exception), n16
defendants offer no possible limiting construction, and none suggests itself to
this Court. Abstention is not appropriate.
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n16 As a
possible partial exception, a state court might tell defendants they are
misapplying the Act § 1 reference to "resid[ing] in Illinois" by excluding
Individual Plaintiffs from that category. That, however, would not resolve many
of the issues posed by the Complaint and discussed in this opinion.
Pullman abstention does not counsel the splintering and deferral of
closely-linked constitutional challenges of the types presented here.
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Injunctive Relief
Finally, defendants say
plaintiffs cannot meet the requirements for obtaining an injunction because they
have an adequate [**25] remedy at law and cannot show an irreparable
injury. Even were that so, the Complaint would survive -- plainly the
suitability of injunctive relief goes to the remedy, and not to whether
plaintiffs have stated a claim for which relief may be granted.
Nevertheless this Court is constrained to advise defendants that
injunctive relief is a particularly appropriate remedy when the harm is
prospective enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. Our Court of Appeals
affirmed an injunction against the Act's predecessor in W.C.M. Window,
without pausing to consider whether other forms of relief would be adequate.
This Court will do likewise. n17
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n17 It is particularly
objectionable to be told by a litigant that adequate remedies at law are
available, and yet to have the proffered examples include a declaratory judgment
action (which plaintiffs seek here!) and a writ of certiorari -- both equitable
remedies. If defendants are really suggesting plaintiffs should be forced to go
to state court to redress the deprivation of their federal constitutional
rights, they utterly misperceive the role of federal courts in our system.
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[*278] Conclusion
Individual
Plaintiffs have stated claims under [**26] the Privileges and
Immunities, Commerce, Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United
States Constitution, and they have hence advanced a cause of action under
Section 1983. Corporate Plaintiffs have stated claims under each of those
provisions except the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Defendants' motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is therefore granted as to Corporate Plaintiffs'
claims under the Second Claim for Relief, but denied in all other respects.
Department is immune from federal court suit on the Complaint's claims
and is therefore dismissed as a defendant. Individual Defendants may not be sued
for damages in their official capacities. Leave is granted to amend the
Complaint's caption to conform to its text, making it clear the damage claims
are brought against them personally.
This action is set for a status
hearing at 9 a.m. December 3, 1987. At that time counsel should come prepared to
discuss plans for the preliminary injunction hearing and all other aspects of
the lawsuit. n18
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n18 P. Mem. 4 and 16 ask for Rule 11
sanctions -- attorneys' fees and expenses -- because of the emptiness of
defendants' arguments. Because defendants were busy reasserting the same
arguments, their Reply Memorandum did not speak to that subject (except to
invoke Rule 11 themselves on an untenable ground, R. Mem. 3-4). This opinion has
not addressed the matter, except perhaps inferentially by ruling on defendants'
dismissal contentions. Consequently the litigants may want, in anticipation of
the status hearing, to discuss dealing with the possible renewal of plaintiffs'
request.
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