CORE TERMS: indictment, ladies, gentlemen, wilfully, subscribed, jurors, knowingly, guilt, remember, duty, material matter, reasonable doubt, witness stand, tax year, innocence, beyond a reasonable doubt, circumstantial evidence, declaration, credibility, subscribe, perjury, income tax, matter of law, jury find, intentionally, deliberations, instruct, automobile expense, written claim, state of mind

OPINIONBY: HOFFMAN

OPINION: Charge to the Jury

HOFFMAN, District Judge: THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury: Let me first express my deep and appreciative thanks for the service which you have rendered during the many weeks of this trial. The trial in this case has covered a lengthy period of time, pretty nearly nine weeks, longer than most trials, shorter than some, and unfortunately for those of you who have business and household responsibilities, the trial has run five weeks beyond the regular period of jury service which, as you know, is generally one month.

Despite the length of the trial, however, I have observed that all of you, each and every one of you, have been most attentive, alert and punctual during these many arduous days, and I am confident that you will complete your remaining responsibilities here as jurors in the  [*2]  best traditions of our Federal Courts.

I believe that to the man or woman who performs his duties well, jury service is a gratifying one, and I think that after you have been discharged from your final responsibilities here, you will look back on your service in this case as a truly memorable experience.

As you know, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it is my duty now to charge and instruct you with respect to the law which you will apply to the facts as you find the facts to be from the evidence which has been offered and admitted in this case. By evidence, I mean the spoken testimony of the various witnesses given from that witness stand as well as the documentary and physical exhibits which have been admitted into evidence.

These instructions which I am obligated to give under the law are for your benefit and guidance in considering the evidence and also for assistance to you in your deliberations upon this case.

You remember I told you in substance when you were being examined to determine your qualifications to serve as jurors in this case that the instructions which the Court would give insofar as they pertained to the principles of law applicable to this case must  [*3]  be accepted by you as a binding control and guide in your consideration of the evidence and in your deliberations, and I so instruct you now.

You will recall that preliminary to your being sworn to act as jurors in this case, you were examined not only by the Court, but by the lawyers as to your competency and qualifications to serve as jurors in this case.As part of such examination, each of you answered all questions put to you by the Court and counsel. Your answers showed that you were competent and qualified to act as jurors. The answers you then made to such questions in regard to your competency and qualifications, your fairness, your lack of prejudice and freedom from passion and sympathy are as binding on you now as they were then and should so remain until you are finally discharged from further consideration of this case. It would be improper and unlawful for any of you to disregard the answers that rendered you competent to serve as jurors in this case.

You will remember that I told you during my examination of you prior to your selection as jurors that it is your responsibility to determine what the facts are in the case. It is your exclusive function under the  [*4]  law and as the Court may give the law to you uninfluenced by any expression of opinion that the Court may have made or may hereafter make with respect to any matters of fact. I say to you that the Court has not intended at any time during the trial and does not intend now to express any opinion on any matter of fact. If by chance the court has expressed or does express any opinion on any matter of fact, you are at liberty to disregard such opinion and it is your duty to disregard it if it is different from your own.

Members of the jury, you will recall at the beginning of this trial I instructed and ordered you to refrain from talking with anybody about this case. I also instructed you not to permit anyone to speak with you about it. I also directed and ordered you not to read any articles about the case that might be printed in the newspapers concerning it, and from listening to anything that might be said over the radio or television about it. I assume that as jurors you have complied with the orders of the Court in this regard.

You are instructed that you are to decide this case only upon the evidence, oral evidence given from that witness stand, documentary or physical  [*5]  exhibits which were admitted in open court, and if by any chance you have heard, read or observed anything concerning the case other than hearing or seeing it in court, you must disregard what you have heard or seen and decide this case solely upon the evidence admitted in open court under the instructions pertaining to the law now being given to you.

I don't think that I need say at this point that this is a so-called criminal case in that a defendant is being charged here in an indictment with the commission of certain offenses, and the law in such cases is that the defendant comes into court presumed to be innocent, and that presumption protects him until such time, if such time shall come, when the jury shall believe from the evidence in the case beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty as charged in the indictment.

The guilt of the accused, Mr. Accardo, is not to be inferred because the facts proved are consistent with his guilt, but, on the contrary, before there can be a verdict of guilty, you must believe from all the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts proven are inconsistent with the defendant's innocence. If two conclusions can reasonably  [*6]  be drawn from the evidence, one of innocence and one of guilt, you should adopt the conclusion of innocence.

The defendant on trial, Mr. Accardo, has pleaded not guilty.The law does not require any defendant to prove his innocence. The burden of proving the charges in the indictment rests upon the government. You cannot find the defendant guilty unless from all the evidence you believe him guilty of the charges in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing is to be presumed or taken by implication against the defendant. The law presumes him innocent until he is proven guilty by competent evidence, and if the evidence you have in this case leaves in your mind any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, the law makes it your duty to acquit him.

Now I have used the words "reasonable doubt" here, and we have heard the expression mentioned by the lawyers during the trial. What is a reasonable doubt? A reasonable doubt is what the term implies, a doubt founded upon reason. It does not mean every conceivable kind of doubt; it does not mean a doubt that may be purely imaginary or fanciful or one that is merely speculative. It means, members of the jury, simply an  [*7]  honest doubt that appeals to reason and is founded upon reason. If, after considering all the evidence in this case, you have such a doubt in your mind as would cause you or any other reasonably prudent person to pause or hesitate before acting in a grave transaction of your life, then you have such a doubt as the law contemplates as a reasonable doubt.

You have heard today some discussion by the lawyers in respect to the truth or falsity of the testimony of certain witnesses. If you believe from the evidence that any witness in this case took that witness stand and knowingly and wilfully testified falsely during this trial to any matter material to the case, or, as we sometimes say, material to the issues, you are at liberty to disregard the entire testimony of such witness except as it may have been corroborated by other credible evidence or by facts and circumstances proved on the trial.

Your verdict in this case must be reached from all the evidence in the case, but if any evidence was admitted and was later stricken out by the Court, you must wholly disregard that evidence as was stricken out.On ocassions, you will remember, during the trial witnesses made answers to questions  [*8]  before the Court had an opportunity to rule on objections which were made. After such objections were sustained, if they were sustained, the Court directed the answers to be stricken from the record and that the jury disregard such answers; and I now again instruct you to disregard answers which were given in such circumstances.

You have heard the word "circumstantial" used here during this trial. There are two kinds of evidence, direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. There have been both kinds of evidence introduced during this trial. Direct evidence is that sort of evidence by which a fact is proved directly and without inference of other facts, and it is usually given by witnesses who saw, heard or otherwise observed some particular fact or occurrence. Circumstantial evidence is indirect evidence or that sort of evidence by which an inference of an unknown fact is drawn from the evidence of known facts. Circumstantial evidence in criminal cases is the proof of such facts and circumstances connected with or surrounding the crime or crimes charged as tend to show the guilt or innocence of the party charged.

If the facts and circumstances as shown by the evidence  [*9]  in this case are sufficient to convince you of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, then such evidence is sufficient to authorize you to find the defendant guilty. The law requires a conviction where there is sufficient legal evidence to show a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and circumstantial evidence is legal evidence.

Of course, if you find there is no such evidence or any other kind of evidence which I am giving to you, then in that event you must find the defendant not guilty.

You have a right, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, to weigh and examine the evidence closely and carefully in the light of common knowledge and experience of mankind.You have the right to take into consideration the common knowledge and experience of mankind in determining whether any evidence is reasonable or unreasonable or probable or improbable in determining what weight it is entitled to receive.

Let us now consider the indictment in this case.

The indictment was filed and returned in this court by a Federal Grand Jury of this District on April 26, 1960. The indictment contains three separate counts.

Count one reads as follows, substantially:

That on  [*10]  or about March 20, 1957, in the Northern District of Illinois,

ANTHONY JOSEPH ACCARDO

defendant herein, did unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly make, and subscribe a document which contained a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which said defendant did not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter, in that the said Anthony Joseph Accardo, on or about March 20, 1957, made, subscribed, and filed, and cause to be made, subscribed, and filed at Chicago, Illinois, with the District Director, Internal Revenue Service, United States Treasury Department, a document, to-wit, 1956 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, U.S. Treasury Department Internal Revenue Service Form 1040 (a true and correct copy of which document is attached hereto and made a part of this indictment), in which document defendant stated in substance, that during the tax year 1956 he was employed by Premium Beer Sales, Inc., and paid the sum of $42,862.25, and that while so employed 80 per cent of the automobile expenses involved in the operation of a certain Mercedes Benz automobile were incurred by him in promoting beer sales for the said Premium Beer Sales, Inc., whereas  [*11]  the said defendant then and there well knew that this statement was not true and correct in that 80 per cent of the said automobile expenses were not incurred by him in promoting beer sales for Premium Beer Sales, Inc.: in violation of Section 7206, Sub-Section 1, Title 26, United States Code.

The next count in the indictment, ladies and gentlemen, is Count two, and that count reads substantially as follows:

That on or about April 15, 1958, in the Northern District of Illinois,

ANTHONY JOSEPH ACCARDO

defendant herein, did unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly make, and subscribe a document, which contained a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which said defendant did not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter, in that the said Anthony Joseph Accardo, on or about April 15, 1958, made, subscribed, and filed, and caused to be made, subscribed, and filed at Chicago, Illinois, with the District Director, Internal Revenue Service, United States Treasury Department, a document, to-wit, 1957 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, U.S. Treasury Department Internal Revenue Service Form 1040 (a true and correct copy of which document  [*12]  is attached hereto and made a part of this indictment), in which document defendant stated, in substance, that during the tax year 1957 he was employed by Premium Beer Sales, Inc., and paid the sum of $67,540.85, and that while so employed 90 per cent of the automobile expenses involved in the operation of a certain Mercedes Benz automobile were incurred by him as an agent for Premium Beer Sales, Inc., whereas the said defendant then and there well knew that this statement was not true and correct in that 90 per cent of the said automobile expenses were not incurred by him as an agent for Premium Beer Sales. Inc.: in violation of Section 7206, Sub-Section 1, Title 26, United States Code.

The last count, Count three of the indictment, reads substantially as follows:

That on or about April 9, 1959, in the Northern District of Illinois,

ANTHONY JOSEPH ACCARDO

defendant herein, did unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly make, and subscribe a document, which contained a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which said defendant did not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter, in that the said Anthony Joseph Accordo, on or about  [*13]  April 9, 1959, made, subscribed, and filed, and caused to be made, subscribed, and filed at Chicago, Illinois, with the District Director, Internal Revenue Service, United States Treasury Department, a document, to-wit, 1958 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, U.S. Treasury Department Internal Revenue Service Form 1040 (a true and correct copy of which document is attached hereto and made a part of this indictment), in which document defendant stated, in substance, that during the tax year 1958 he was employed by Premium Beer Sales, Inc., and paid the sum of $68,871.70, and that while so employed 90 per cent of the automobile expenses involved in the operation of a certain Mercedes Benz automobile were incurred by him as an agent for Premium Beer Sales, Inc., whereas the said defendant then and there well knew that this statement was not true and correct in that 90 per cent of the said automobile expenses were not incurred by him as an agent for Premium Beer Sales, Inc.: in violation of Section 7206, Sub-Section 1, Title 26, United States Code.

I might say at this point, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that the tax returns which are referred to in the indictment, the 1956, 1957,  [*14]  and 1958 returns, have, you will remember, been admitted into evidence, and along with other exhibits will be sent to the jury room for you to inspect and examine.

While we are on the subject of the indictment, ladies and gentlemen, I must say to you that the indictment is not to be treated by you in any way as raising any presumption of guilt or creating any kind of prejudice against the defendant, Mr. Accardo. An indictment is one of the forms prescribed by law to prefer a charge against an individual and must be regarded by you in that light and no other light.

The Federal statute to which the indictment refers and which the defendant is charged with violating is Section 7206, Sub-Section 1, Title 26, United States Code. Insofar as it is pertinent here to this case, that statute reads as follows:

"Any person who wilfully makes and subscribes any return, statement or other document which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter... shall be punished as provided by law."

And the statute later details the punishment, among other things.  [*15] 

Now for a violation of this statute to occur, there must be:

1. A wilful making and subscribing of a return, statement or other document.

2. The return, statement or other document must contain a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury.

3. The maker must not believe the return, statement or other document to be true and correct as to every material matter.

These are the three essential elements.

In this case the government charges that the false statements concerned - the alleged false statements concerned, consisted of:

1. The defendant's written claim that 80 per cent of his Mercedes Benz automobile expense for the tax year 1956 was incurred in the promotion of beer sales for Premium Beer Sales, Inc.

2. The defendant's written claim that 90 per cent of his Mercedes Benz automobile expense for the tax year 1957 was incurred as an agent of Premium Beer Sales, Inc.

3. The defendant's written claim that 90 per cent of his Mercedes Benz automobile expense for the tax year 1958 was incurred as an agent of Premium Beer Sales, Inc.

I have ruled as a matter of law that the Federal Income Tax Return, Forms 1040 and their attached addenda  [*16]  and schedules, returns, that is to say, made and subscribed by the defendant in this case for the years 1956, 1957 and 1958, if you find such documents were made and subscribed by the defendant, are returns as contemplated - are returns and documents as contemplated by Section 7206, Sub-Section 1, Title 26, United States Code.

I have also ruled as a matter of law that the statements made by the defendant in this case, if you find such statements were made, were of such a material matter as is contemplated by Section 7206, Sub-Section 1, Title 26, United States Code.

Inasmuch as it is your duty as jurors to follow the law as stated in the instructions of the Court, you need not and should not concern yourselves to any further degree with these matters of law. It remains, therefore, for you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, to concern yourselves solely with the following questions of fact:

1. Whether the returns in question were made and subscribed by the defendant.

2. Whether the defendant, if he made and subscribed these returns, acted wilfully at the time of making and subscribing.

3. Whether the defendant, if he made and subscribed these returns, believed the alleged  [*17]  false statements to be true and correct as to every material matter.

Members of the jury, a necessary element of the crimes charged in this indictment is the intent to commit such crimes. Intent may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence or by a combination of both. I would say that intent can rarely be established by any means other than circumstantial evidence. While witnesses may see and hear and thus be able to give direct evidence of that a defendant does or fails to do.There can be no eye-witness account of the state of mind with which the acts were done or committed, but what a defendant does or fails to do may indicate intent or lack of intent to commit the offense charged.

In determining the issue as to intent, you are entitled to consider anything done or omitted to be done by the accused and all facts and circumstances in evidence which may aid in the determination of the state of mind. It is obviously impossible to ascertain or prove directly what were the operations of the mind of the defendant. You cannot look into a person's mind and see what his intentions are or were, but a careful and intelligent consideration of the facts and circumstances shown  [*18]  by the evidence in any case enables one to infer what another's intentions were in doing or not doing things.

With a knowledge of definite acts, we may draw definite logical conclusions. We are, in our affairs, continuously called upon to decide from the acts of others what their intentions or purposes are, and experience has taught us that frequently actions speak more clearly than spoken or printed words. You must, therefore, rely in part on circumstantial evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

Before the defendant can be found guilty under this indictment or any count thereof, it is incumbent upon the government to prove every material allegation in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing is to be presumed or taken by implication against the defendant.

It is your duty to consider all the evidence of both sides without regard to which side called the greater number of witnesses to the witness stand. I don't know at this time whether the government called the larger number of witnesses - at least I don't remember - than the defendant called, but consider all of the evidence of both sides, ladies and gentlemen, without regard to which  [*19]  side called the greater number of witnesses.

In the statute which I have been discussing, the statute upon which the indictment is based as well as the indictment itself, you will remember the words "knowingly and wilfully" are used, and, as I have said, in this case the matter of intent is an essential element which must exist in order for the accused, Mr. Accardo, to be criminally liable.

Therefore, in order to find the defendant guilty, you must not only believe that he did the acts complained of and of which he stands charged, but you must also believe that the acts were intentionally and knowingly done, or, rather, the acts were intentionally and knowingly done by him. The word, "knowingly," as used in the statute and as set forth in the indictment, means that state of mind wherein the defendant was in possession of facts from which he knew or was aware that he could not lawfully act or commit the acts whereof he now stands charged.

"Wilfully," the word, "wilfully," ladies and gentlemen, means intentionally and not by accident.

We have heard the subject of the credibility of witnesses discussed here today - perhaps before today.

I say to you, ladies and gentlemen  [*20]  of the jury, that you are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the testimony of the witnesses who have testified here upon this trial. In weighing the testimony of each witness, you should carefully scrutinize it; consider all of the circumstances under which the witness testified; his or her demeanor on the witness stand; the manner in which he or she might be affected by the verdict; the extent to which he or she is corroborated or contradicted by other credible evidence, and, in short, any circumstances that tend to throw light upon his or her credibility; and, in applying these tests which I have just outlined, it is for you to determine the weight which is to be given to the testimony of each witness.

One of the methods of impeaching or impairing the testimony of a witness is to show that on a material point he has made other, or different, or conflicting statements at some other time or on some other occasion, and this is one of the matters you should take into consideration in determining the credibility of any witness.

There has been some talk about gambling in various aspects in this case. Evidence of gambling activity by  [*21]  certain witnesses has been admitted. While such evidence does not impeach these witnesses, it may be considered by you in reaching a conclusion in respect to the credibility of the witness.

There is a statute of the United States which reads, so far as pertinent here, as follows:

"In the trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against the United States * * * the person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness. His failure to make such a request shall not create any presumption against him."

Mr. Accardo has not testified here. The failure of Mr. Accardo, the defendant, to take the witness stand and testify in his own behalf does not create any presumption against him.

You are instructed that you must not permit that fact to weigh in the slightest degree against Mr. Accardo, nor should this fact enter into your discussions or deliberations in any manner.

You will remember that the government, through its witnesses Harry Kandell and Arthur Hill, and the defendant, through the witness Gordon Winston, offered written summaries and testimony concerning computations prepared by them from exhibits previously received in evidence. The summaries  [*22]  and testimony concerning these computations were offered and are to be considered by you only as an explanation by the witnesses Kandell, Hill and Winston as to what the exhibits previously admitted into evidence show. Those exhibits are controlling, and the testimony of the witnesses Kandell, Hill and Winston pertaining to the computations made by them are to be considered by you merely as a matter of your convenience.

Adverting for a moment to the subject of intent again, I must say to you that the intent required to be proved in order to convict the defendant of the offenses charged in the indictment is the intent of the defendant to wilfully make a knowingly false statement on his 1956, 1957, and 1958 Federal Income Tax Returns, Form 1040, or on any one of them, and I repeat, in substance, that the word "wilfully" means knowingly and intentionally, done with corrupt design or purpose.

Now whether or not an act is done wilfully is a fact which must be determined by reasonable inference established from the facts proved by the evidence. You cannot look into the defendant's mind or open up his head to look and see what his intention was when he allegedly made the statements  [*23]  in question on his 1956, 1957 and 1958 Federal Income Tax Returns. But a careful and intelligent consideration of the facts and circumstances which you find to be proved in the evidence will, I think, enable you to decide what the defendant's intention or intentions were.

You may find from the fact that the defendant signed his income tax returns for the years 1956, 1957, and 1958 that he had knowledge of the contents of his returns.

A defendant may not sign and file a false return - or, I should say, a taxpayer may not sign and file a false return and escape punishment by disclaiming knowledge of what he has sponsored.

Of course he would not be liable for innocent clerical mistakes, but he must be held to know that which it is his duty to know, and it is for you to determine from all the evidence whether the defendant had knowledge of the alleged falsity of the matters set forth in these returns.

Now the word "subscribes" simply means the signing of one's name to a document. During the trial you have seen Federal Income Tax Returns, Forms 1040, for the years 1956, 1957, and 1958, they are in evidence, each bearing the signature Anthony Joseph Accardo.

The fact that  [*24]  an individual's name is signed to a return shall alone be sufficient evidence, until evidence to the contrary is introduced, that the return was actually signed by him.In other words, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the fact that the signature "Anthony J. Accardo" appears on the tax returns in issue in this case creates a presumption that Anthony J. Accardo, the defendant in this case, actually did sign these returns, and that you may so find without further proof.

I have ruled as a matter of law that the U.S. Individual Income Tax Returns, Forms 1040, together with their attached addenda and schedules for the years as I indicated before, 1956, 1957, and 1958, and which have been admitted into evidence, are returns, are tax returns, and are documents within the meaning of 7206(1), Title 26 of the United States Code.

Now you will recall, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that the defendant's income tax returns for the years 1940 through and including 1955 were admitted into evidence, although the defendant is not charged in this indictment with having committed any offense with reference to these returns. I say in respect to these documents, witnesses have testified  [*25]  to events occurring prior to 1956, 1957, and 1958, which, as you know, are the years involved in this indictment. By this I mean to refer to the testimony relating to the nature and source of the items of income appearing in defendant's income tax returns from 1940 through 1955. I also refer to the testimony which you have heard concerning two letters sent to the defendant by the Internal Revenue Service, one in February of 1954 and the other in October of 1955.

The theory upon which this evidence was admitted is that it may bear upon the intent of the defendant. Evidence of this nature, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is only admissible where motive, intent or wilful conduct is in issue, such as it is in this case. You are to consider this evidence only on the issue of motive, intent and wilful conduct, and only insofar as the charges in the three counts of the indictment are concerned. You must disregard such evidence for all other purposes and keep in mind that the defendant is on trial only upon the charges set out in the three counts of the indictment which I summarized to you earlier in my charge. I caution you that the defendant is not charged with having violated  [*26]  the income tax laws for any years other than for the three years charged in the indictment, namely 1956, 1957, and 1958.

Grand jury minutes were used in the questioning of certain witnesses. You may consider in that connection only those questions and answers insofar as they may have tended to impeach the witness in question. You shall not consider them as evidence that any of the facts that were recited were true.

We have on the law books what is known as Section 2 of Title 18 of the United States Code which deals with crimes and criminal procedures. That provides as follows:

"(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.

"(b) Whoever wilfully causes an act to be done which, if directly performed by him or another, would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal."

You will have occasion to consider that statute in your deliberations.

The lawyers, during the trial, in their opening statements, and while they were arguing on objections to question, objections to the introduction of evidence, made certain statements. Of course,  [*27]  their final arguments contained many statements. Some of the statements, you will recall, made by one lawyer were disputed by the other lawyer. I say to you as a matter of law that the statements of the lawyers in the case are not evidence.

Now I think all of you observed during this trial that it became the duty of the lawyers for both sides to object to questions or to object to the introduction of evidence. You shall not take into consideration against either party such objections, or the number of them, nor permit yourselves to be in any way influenced by such objections against either party that may have made them.

There has been some talk here during the trial, some discussion about the amount of money involved in this case.In reaching your verdict as to the guilt or innocence of Mr. Accardo, the defendant, you are instructed that whether or not the government has suffered pecuniary or monetary loss as a result of the alleged false statements, or the amount of such loss, if any, is not an element of the offense or offenses as charged in the three counts of the indictment, and such pecuniary or monetary loss, if any, should be considered by you only in regard to the possible  [*28]  light it may shed upon the motive of the defendant in this case.

During the course of a trial, I occasionally asked questions of a witness in order to bring out facts which I considered were not fully and adequately brought out during the testimony of the witness. I did that on a few occasions during this trial, but I instruct you that you must not assume that I hold any opinion on the matter or matters to which my questions related. Remember at all times that you as jurors are at liberty to disregard all comments of the Court in arriving at your own findings of the facts.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, there was some reference to punishment, possible punishment, by the lawyers, some of the lawyers - one or more of the lawyers - during the discussions today. I say to you that it is your duty to tell the Court by your verdict whether or not the defendant is guilty or not guilty on the one or more counts of the indictment - on one or more of the three counts of the indictment. Under no circumstances are you to consider the matter of punishment. Under the law, that is a matter committed to the attention of the Court alone.

Also you must consider each of the statements which  [*29]  I have made here in this charge, not merely in itself, but as related to all other points covered by the charge. In other words, you must consider what I have said here by way of instructions, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, as a whole.

Now when you retire to the jury room, I shall send with you three forms of verdicts. If you find the defendant not guilty on all three counts of the indictment, you will sign this form of verdict:

"We the jury find the defendant Anthony Joseph Accardo not guilty as charged in the indictment," and the verdict will be signed by the foreman and the other 11 members of the jury.

If you find the defendant Anthony Joseph Accardo guilty on all three counts of the indictment, you will sign this form of verdict:

"We the jury find the defendant Anthony Joseph Accardo guilty as charged in the indictment."

A third form of verdict will go with you to the jury room and that is to be signed only in the event you find the defendant guilty on one and not guilty on two, or guilty on two and not guilty on one - on a third one, and in such instance, in instances such as those, if it comes to pass, if they come to pass, or if such an instance comes to pass,  [*30]  the jury will sign this form of verdict:

"We the jury find the defendant Anthony Joseph Accardo guilty as charged in Count -" then there is a blank form in the verdict where you will insert the count upon which the defendant is found guilty - " - of the indictment, and we find the said defendant not guilty as charged in Count -" - or if it is "Counts," you fill in the blank form there - "- of the indictment."

And, of course, any verdict will be signed by the foreman and the other 11 members of the jury.



* * *



Verdict

"The jury returns the following verdict. We, the jury find the defendant Anthony Joseph Accardo guilty as charged in the indictment."