SALVATORE CACI, Plaintiff, v. LABORERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, ROBERT D. LUSKIN, COMEY, BOYD &
LUSKIN, Defendants.
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4874
COUNSEL:
For SALVATORE CACI, plaintiff: Robert H. Perk, Buffalo, NY.
For
LABORERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, ROBERT D.
LUSKIN, COMEY, BOYD & LUSKIN, defendants: Lawrence J. Vilardo, Connors &
Vilardo, Buffalo, NY.
JUDGES:
HONORABLE RICHARD J. ARCARA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
OPINIONBY: RICHARD J. ARCARA
OPINION: DECISION AND ORDER
BACKGROUND On or about December 10, 1996,
plaintiff Caci filed a complaint in New York State court against defendants
Laborers' International Union of North America ("LIUNA"),
attorney Robert D. Luskin and the law firm of Comey, Boyd and Luskin, alleging
numerous counts of defamation.
On January 17, 1997, defendants removed
this case to federal court. On January 30, 1997, plaintiff moved to remand this
case back to state court. On March 27, 1998, this Court denied plaintiff's
motion to remand finding that at least two of plaintiff's claims (counts one and
seven) were pre-empted under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA"),
29
U.S.C. § 185(a). The Court noted that plaintiff's remaining defamation
claims also appeared to be pre-empted, but declined to decide [*2]
the issue at that juncture. The Court then referred the case to Magistrate Judge
Foschio for further proceedings.
Defendants thereafter filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint and/or for summary judgment on the ground that all of
plaintiff's remaining defamation claims are also pre-empted. On September 7,
1999, Magistrate Judge Foschio filed a Report and Recommendation ("Report"),
recommending that plaintiffs claims be dismissed as pre-empted.
Plaintiffs filed objections to the Report and defendants filed a
response thereto. On November 23, 1999, the Court held oral argument on the
objections.
DISCUSSION Pursuant to
28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this Court must make a de novo determination of those
portions of the Report to which objections have been made. Upon a de novo
review, and after reviewing the submissions and hearing argument from the
parties, the Court finds that all of plaintiffs claims should be dismissed as
pre-empted.
The instant dispute is one of several related actions filed
by various members of Local 210,
Laborers' International Union
of North America ("Local 210") against defendants. See Caci v.
Laborers Int'l Union of North [*3] America, et al.,
97-CV-0034A; Capitano v.
Laborers Int'l Union of North America
et al., 97-CV-0035A; Fasciana v.
Laborers Int'l Union of North
America, et al., 97-CV-0833A; Panzcyskowski v.
Laborers Int'l
Union of North America et al., 97-CV-0036A. As in each of the related actions,
the complaint in this case sets forth numerous claims of defamation brought by a
member and/or officer of Local 210, plaintiff Caci. The allegations, which are
discussed in detail in the Magistrate Judge's Report and in this Court's March
1998 Decision and Order, n1 are virtually identical to the allegations set forth
in the related actions in that the defamation claims are based upon the same
allegedly defamatory statements. As noted above, this Court has previously
determined in its March 1998 Decision and Order that counts one and seven of the
complaint are pre-empted. Accordingly, the issue currently before the Court is
whether plaintiff's remaining defamation claims are also pre-empted.
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- -
n1 Familiarity with this Court's June 1998 Decision and Order is
presumed.
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The defendants allege complete
pre-emption of plaintiff's remaining defamation claims under § 301 of the LMRA.
Section 301 of the
LMRA provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
29
U.S.C. § 185(a).
The Supreme Court
has stated that complete pre-emption of a plaintiff's state-law claims under
Section 301 will be found only where resolution of the state-law claim is
"inextricably intertwined" with consideration of the terms of the labor
contract, or where the rights and obligations created under state-law do not
exist independently of the labor contract.
Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206, 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985).
Where resolution of plaintiff's state-law claim depends on interpretation of the
labor contract, the claim is pre-empted.
Hawaiian
Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 129 L. Ed. 2d 203, 114 S. Ct. 2239
(1994). [*5]
However, the fact
that the labor contract provides a remedy that plaintiff could pursue as an
alternative to the state-law claim does not mean that pre-emption is
required. See
Trans
Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 229 (3d Cir. 1995) ("plaintiff
may bring a state-law tort action against an employer, even where he could have
brought a similar claim on a provision in [the labor contract], so long as the
state claim does not require interpretation of the [labor contract.]").
Likewise, the fact
that the state-law analysis involves attention to the same factual
considerations as a determination under that labor contract does not mandate
pre-emption.
Lingle
v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409-10, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410,
108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988). A state-law claim
will only be completely pre-empted where it cannot be resolved without
interpretation of the labor contract.
As previously determined in this
Court's March 1998 Decision and Order, the LIUNA constitution is a labor
contract within the meaning of Section 301 of the LMRA. Therefore, if resolution
of plaintiff's claims requires interpretation of the terms of the LIUNA
[*6] constitution, those claims are pre-empted.
The Court
finds that all of plaintiff's remaining defamation claims are pre-empted under §
301 of the LMRA. As Magistrate Judge Foschio determined, and as this Court
intimated in its March 1998 Decision and Order, the issue of whether the
statements alleged to be defamatory in counts two through ten of the complaint
necessarily require interpretation of the LIUNA constitution. In other words,
the issue of whether the complaint for trusteeship was necessary and whether
Local 210 has been influenced or controlled by members and associates of
organized crime necessary turns on whether plaintiff Caci and others violated
various provisions of the LIUNA constitution. This determination cannot be made
without interpreting the LIUNA constitution itself. Because the veracity of the
statements alleged to be defamatory cannot be resolved without interpretation of
the LIUNA constitution itself, counts two, three, four, five, six, eight, nine
and ten must be dismissed as pre-empted.
Furthermore, as
the Court indicated in its March 1998 Decision and Order, in situations where,
as here, the labor contract imposes a duty upon the defendant to make the
[*7] statements that are alleged to be defamatory, courts have
repeatedly held that plaintiff's defamation claims are pre-empted. See e.g.
Johnson
v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 876 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1989); Peek
v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10138, 1997 WL
399379 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (pre-emption found where allegedly defamatory
statements "overwhelmingly relate[d] to conduct that formed the substance of
plaintiff's grievance and arbitration proceedings").
Here, most of the
statements alleged to be defamatory were required to be made under the terms of
the LIUNA constitution. Specifically, statements alleged to be defamatory in
counts two and three are contained in letters sent to members of Local 210
notifying them of the hearing to be conducted regarding the appointment of a
trustee. That notice was required pursuant to Article IX, § 7 of the LIUNA
constitution. Similarly, the statements alleged to be defamatory in counts four,
five and nine of the complaint were all contained in issues of
The
Laborer, a bimonthly publication that is published by
LIUNA. Section 3 of the Ethics and Disciplinary Procedure n2 requires that the
General Executive Board Attorney [*8] (defendant Luskin) "prepare
reports concerning his . . . activities, the progress he . . . is making towards
achieving the objectives and purposes of the Disciplinary Procedure, to be
published on a bimonthly basis in
The Laborer." As
with the statements made in counts two and three, defendants were under a duty
under the LIUNA constitution to make the statements alleged to be defamatory in
counts four, five and nine. The issue of whether those statements exceeded the
scope of defendants' duties under the LIUNA constitution will necessarily
require interpretation of the constitution itself. Therefore, counts two, three,
four, five and ten pre-empted on this-basis also.
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n2 As
noted in this Court's June 1998 Decision and Order, at 3, the Ethics and
Disciplinary Procedure became part of the LIUNA constitution in January 1995.
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CONCLUSION For the reasons
discussed above, in the Magistrate Judge's Report, and in this Court's March
1998 Decision and Order, the Court hereby dismisses all of plaintiff's
[*9] claims as pre-empted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to
enter judgment in favor of defendants and to close this case.
IT IS SO
ORDERED.
HONORABLE RICHARD J. ARCARA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT
Dated: March 31, 2000
Labor
& Employment Law : Collective Bargaining & Labor Relations :
Enforcement 
